November 15, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• The leaders of the occupying entity sense the depth of their predicament in attempting to conclude the war on Lebanon through negotiations. Accepting the implementation of Resolution 1701 would deny them the de facto gains acquired over 18 years – gains manifested in the free exploitation of Lebanese airspace and waters, and the refusal to withdraw from strategic sites like the Shebaa Farms, even for a transfer to UNIFIL control. This trio – the skies, seas, and farms – forms the backbone of any future war the occupiers may wage when the circumstances are more favourable for eradicating the resistance as they are failing to achieve this aim in the current war.
• Achieving a negotiated success to legitimise these transgressions requires amending Resolution 1701 through force, embedding facts on the ground that would lend strength to such a demand. The occupiers remember that similar demands, which had been attached to the May 17, 1983, agreement as security annexes, were never realised; resistance forces established an internal balance that nullified the agreement in under a year, preventing its ratification. At that time, the occupier stood at Beirut’s gates, holding over a third of Lebanon’s territory. The U.S. presence, through Marine forces at Beirut’s airport, and the loyalty of Lebanon’s political and military leadership to the U.S. and Israel, did not suffice to seal the agreement. How can they succeed now, facing a resistance that far surpasses its former capabilities?
• The focus appears to be on one pivotal demand – a potentially substantial gain if achieved, while ignoring unattainable ones: the imposition of international oversight on the Lebanese-Syrian border. This demand traces back to the 1982 invasion’s failure to reach this border, halted by fierce battles with the Syrian army, most notably at Sultan Yacoub, which thwarted Israeli advancement. In 1987, Ehud Barak, then Chief of Staff of the occupier’s army, wrote in Haaretz that the forced withdrawals constituted a deferred comprehensive retreat, as long as Syria remained a supply depth for the resistance. He acknowledged that withdrawing from one area would lead to subsequent withdrawals elsewhere.
• This recognition of Syria’s strategic depth in the occupier’s perspective is reflected in ongoing attacks targeting the border and both formal and informal crossings north and eastward, including smuggler and agricultural routes. Western and U.S. efforts to enforce international surveillance of the border, though initially unsuccessful in amending Resolution 1701, have persisted under various guises. When the war on Syria began, Israeli attacks within Syria were often justified as efforts to cut off the resistance’s supply line. Not surprisingly, the current intense pressure on Lebanon to accept terms for a new agreement is mirrored by a simultaneous escalation against Syria, as well as a probing of Russia’s willingness to engage as a partner in border monitoring in exchange for shared oversight. However, Russian Presidential Envoy Alexander Lavrentiev recently dispelled rumours of this arrangement, affirming Syria’s exclusive sovereign control over these matters.
• The resistance, having fought to defend Syria, has consistently acknowledged Syria as its backbone and support, viewing the defence of this ally as crucial to securing its own rear. As the occupier attempted to leverage the war on Syria to curb resistance supplies, the resistance, in turn, has reciprocated in kind. Yet, the issue of the border extends beyond logistical support; Western interest in the border is strategic, reflecting a desire to restore the divisions established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement a century ago.
The recent moves to back Gaza’s resistance and the prior defence of Syria are statements defying this separation. Meanwhile, the Lebanese-Syrian relationship, described as “distinctive” in the Taif Agreement, was constitutionally formalised by a treaty but subsequently frozen due to U.S.-imposed shifts in Lebanon’s direction. Washington and Western capitals now view this relationship as one warranting perpetual monitoring, seeking to impose a “cold separation” politically, economically, and militarily. This extends to pressuring Lebanon to take hostile actions against Syria, such as internationalising the border without Syrian consent – contravening the legal norms governing state relations.
• The battle to eliminate the resistance ended in abject failure, as evidenced by Benjamin Netanyahu’s shift in war objectives to merely pushing the resistance behind the Litani River – a correction to his Defense Minister’s reckless statement about aiming to annihilate Hezbollah. The new battlefront now is the Lebanese-Syrian border.
