Albinaa’ Newspaper August 22, 2024
Nasser Kandil
From Al Aqsa Deluge’s first day, U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, was assiduous in affirming his ideological identity in the backdrop of his position of unqualified siding with the occupying entity, which took precedence over his position as Foreign Secretary to the great super power. It appears that on more than one occasion, his negotiation performance and commitment of one error after the next is due to this close adherence to his ideological position. It may be that he has committed the fatal error on his last trip.
In his numerous trips to the area, Blinken’s rounds, under the headline of the dossier of negotiations, were devoted to support the occupation’s position, and the much talked about stages in the famous proposal he presented on his 7th visit in April, became apparent now based on their sequence. Negotiations over enduring pacification in Blinken’s text starts on the 16th day of the 1st stage, but without any mention of what would happen in the event that no agreement is reached, which was the reason Hamas refused the proposal. What followed was CIA Director, William Burns’ arrival in the area as a representative of the American deep state, seeking to prolong the negotiation endeavor. An amended proposal was then crafted stating that the 2nd stage begins with the announcement of the start of enduring pacification and ends with a complete lifting of the blockade, which is the stage which contains the release of the imprisoned live male occupation soldiers and settlers. This was the proposal accepted by Hamas and rejected by Benyamin Netanyahu who insisted on Blinken’s proposal, but the negotiations continued.
Following the dangerous escalation represented by the entity’s attacks on Beirut and Tehran, and the assassination of commanders of the weight of Ismail Hanieh and Fuad Shukr, Washington rushed to issuing a statement asking for the Egyptian President’s and Qatari Emir’s signatures to call for negotiations, knowing that a containment of the escalation was required through a round of negotiations, not aimed at reaching results, but as a political cover to block the determined response of each of Iran and Hezbollah to the Israeli operations. When Hamas declared her refusal to participate in negotiations about a framework supposed to have been definitely decided, based on President Biden’s initiative and UN Security Council Resolution 2735, but her willingness to discuss an implementation plan for this agreement, the negotiations practically became American-Israeli, and the round in Doha was between the Israeli negotiating team and William Burns around Netanyahu’s demands, and despite the talk about it being an American proposal, it was known that the matter was waiting for what Blinken would do with Netanyahu.
With Blinken’s arrival in Tel Aviv, the Israeli negotiating team expected American pressure on Netanyahu for an Israeli agreement by him to a complete withdrawal from Gaza based on the advice of the military and security establishments, which would have created an opportunity for a negotiation breakthrough, in addition to his concession of ending the war as a guarantee for the release of all the prisoners in Gaza. In spite of Netanyahu’s obduracy, everyone was aware that in spite of the size of American protection in the face of the Iranian response, he could not say “no” to the American demand, and in the worst case scenario, Blinken would fail to end the negotiations with the formula he ended them with, announcing that understanding with Netanyahu had been reached, and that the ball is in Hamas’ court to agree to the deal Netanyahu accepted, in order to keep the negotiating game going to serve the aim it was intended for, namely a cover to block Iran and Hezbollah from a response which would confuse the game and disorient it. Blinken’s ideological stance propelled him to identify with Netanyahu and to adopt his approach and include it in what he called, the American proposal, asking Hamas to agree to it.
In effect, Blinken’s statement declared the failure of negotiations and the return to the atmosphere preceding the call inviting for them, with the failure of negotiations opening the doorway to the battlefield, and liberating Iran and Hezbollah from the burden of waiting, in order to give an opportunity, albeit fictional, for the negotiations to succeed, while the ordinary people were waiting for the success of the negotiations which they were hopeful about. Blinken committed the fatal error, which his President was no smarter about and fell into when he stated that Hamas overturned her positons, and did what his Secretary had done by blaming her for the failure. This occurred before both he and Blinken came to a lame realization that the revival of negotiations is what is required to confuse both Iran’s and Hezbollah’s right to respond. Blinken fumbled, and leaks attributed to an American official said that Blinken was disturbed by Netanyahu’s statements about his hardline conditions and spreading the news of Blinken’s agreement to them. Then came Biden’s call with Netanyahu to find a breach to allow the continuation of the negotiation endeavor, by allowing the American to take a step back from Netanyahu’s demands to buy more time. However, the maneuver became too exposed for the dust to successfully cover it up.
