November 21, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• A dominant narrative persists among many, asserting that the agreement under negotiation is one that ends with Hezbollah’s disarmament, beginning with its withdrawal from the south. It is painted as an agreement marking the defeat of the resistance, forcing it to save itself from annihilation by accepting Israeli conditions: granting Israel operational freedom in Lebanon, restructuring the Lebanese state under American tutelage, starting with a president chosen to align with this vision. Confronting such deeply entrenched narratives is far more demanding than simply waiting a few days for the fog of negotiations to clear and the reality to emerge. Betting on their collapse under their own weight is far less costly than engaging in fruitless debate.
• The situation boils down to two possibilities: either the negotiations succeed in producing an agreement, or they fail. Failure is likely if the leadership of the occupying entity fails to recognise that it has lost the war, its army is incapable of achieving results on the battlefield, and the resistance is advancing to a new phase of missile and drone warfare, putting the enemy’s depth under fire. This aligns with the equation previously established by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and reiterated by Sheikh Naim Qassem: Tel Aviv for Beirut. If the occupying leadership remains trapped in its bubble of superiority and illusions that it can cling to demands like Hezbollah’s withdrawal from south of the Litani River before its army withdraws beyond the international border, retaining air control over Lebanon under the pretext of monitoring Hezbollah’s rebuilding efforts, and asserting the right to intervene militarily under the guise of self-defence, no agreement will be reached.
This reality has not escaped U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, who understands that every reconnaissance flight over Lebanon by the occupation will be mirrored by resistance reconnaissance flights over occupied Palestine.
• A failure in negotiations would return matters to the battlefield, necessitating new tests of strength. Historically, regular armies peak in performance in the early stages of a war, while resistance movements gain strength gradually, avoiding fatal blows early on and transitioning to a prolonged war of attrition.
As the occupying army disperses and stabilises its positions, the resistance will intensify its direct attacks and ambushes, inflicting ever-heavier losses. This dynamic has been unfolding in southern Lebanon for two months. Should negotiations fail, the resistance is poised to escalate its operations having already withstood the most severe blows. Well-prepared for a prolonged war of attrition, the resistance is capable of targeting the entity’s depth, including Tel Aviv, to pressure the enemy into a ceasefire and a return to negotiations under new terms.
• If the negotiations succeed, they would strictly implement Resolution 1701, requiring the occupation’s withdrawal from the international border, starting with Al-Ghajar, and ending air and maritime violations. In return, the resistance would withdraw its regular units and heavy weaponry beyond the Litani River, with the remaining border disputes resolved and Shebaa Farms handed over to UNIFIL. However, Hezbollah’s weapons would continue to align with the doctrine of ‘The People, the Army, and the Resistance’, until a comprehensive national defence strategy emerges. As long as the U.S. restricts Lebanon’s military capabilities and prevents it from acquiring deterrent weaponry, the resistance remains the only viable answer to protecting Lebanon – unless someone can suggest an alternative?
• The claim that this marks the end of the unity of battlefronts is premature. Failure in negotiations would mean the continuation of the war, thereby sustaining the functional role of the support front. Success in negotiations, on the other hand, would signify the collapse of the occupying army and the entity’s leadership conceding defeat, leaving them unable to shift their focus to Gaza. Instead, they may be compelled to seek a resolution in Gaza alongside broader concessions, such as halting violations of Lebanese airspace, withdrawing from occupied territories, and postponing discussions on Hezbollah’s disarmament.
The evolving nature of resistance weaponry since 2006 – missiles and drones with ranges spanning hundreds of kilometres – has rendered obsolete the notion that disarmament equates to reduced deterrence. The price the entity pays for ending the war in Lebanon is accepting coexistence with the resistance’s arsenal.
Thus, any agreement with Gaza could pave the way for a broader ceasefire across all fronts, leaving future negotiations open-ended.
