The rules of dealing with the decision of war between Tehran and Washington

Written by Nasser Kandil,
Whether the rules of engagement have been reached in determining the nature of the Iranian response to the American aggression which led to the assassination of the two leaders Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis which followed by an American refrainment from any response contrary to its threats or they were mutual calculations made by each of the two parties it is certain that the hypotheses of a settlement that ends the conflict are just an illusion or a big lie in the context of the media propaganda in order to facilitate the situation of the party that fears from the confrontation over its internal situation internationally and regionally, especially after the American despair from reaching to any negotiation of settlement regarding the assassination of Soleimani and after the Iranian leadership raised the ceiling of its political confrontation by raising the slogan of removing the American troops from the region and the liberation from all controls of its nuclear file according to the content of agreement.
It is clear that what had happened prevented the outbreak of war. At the time of the impossibility of getting rid of the opponent or destroying its forces completely, every war becomes a preparation for a political negotiation as a costly war of attrition in which the one who withstands is the one who can bear the consequences and the repercussions more than his opponent, picking the fruits of its steadfastness away from the capabilities of the net military force of the fighting forces. The course of the War of July 2006 on Lebanon And the repetitive wars on Gaza show that ends have been drawn by the equations of the ability to withstand rather than the equations of the ability to destroy.
The first moment of confrontation started when America thought that Iran is unable to bear the challenge of escalation caused by the assassination of Soleimani, since it is in difficult economic conditions and does not have resources for going to war, moreover, its internal arena faces popular protests complaining from the economic situation as the situation of its allies whom their arenas suffer from political division that threatens their ability to share the necessary steps of confrontation with Iran. It is supposed that Iran will live under the pressure of the American deterrence ability and will meet even indirectly Washington’s demands especially the withdrawal from Syria and reducing its support of the resistance movements in preparation for the return to negotiation upon its nuclear file.
The military aspect of any confrontation is governed by the high firepower of the two parties that commensurate with the types of the targets. In order to achieve a fire military balance Iran does not need parallel capabilities to those possessed by America to target the occupation entity and the American bases which are within the range of its missiles. This means that the internal political factor of the two teams resolves the ability to bear the decision of war. The days between the assassination of Soleimani and the Iranian response witnessed what is enough to say that we are in front of two completely opposite interiors; Iranian interior that seeks for war and American interior that screams to avoid it; the Iranian popular and political interior which appeared unified dashing to war and American popular and political interior that is escaping from its divisions.
The Iranian response took into consideration this outcome as a rule to go to war; it spent some of this political and popular balance which appeared that it includes all Iran’s allies, it shows the capabilities that can harm and inflect, but at the same time it works on a long war of attrition that makes use of the American division in favor of an overwhelming majority that refuses it along with a popular opposition waiting for the American electoral time in the coming months. The request of more responses in Iran and its allies is an expression of what the Iranian leadership and the resistance leaders want, since they have not avenged yet, since it is only a first shot, sticking to the equation that you have the right either to withdraw vertically on your feet after taking the appropriate excuses for the decent withdrawal politically or horizontally in coffins, which means to go to war and bearing the consequences. With the increasing of the opposite situations between popular and political on the both sides of engagement, Iran along with its resisting forces put the American presidential scene in the coming months between a president who decided to withdraw so he gets the chance to be-elected or a presidential candidate who comes in the days of war, and he pledges to withdraw and thus be elected.
Translated by Lina Shehadeh,