Yemen is at the gates of the great victory

Written by Nasser Kandil,

The indicators of the proceeding of the negotiations of the Yemeni teams have become beyond debate and controversy, specially that these negotiations which occurred from the beginning in different conditions of the previous rounds in Geneva, provoked the inquiry about best opportunities for just accepting Kuwait and its Prince of thier hosting and providing additional sponsorship without guarantees from the parties of the negotiations’ success, particularly the Saudi American guarantees of supporting Kuwait to achieve a settlement that meets the acceptance of Al-Houthis, who represent the active party on the opposite bank. But despite the difficult path of the negotiations it seems that the repeated keeping away by the party which is supported by Saudi Arabia has not been translated even once through leaving Kuwait where the negotiations are going on, while it seems that the preparation to ensure ceasing-fire totally is one of the sources of the UN optimism of the success in sponsoring the negotiations towards the solution, however stopping the Saudi raids, and giving the responsibility of observing the ports to the United Nations express a Saudi message of changing the approach which caused the failure of Geneva and which is based on linking stopping the raids with reaching to an understanding through which Al-Houthis are implementing the claims by giving Sanaa and the weapons to the government and the troops of Mansour Hadi, however, this is what Al-Houthis are refusing totally, they do not accept linking stopping the raids with the progress of negotiation, and they do not accept a limit for the negotiation, which means their call for the surrender as they expressed repeatedly in Geneva and Kuwait.

The negotiating track which was going on in vicious circle despite the insistence of not failing, it seems that it is determined with the difficulty of linking between Al-Houthis and their allies of any security arrangements as the search of delivering the cities and the weapons according to the UN resolution which the Saudis and their groups are raising as a ruling basis for the negotiations, and through a political understanding entitled a unified government that paves the way for a new constitution on which presidential and parliamentary elections are based, and between the insistence of the Saudis and their group on the priority of the security arrangements which is stipulated by the UN resolution for proceeding in the political issues, it seemed that compensating the failure with a temporary and topical solution entitled exchanging the arrested and the detainees is not enough, and what has happened of a direct Saudi negotiation with Al-Houthis before moving to Kuwait has reached to the expectations that may suit getting out of the vicious circle, specially that waiting more has become the most dangerous. The Saudis have reached the impasse in their war and what has happened in Taiz and Sanaa militarily according to the narration of the group of Mansour Hadi showed that Al Houthis were having control on the military position and seizing the initiative. In contrast the Saudi war has revived Al-Qaeda organization including its revised version ISIS, but this revival was not spontaneous due to the inability of the Saudis to find a real local strength that stands against Al-Houthis other than Al-Qaeda, the expansion and the rootedness of Al-Qaeda seemed to start foreshadowing of enlarging the territory of Somalia and  its connection with Yemen across the shores of  the Strait of Bab Al Mandeb, Hadramout, and Aden across the Red Sea through the emergence of Al-Qaeda organization in Djibouti and perhaps in Sudan. When Al-Qaeda is going to settle in Sudan it starts to communicate with Libya thus the situation becomes very dangerous, this explains alone the American insistence through the President Barack Obama during his visit to Saudi Arabia at the presence of Kuwait’s Prince on reaching to a solution for the Yemeni crisis by the end of May and early of June.

The most important Yemeni developments on these two days were what was reported by the UN Envoy Ismail Sheikh Ahmed of agreement on forming  a military committee of officers that have not been driven to war, those officers will take over the responsibility of reintegrating the units of the Yemeni army according to the doctrine of combating the terrorism, deploying them in the cities starting from Sanaa and Aden and giving the army corps which are in the hands of the two teams to it gradually, in order to make these units a Yemeni national army nucleus. Thus the talks will continue smoothly about the conditions of the birth of a government of a national unity, which will be the political ceiling for applying the terms of settlement which does not seem that it get matured on regional understandings that are organically linked with the Saudi Iranian understanding which is still far away, but it seems that the Saudi Movement towards the Yemeni solution is an extending of the deadlock in the relationship with Iran, despite the recognition of the failure of the war. This means the acceptance of a government of a partnership that is required by Al Houthis since the beginning and now on, despite the acceptance of the Iranian influence in Yemen that is represented by Al Houthis. Saudi Arabia said that its eradication was its essential reason for the war. Riyadh is behaving on the basis of the separation between the Yemeni and the international requirements for the settlement and between the future of the relation with Iran despite the engagement and the entanglement between them, the Saudi position based on the equation of the political and media escalation with Iran as well as breaking off the relationships with it as an existing policy, not as an outcome of the disagreement over the issues. The breaking off and the hostility allow having control over the Saudi and the Gulf interior on the basis of the hostility and prosecuting anyone who suggests transcending this hostility, while the reconciliation will open the doors which Saudi Arabia is afraid of, even if it is needed, as in Lebanon if the Saudis ask Al Mustaqbal Movement to accept forming a unified government with Hezbollah, so they will do that while they are continuing the hostility language against Iran and Hezbollah, to protect their inner position, after the hostility has surpassed being an outcome of differences, and it became a part of the requirements of the interior immunization as an independent existing policy.

The problem of the Saudis is that they face the equation of the inheriting crises because of their disagreement with Iran and their obligation to accept them after the failed wars, and because the conflict with Iran was not solved yet, as well as their acceptance of the coexistence with partnerships of Iran’s allies, where they push their allies toward as an admission of the failure, without being able to employ these reconciliations to form a framework of regional balance for the bilateral of their relationship with Iran, their biggest problem is that they will discover that the surrounding countries on the area of the region especially which they see it closed in front of Iran’s allies has become an acknowledged partnership, the most important is that Yemen is the vital and regional extension of Saudi Arabia, in which Al Houthis Movement has succeeded in obliging them through a settlement equation to admit of it as an inevitable partner without claiming that they did that due to the requirements of the settlement with Iran, thus the unconfused victory has been achieved in favor of Al Houthis, a pure victory for them as the victory of Hezbollah in the war of July without a direct partnership from Syria or Iran to protect the resistance. As the Israeli era has fallen after the war of July now the Saudi era is falling after the war of Yemen, thus the path of the Yemeni resolution 2216 is integrated in reality with the Lebanese resolution 1701 in terms of the difference between what those who wrote about who applied wanted and for whom was the influence at the end?

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,