October 08, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Some express concerns about the resistance – often stemming from the notion of the historical absence of the supreme leader in Arab resistances and liberation movements- questioning whether the resistance can triumph without Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. On a separate front there is a deliberate campaign that aims to cast doubt on the resistance’s capabilities, driven by a malicious agenda, but their message resonates with those with genuine fears. Sinister plots, however, are not our focus, as their treachery is part of the ongoing war, propagated by Arabs – including Lebanese – who wish to declare resistance’s demise, not the loss of its leader. They openly exploit both his absence and the savagery of the occupation’s war seeking to impose new political dynamics in Lebanon and the Arab world.
• For those sincerely worried about the resistance, a careful examination of the situation in Gaza and decoding the year-long war is useful, especially considering the occupation’s army, backed by American military, technological, and intelligence support, has failed to achieve its goals there. In the war on Gaza the supporting fronts inflicted significant harm on the occupation by creating ongoing dilemmas they couldn’t resolve by sheer force; rather, they are cornered with two choices: escalation, or reaching an agreement with Gaza’s resistance. The latter remains the aim of the supporting fronts for Gaza’s resistance, however the entity chose escalation, as evidenced by its war on Lebanon – backed by unlimited American support. The strategic direction by the supporting fronts, particularly Lebanon’s, is preemptive defence; a mechanism against the imminence of war should the occupation prevail in Gaza. However, this strategic support did not alter the dynamics of the war on Gaza, including the scale of death, and destruction, as well as the many attempts to claim victory over the resistance. Nonetheless, the outcome after a year is that the resistance continues to fight and inflict losses on the occupiers, which is evidenced by the occupying army’s movements, such as when several divisions were deployed together to fight secondary fronts in Khan Younis.
• This summarises the situation in Gaza, despite the destruction of most of its infrastructure and the massive loss of life, in addition to the lack of a leader with the same influence and popularity as Sayyed Nasrallah. However what they do have are truthful commanders, much like the Lebanese resistance in the absence of its leader. This conclusion paints the worst-case scenario for southern Lebanon: the occupation army may succeed in advancing, but it will face fierce resistance, which is undoubtedly stronger and more effective than Gaza’s for several reasons. First, in Lebanon civilians have evacuated the areas under bombardment. While this is a humanitarian tragedy, militarily, it grants the resistance greater mobility and manoeuvrability, unimpeded by civilian presence and suffering under the weight of destruction. Second, the geographical nature of southern Lebanon is many folds larger than Gaza and has ideal terrain for resistance warfare. Third, the presence of an open supply line and a geographical depth extending to Syria and Iraq, ensures continued and effective missile cover. Fourth, the war will be fought by an army already exhausted from a year-long battle in Gaza. Fifth, the resistance has more fighters and better weaponry. Warfare logic dictates that a single month of confrontation under these factors would inflict on the occupation army the same toll as a full year in Gaza, which are figures the entity itself has reported as 10,000 casualties, 2,000 deaths, and 1,000 disabled vehicles. In light of the aforementioned, will this occupying army remain in the south, or will the resistance transition to a stage for liberation, as it did in 2000? Or perhaps transition to a stage that extends beyond liberation?
• Those with genuine concerns over the resistance are also invited to reflect on the July 2006 war, when the image of a great victory led by the resistance’s leader emerged. However it did so under more favourable conditions for the occupation army and far harsher conditions for the resistance, in terms of numbers, equipment, and experience. The legitimate concern today is regarding morale, given the absence of the Sayyed, which is probably what the occupation is counting on in order to change the outcome. Yet the field commanders have shown their presence and capability, as evidenced by the continued and effective missile strikes on northern occupied Palestine. The frontline engagements have displayed a more cohesive and capable structure than what was seen in the July war.
• The question of morale is critical but delicate. It can be gauged from what transpired in the days following the Sayyed’s absence, the most emotionally charged moments. Did those days suggest the fighters were disheartened, or did their loyalty, anger, and desire for vengeance transform into steadfastness on the battlefield, greater fighting spirit on the front lines, and unshakable resolve in the firing of missiles?
• What many fail to recognise is that the resistance’s fighters are following plans laid out by Sayyed Nasrullah, in which he addresses a multitude of hypothetical scenarios. These fighters have decided not to mourn their leader until they succeed in giving him the victory he desires. They hold tight to his teachings – faith, tranquillity, prayer, confidence, and discipline. The magnitude of loss, and the success of the occupation, backed by American support, in inflicting severe damage on the resistance, including its infrastructure, and leadership – culminating in the assassination of its inspiring leader – all of these events – if we were to consider them from a purely practical stance, then we can say that the battles in southern Lebanon present us with a refined, condensed version of the Gaza war and the July 2006 war. As such, these will be days -not weeks- of fighting, that will shape the future of the region and, through it, the world.
