October 19, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Amos Hochstein, the U.S. Presidential Envoy between Lebanon and the occupying entity, is not merely tasked with negotiating gas field shares. He has been closely following the course of the war for an entire year, delivering messages, the latest of which were Israeli threats that provoked Walid Jumblatt, the former leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, who publicly criticised the envoy, stating that a mediator should seek solutions, not convey threats. When Hochstein says, “There must be additions or amendments to the resolution to ensure its implementation”, he isn’t speaking in vain but as a representative of the U.S. presidency. This aligns with President Joe Biden’s statement: “There’s potential for a ceasefire in Lebanon, but it will be harder in Gaza”. It also explains Washington’s retreat from the joint U.S.-French presidential statement, which called for a temporary ceasefire to negotiate the implementation of Resolution 1701 in Lebanon and 2735 in Gaza, bowing to Israeli demands as expressed by the occupying entity’s Defense Minister, who declared, “Negotiations with Lebanon will happen under fire”.
• It’s clear that Resolution 1701 displeases Washington because it displeases Tel Aviv. The resolution was born from Israel’s failure to continue the war in 2006, leading to an interpretation of the deployment of the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL in southern Lebanon without granting UNIFIL the authority it had in the previous version of the ceasefire agreement – a version rejected by Lebanon and the resistance. The intent was to ensure that no weapons were present south of the Litani River, while the resistance committed to no visible armed presence there. This fact is well-known to those who followed the negotiations leading up to the ceasefire. For anyone seeking confirmation, they can refer to the published video of former Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim, who described how the Israelis, after their ground war failed, requested a hasty ceasefire and accepted the conditions set by Lebanon and the resistance.
• The U.S. and Israel now seek to renegotiate the terms of Resolution 1701 and the interpretations of its implementation, betting on a shift in the balance of power that produced the original resolution and its tacitly agreed interpretation. This is the purpose of the current ground war, after the failure of the destructive bombings, assassinations, and strikes that were designed by the U.S. and Israel to crush the resistance. Yet, the resistance surprised them by standing firm, rising to its feet, crafting heroic battles in the ground war, and successfully establishing firepower balances deep into the occupying entity, with the equation ‘Haifa is like Kiryat Shmona’ and operations like that of Binyamina. Therefore, it appears that the ceasefire itself is a subject of negotiation under fire, as reflected in the overlapping statements from Gallant, Hochstein, and Biden. This implies that those who seek to implement Resolution 1701 must also support a ceasefire to negotiate its mechanisms. They must also question whether it’s possible to reconcile this position with Washington’s role in imposing a ceasefire, as those who want to amend Resolution 1701 are, in fact, advocating for negotiation under fire.
• The same dynamic is at play in Gaza, as evidenced by the announcement of President Joe Biden’s initiative, which was accepted by the resistance but derailed due to amendments proposed by the occupying entity under the formula of negotiating under fire. The initiative’s author then adjusted it to suit the occupier, again under the premise of negotiating under fire, while the resistance continued to hold fast to the initiative because it prioritises a ceasefire. Meanwhile, the joint U.S.-French presidential statement calling for a ceasefire to negotiate Resolutions 1701 and 2735 was discarded, as it conflicted with the framework of negotiation under fire, even though Washington had secured the endorsement of ten Western and Arab nations.
• This all points to one conclusion: the steadfastness of the resistance on the frontlines will be the determining factor in ensuring the implementation of Resolution 1701 and prioritising a ceasefire. The question now is whether the Lebanese advocates of Resolution 1701 understand this reality.
