October 31, 2024
By Nasser Kandil
• A pressing question frequently posed to the Lebanese resistance is whether it would agree to separate the Lebanese and Gaza fronts, implementing a ceasefire in Lebanon while war rages on in Gaza – contrary to the resistance’s stated commitment that any ceasefire on the Lebanese front should be contingent upon ending the war in Gaza.
• Lebanon has endured intense assaults aimed at dismantling the resistance, coupled with a full-scale war declaration from the occupying army, seeking to impose political and security conditions on Lebanon unrelated to supporting Gaza from Lebanon. This situation has compelled the resistance to adapt its tactics, though its core strategy and commitment to Gaza remain unwavering.
• The Lebanese resistance has ample reason to believe that the occupier cannot accept a ceasefire on the Lebanese front without securing strategic gains that go beyond its war path in Gaza. Chief among these ambitions, as expressed by occupying entity leaders, is amending Resolution 1701 to grant them authority for ground pursuits against the resistance within Lebanese territory, while disregarding their ongoing occupation of Lebanese land and continued violations of Lebanese airspace and waters under the pretext of “security needs” and “ensuring disarmament of the resistance”. Such aspirations open an opportunity for the resistance to rally broad Lebanese support to defend national sovereignty under the framework of a ceasefire and Resolution 1701, unmodified. The resistance’s alignment under this framework rests on a clear understanding: the occupying entity cannot accept it without force. Its heavy investment in the war on Lebanon and the substantial costs it has incurred – through ground warfare and attacks on the resistance’s depth using rockets and drones – make it unlikely to retreat without extracting gains over Lebanon’s sovereignty unless compelled to do so by defeat.
• If the occupier is forced to accept a ceasefire and Resolution 1701 without modification, guaranteeing its withdrawal from occupied Lebanese lands and halting its violations of Lebanese airspace and waters, it cannot continue its war in Gaza. The question of prisoners will also arise, and the occupier must answer: why would it accept ending the war in Lebanon without concessions despite losses, while continuing the war in Gaza, where prisoners are at risk?
• If the occupier were in a position of strength, it would likely persist in its war against Lebanon. However, should it find itself weakened, it would cease its campaigns in both Lebanon and Gaza with minimal losses, ideally starting with Gaza. Gaza exists outside the United Nations’ purview and within an exclusively American framework; if a ceasefire is brokered there, it could set a precedent for a wider cessation of hostilities on all fronts.
• The resistance, as stated consistently by its leaders, stands firmly with Gaza. It is not obligated to explain in detail how this support will manifest. As long as the war continues on both fronts, there is no reason for concern. Should anyone witness a ceasefire in Lebanon without one in Gaza, they should then ask the resistance: “How did this happen?”
