Complementary, Not Identical: The Military and Diplomatic Strategies

October 22, 2024

Nasser Kandil

• As the 2006 July War and everything preceding it have shown, the military strategy of the resistance, led by Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, the martyr Hassan Nasrallah since 1992, works in harmony with the diplomatic strategy managed by Speaker Nabih Berri. Together, they form a cohesive symphony, though each plays a different instrument and follows a different score. Yet, the final note is the desired musical outcome, one that would be incomplete without each player fulfilling their role. To use a comparison, this division of roles mirrors that of the Americans and Israelis. The Americans put on their diplomatic hat when one of two things happens: either the occupation achieves a military victory that requires political translation, in which case they speak the language of preventing harm to Lebanon or Gaza – or wherever the front line may be – and propose a political solution that is, in reality, the price the occupation seeks for halting the war; or, the occupation faces setbacks, failures, or an inability to meet its goals. Here, the Americans step in, seeking an exit strategy that salvages face, even if they start by attempting to extract a political price for the occupation’s military failures. When the occupation finds itself cornered, the Americans retreat under the guise of pursuing stability and respecting international law.

• In the current confrontation, the resistance is conducting the war under goals distinct from those of the diplomatic battle. The resistance’s statements about delegating authority to President Berri and accepting the priority of a ceasefire are the last we will hear from them on diplomatic matters. From now on, the resistance will focus on the battlefield, unconcerned with the diplomatic arena. Their priority is inflicting the maximum possible losses on the occupation, pushing it to despair and breaking its hopes of achieving any victories. This is the essence of the resistance’s strategy to cause pain to the occupier. In this context, the resistance might even allow the occupying army to advance, not to retreat but to ambush and deliver fatal blows, as seen in recent battles along the border. Meanwhile, the resistance’s missiles and drones strike deep into the entity’s territory, covering northern occupied Palestine, damaging the core of the entity’s security doctrine, and eroding confidence in the occupation’s ability to provide safety for its institutions and settlers, weakening the will to continue the war.

• On the diplomatic front, however, the situation is different. The entity can no longer coexist with a powerful, armed resistance at its border, one that is willing to set aside the rules of engagement and open fire across the border when it sees fit, as it did on October 8 under the banner of the “support front”. The resistance also targets settler security, causing evacuations, in service of Gaza’s support front, and may find similar reasons in the future. The entity’s position is clear: the dismantling of the resistance, the occupation of more land, and control over the skies are now considered essential guarantees for its strategic security. This means that while the entity might have accepted a ceasefire with Lebanon months ago, it can no longer do so without altering the strategic balance with the resistance and shifting the power dynamics along the border. This shift has become an official commitment and public plan after the perceived successes of the occupation’s recent strikes against the resistance, which have convinced them of the plan’s feasibility.

• At this stage of the war, the diplomatic strategy no longer hinges on linking the front with Gaza, given that the entity is unwilling to ceasefire without achieving its core goal of dismantling Resolution 1701. Why should Lebanon grant legitimacy to its war by linking its front to Gaza’s? Therefore, the diplomatic strategy now revolves around the dual focus of enforcing a ceasefire and implementing Resolution 1701. This forces the occupation to coexist with an armed resistance at the border, a defeat reminiscent of accepting Gaza’s resistance conditions. The occupation must take responsibility for undermining Resolution 1701 and refusing a ceasefire. The diplomatic strategy thus ensures that as long as the war continues, the occupation remains delegitimize, facing refusals of both the ceasefire and the implementation of 1701. At the same time, the resistance need not openly declare that it has severed its link with Gaza’s front, as its focus is elsewhere – on defeating the occupation’s military objectives on the battlefield. This prevents the Americans from capitalising on any perceived Israeli military achievements and forces them to intervene only when the occupation has lost hope of success, with the cost of war outweighing its benefits, and the price of continuing the war exceeding that of ending it.

• In its tactics, the resistance retains the flexibility to lure the occupying forces into advancing and then strike back. Diplomatically, the same flexibility exists, using calls for a ceasefire and implementing Resolution 1701 to trap the occupation in its escalation, just as the military pressure on the ground tightens around it. The goal is to corner the occupation in both arenas, culminating in a victory akin to that achieved in the 2006 July War – a resounding success on all fronts.