October 24, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Israel’s Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, speaking to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, declared, “Even after the operation in Lebanon ends, we will continue targeting Hezbollah until they withdraw beyond the Litani River and the northern residents return”. This statement warrants deep reflection on its implications, feasibility, and how the resistance might respond.
• Gallant, who has been the architect of the war on Lebanon since October 11, 2023, aims to dismantle Hezbollah’s combat structure and eliminate the threat of an assault by the resistance. According to an official statement from the Israeli army, Hezbollah has mobilised 3,000 fighters along the border for an incursion resembling the Al-Aqsa Flood. Gallant also mobilised six divisions for the ground operation – essentially the entire Israeli army – given the ongoing war in Gaza and the West Bank, which Israel cannot afford to neglect. His remarks were made in front of a strategic ally whose presidential envoy had come to gauge Lebanon’s willingness to accept modifications to Resolution 1701, potentially granting Israeli forces security privileges at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty, in exchange for halting the war. But what exactly did Gallant say, and what did he mean?
• Gallant laid out a series of sequential stages: stopping the ground operation, continuing to target Hezbollah, forcing Hezbollah to withdraw beyond the Litani, and the return of the northern residents. Before assessing the realism of these objectives, it’s crucial to note the primary message here: the halting of the ground operation, which is the headline. The cessation is clear, and the discussion is now about what comes next – Gallant’s phrase “even after the ground operation ends” implies that this halt is a settled matter, even if it hasn’t yet occurred. But this withdrawal of ground forces will happen without achieving the goals of returning the northern residents or pushing Hezbollah beyond the Litani, and without securing security privileges for the Israeli army in a potential agreement with Lebanon – an agreement Lebanon was expected to accept to end the ground operation, which will now stop of its own accord.
So why is the ground operation stopping? What has it accomplished if the next phase reverts to relying on long-range firepower, which had previously failed to achieve its objectives? This strategy nearly triggered a northern “Al-Aqsa Flood” akin to the southern one on October 7, 2023, making the ground operation an inevitable response to both the failure of remote strikes to force Hezbollah to retreat and the looming threat of a northern onslaught.
• Gallant’s words are a tacit admission of the failure of the ground operation and, more significantly, the inability to sustain any long-term ground presence in Lebanon, given the heavy losses inflicted by the resistance over three consecutive weeks. The resistance’s operations room reported 70 Israeli soldiers killed, 600 wounded, and 28 tanks destroyed – casualties comparable to the July 2006 war. More than 33 days have passed since the conflict escalated on September 17, making the need to discuss post-operation phases, as Gallant suggested, urgent. But if a decision to end the war and revert to the pre-existing border dynamics hasn’t matured, and Israel’s military and political leadership remain unable to publicly admit defeat, they are stuck seeking a traditional framework to justify an exit from the war – a plan that is illogical and unconvincing.
The ground war was never the preferred option for the Israeli army or government, despite all the bluster and threats, precisely due to the fear of failure. It became a necessary step after claims of having neutralised the resistance and its capabilities, but those claims did not translate into a halt in rocket fire on northern settlements. The pressure mounted for an alternative to relying on firepower alone, especially as the rockets increased in number, range, and strength. How can anyone believe that returning to firepower, which had already failed to subdue the resistance and stop its rockets, is now a viable alternative to the failure of the ground operation?
• In practice, when Gallant, speaking for the Israeli army and government, admits the failure of the ground operation by discussing what follows it, he is also acknowledging the failure of the entire war. The ground operation was the lifeline for Israel’s army and government after the failure of firepower to provide security, suppress the resistance, and stop its rockets. What Israel’s army, government, and people have witnessed since the beginning of the ground operation in terms of resistance firepower exceeded their expectations – from the Binyamina operation to Caesarea, Haifa, and beyond. Returning to firepower alone will only escalate the resistance’s counterfire. Furthermore, stopping the ground operation does not obligate the resistance to reciprocate, especially since Gallant himself stated that the ground invasion was to prevent a Hezbollah incursion similar to the Al-Aqsa Flood. Gallant may try to justify ending the ground operation by claiming success in preventing an incursion, but this would only underscore the failure.
• The real question is whether Gallant truly believes that continuing airstrikes will force Hezbollah to withdraw beyond the Litani when his army couldn’t achieve that with ground forces. Is this a recipe for the return of displaced northern settlers, or rather an invitation for further displacement, as Sayed Hassan Nasrallah previously warned?
