Why are the Israelis afraid of the raid on Masyaf?

Written by Nasser Kandil,

There are four warnings launched by four important Israeli newspapers as a result of the raid on Masyaf in conjunction with the qualitative military maneuvers on the northern borders. The writers are among the most prominent Israeli analysts of the military and the strategy affairs Zvi Bar’el, Alex Fishman, Yossi Yosha and the Head of the National Security Council Yaakov Amidror. The warnings were distributed between whether the goal of Israel’s entry to the line of formulating new Syrian position was a justification for the increasing of the Iranian presence and the approaching of Hezbollah from the borders as Bar’el said, or that the appreciation of the self-confidence is exaggerated and led to the current Israeli maneuvers, it is a false confidence if we compare between what has happened in 2006 and what might happen in a future war, or that the maneuvers have depended on a war premise; entitled the ground attack of Hezbollah, while what is probable is that Hezbollah will drive Israel into a war inside Lebanon and Syria as Fishman said. The third warning has been launched by Yossi Yosha, he said if the goal as the military and the security leadership was to prevent the facilities provided to Iran to build military qualitative industries in Syria, then the Israeli commitment to the equation of the deterrence with Hezbollah and not targeting it in Lebanon tells the Iranians “go to Lebanon and build your factories there, we will not target them”, while the Head of the National Security Council Yaakov Amidror said to Hayon the Israeli newspaper: Everything is planned and depended on uncertain premise; that the limits of the response of the Syrian President are to prevent us from flying in the Syrian airspaces, but who will guarantee non-responding?

Reading these analyses which some of them praised the Israeli process for  the non-surrender and the insistence to take the initiative is enough to indicate that Israel is worried, confused, and unconfident of the validity and the effectiveness of what it did or the degree of security which it provides. These readings are enough to say that the process is closer to the expression of despair, frustration, and the inability, but nothing is guaranteed, especially in the light of the Russian ambiguity which all the Israeli analyses agree upon, versus the clarity of the Russian deeds and the open support of the Syrian country to achieve its victories on one hand and to refuse to meet any Israeli demand by restricting the presence of Iran and Hezbollah on the other hand.

The scenario was opened by the Israelis, but this time they are unable to control it, it depends as the analysts say on how will the four parties which stand on the opposite bank “Russia, Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah” behave. They are four parties which the Israelis recognize that they are stronger than Israel in Syria and that the Israeli targeting has annoyed all of them, it was a challenge against Russia, a provocation to Iran, and an attack on Syria as the permanent title is the preparation against Hezbollah. What Israel has done practically before the last moments of the end of the war on Syria was to grant Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran a strong argument to say that it is impossible to ensure the stability of any victory or a solution in Syria without deterring Israel which tampers in this stability. This will receive Russian listening, but it is not necessary for Russia to participate in responding to it, but it is enough to understand that and to see it as a part of its vision to ensure the stability in Syria. Just like that the Israelis open a path that will reach at the end of escalation to open the file of Golan and the Israeli occupation instead of opening the file of the presence of Hezbollah in Syria. Maybe Israel will find itself accompanied with a response to the response in front of an escalating confrontation on the borders that will not be halted by a traditional international resolution to return to disengagement and the role of the forces of Andov, but to launch a path that imposes at least its withdrawal from Golan.

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,