September 19, 2024
Nasser Kandil
Two issues were stirring the curiosity of those following Hezbollah’s Secretary General
Al Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s speech, and which Al Sayyed Nasrallah placed outside of public discussion after he acknowledged with remarkable realism the scale of the blow pointing to its savagery, and its terroristic, criminal, and immoral nature. He placed all information and details about how the entity’s intelligence succeeded in executing such operation outside public discussion, considering it subject to investigation to build on its results, and a security matter specific to Al Mukawama. He handled the response to the blow with similar ambiguity, stating that it would be forthcoming, described it as a severe and just retribution, and held on to the concealment of any hint about when and where, implying it a matter solely pertaining to
Al Mukawama and her milieu, related to avenging the blood shed and punishment for the aggression targeted against them.
He opened for general discussion two issues related to the response and Al Mukawama’s position in the context of confrontation with the entity, namely the link between the southern front and the front in Gaza, given that it is the center of concern for the entity’s leaders and their allies in the West, and the front in the south being the axis around which all efforts and communications revolve, and in parallel, the issue of the return of displaced settlers from the north of occupied Palestine, since it is the title which the entity’s Prime Minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, had chosen for this round of the war.
From Al Sayyed’s speech, Al Mukawama appears at ease with what has been accomplished in terms of containment of the blow, reconditioning in structure, resilience in milieu, and Lebanese unity backing Al Mukawama and its implied authorization to Al Mukawama to respond. For such reasons Al Mukawama has no obligation to furnish a statement of account to anyone, or to try to convince anyone about any intended action. The blow was sufficient to say that south Lebanon’s front is the center of war, despite all the efforts to minimize its importance or saw doubt about it, minimization and doubt which Al Mukawama had exerted a great deal of publicity and political efforts to debate, reaching now the point of no longer being concerned about engaging in such debate. What concerns her is solely her concern, and is not open for discussion. Neither perspective nor how the matter will be dealt will be revealed, and there is no interest in pleasing anyone or in anyone’s skepticism. Since the blow was intended for
Al Mukawama, she is the only party concerned in investigating and identifying details about how the blow occurred, it will not be shared with anyone; and since it was her blood that was shed, anything related to avenging the spilled blood pertains exclusively to her. As for the response, what came was the announcement that Al Mukawama will pursue missions on the front supporting Gaza forcefully, steadfastly, and with determination, because the intention behind the blow was for Al Mukawama’s to go back on such commitment, and the announcement was reinforced by immediate tangible proof in the battlefield.
Al Sayyed Nasrallah captured the entity’s Prime Minster, Benyamin Netanyahu’s, repeated statement that the current goal of military action against Lebanon’s front is returning the displaced settlers, and for that reason military brigades are being moved to that front. Thus the strongest response to the entity and its war is the declaration that those displaced settlers will not return. Al Sayyed then accepted raising the matter with the entity to a challenge of victory or defeat, such that victory for the entity comes with the return of the displaced without an agreement with Gaza, and its defeat and victory for Al Mukawama and Hezbollah is if their return is only enabled by an agreement with Gaza. It is understood that the return of the displaced calls on Hezbollah to stop missile and drone strikes on the depths of occupied Palestine, and for that to occur, Hezbollah should decide on it fearing consequences, such as what the blow exemplified, or for the entity to continue its strikes and impose the return by going to total war.
It was how Al Sayyed Nasrallah deprived Netanyahu of a rapid fiery response by Hezbollah under the pretext of bolstering morale following the blow, which Netanyahu would then take as a launching point for the next step in the escalation. The formula which Al Sayyed proceeded with instead, was no return for the displaced, and translated it with localized escalation in the north of occupied Palestine, forcing the entity to match it, and resulting in increased displacement in the place of return for those already displaced.
Practically, Al Sayyed opens the discussion about the matter of the link between the fronts of south Lebanon and Gaza and the matter of the displaced, and ends general discussion about how the blow occurred, and the nature of vengeance and response. With leaving the defeat of the blow’s clear aims of severing the link between the two fronts and returning the displaced, as the only response open to public discussion, Al Sayyed takes hold of the knife and twists it in the entity’s wounds.
Saying that an agreement in Gaza will take care of a ceasefire on Lebanon’s front and the return the displaced is no longer the discourse of Al Sayyed Nasrallah alone, but has been repeated after him by American President Joe Biden, and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, and UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, with Netanyahu standing alone dreaming of bringing to a standstill Lebanon’s front outside of an agreement with Gaza, and thus securing the return of the displaced without ending the war on Gaza. Al Sayyed here invests growing international and regional climates supporting Al Mukawama’s thesis, and transforms such growth as a legitimate cover for proceeding in his war, adding to it another international climate unable to justify the blow which targeted Lebanon, an Arab supportive climate, and an exceptional unifying climate in Lebanon, all of which Al Sayyed does not want to fritter by rushing to a response by prematurely opening a second step of wide escalation beyond the southern front, saying instead what’s the hurry, and let’s go towards increased displacement and more questions, such as what has the blow brought to the entity except a heinous display of power, and to what end, and how will it return the displaced, and what is the efficacy of the entire war which Netanyahu promises since he does not have a roadmap for freeing the prisoners, unblocking the Red Sea, and returning the displaced?
Should Netanyahu decide on his habitual running forward through a new criminal initiative, Al Mukawama will gain more points and keep its strikes under the ceiling of defense, and the legitimacy of defending cities and Lebanese civilian installations if they are targeted. In the event the strikes are confined to Al Mukawama’s body, the response will be more fire on the north of occupied Palestine, more displaced, and more launching pads, to say that an agreement in Gaza will take care of both a ceasefire on Lebanon’s front and the return of the displaced, contained yesterday evening in the White House’s statement.
