Nasser Kandil
The circulating scenario about the hypothesis of an Israeli attack on Al Mukawama in Lebanon, which contains hypothetical plans for separating the south from Beirut, the south from the Bekaa, Beirut from Damascus, and a surgical operation in southern Syria, reaching the Governorates of Quneitra, As Suwayda, and Daraa to the outskirts of Damascus, is a scenario worth discussing, not because it is realistic, but because of widespread circulation, and political, diplomatic, and media interest in it.
The hypothesized area for the operations according to the circulating scenario is a minimum of 3000 sq. kms and up to 5000 sq. kms, to include Lebanon which is a minimum of 2000 sq. kms, to establish belts of 5-10 kms in depth and a total length of 200 kms between the south and Beirut, the south and the Bekaa, and Beirut and Damascus. A simple calculation will show that the minimum area of operations is 5 times bigger than the area of the Gaza Strip, where the Israeli forces operating there since the beginning of October 2023 have been operating in 200 sq. kms. i.e. 10% of the hypothesized area for the proposed attack on Lebanon, with a force exceeding 100,000 soldiers according to journalist Natheer Majli, based on occupation military and intelligence sources.
What this means is that the minimum number of soldiers required for the minimum hypothesized area of operations is the same number fighting in Gaza since the end of December 2023, according to what Majli wrote in The Middle East Journal “According to military reports in Israeli media, the number of Israelis who have entered Gaza since the land invasion last October, reached about 100,000 soldiers and officers, active duty and reservists.”
The first question is how will the occupation’s military get 100,000 soldiers not handling missions which can’t be set aside to execute an operation of such magnitude, when any time a new stage in the operations in Gaza is announced, it is accompanied with talk about moving forces from the West Bank or the northern front to reinforce forces in Gaza, and meanwhile its forces have been in Gaza for 11 months and have failed to gain control. A glance at the military scene in the field is enough to realize that the fronts there are at the height of activity, rendering it impossible to take away any part of the forces from any of the fronts. The issue here is taking out tens of thousands and not a few hundreds or a few thousands, which would require emptying the West Bank and Gaza of the occupation’s military, whose land forces on active duty originally number 110,000, half of whom are expected to take part in any qualitative operation and to be shored up with reservists, given that the occupation’s army has lost a large number of its professional cadres, with their exit from the battlefield disabling combat units.
So can the West Bank or the Gaza front be left for Al Mukawama to occupy while the hypothetical operation is not more secure or guaranteed from the Gaza operation, and in which the occupation’s forces could be lured into a swamp similar to what has occurred in Gaza, with the operation lasting for months, and Al Mukawama controlling Gaza and the West Bank, the circle of counteroffensives expanding, and reaching the risk of the offensive for partial of complete liberation, or the storming of occupied areas outside of the West Bank and the Strip? If what the entity’s experts discuss about the new challenge from the Jordanian borders and the need to mobilize two companies for protection from security risks is added, the talk about making ready the number required for the hypothetical operation, even by half the proposed size, becomes impossible.
If we compare the combat conditions in the proposed theater of operations with Gaza, we will discover by comparing the topography, the expanse of supposed tunnels, the great number of fighters, their quality, and arsenal on the side of Al Mukawama, along with the limited ability to use destructive power without exposing the entity’s depth to danger, the simple deduction is that exhausting 11 months without goal accomplishment will be equivalent to 11 years in the proposed area of operation without goal achievement. Furthermore, if the Gaza confrontation resulted in 10,000 injured and 3000 dead, the number of dead and wounded is expected to be 5 times as much in a field of operations which is harsher, more prepared and combat ready, and the result will be certain failure. And if there is any fool in the entity talking about such a plan, is there any believing fool outside the entity?
For such hypothesized operation, the occupation will have to break two basic rules of engagement as a condition for success of anticipated attack: the first is strikes on the interior, and the second transcendence of geographical boundaries, with the expected repercussions being geographical and demographic infringement matched with the same, and each transgression suiting its transgressor. The occupation’s military is cognizant that Al Mukawama in Lebanon has prepared plans and organized maneuvers for crossing Palestine’s borders, and has the firepower allowing threat to its residential and civilian depths and vital installations, causing destruction similar to what the entity can cause in Lebanon. Consequently, the start of the hypothetical operation will mean the transformation of a geographical area on both sides of the border in which fighting and defending forces will overlap, with close range combat between soldiers, settlers turning into prisoners, and getting to Acre counterbalancing arrival to the outskirts of Rashaiya and Hasbayyiah.
Have the believers in the hypothetical scenario engaged in a mental exercise comparing the elements of strength and weakness for Al Mukawama and the occupation’s military since 2006, to answer the question about gain in power elements by the occupation which it did not possess in 2006, and losses to Al Mukawama leading to a change in results, or whether the reverse has not occurred, with the occupation losing more power elements and Al Mukawama gaining more of them? A similar question is posed about 1982 and the reason for failure of the Israeli advance to the Syrian borders and cutting the route between Beirut and Damascus whether from Dahr Al Baidar after the advance from Ain Zhalta, and the advance towards the Masnaa area near
Al Sultan Yacoub were halted by combat with the Syrian army that day. Anyone believing that the Syrian army’s combat capabilities then were better than they are today, or that coordination with the Palestinian Mukawama then was better than coordination with Al Mukawama in Lebanon today is mistaken.
Perhaps the withdrawal of the American carriers from the region’s seas says the opposite of what has been rumored about objection to the Israeli operation, and more about that it will not take place, and that talk about it is unrealistic because Washington will not allow Tel Aviv to meet its fate, regardless of the talk about disagreements between them which remain under the ceiling of the realization of their common fate regarding control over the region and the confrontation with Al Mukawama forces.
