November 25, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• After two weeks of devastating strikes that began on September 17 with the detonation of pager devices, followed two days later by the destruction of wireless communication systems – causing 4,000 casualties among the resistance’s ranks – came a climactic attack on September 30. This attack targeted the southern suburbs of the capital, as well as the South and Bekaa regions, resulting in 700 deaths and 3,000 injuries within the resistance’s community. The pinnacle of these events occurred on September 27 with the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, preceded and followed by the targeted assassinations of key military leaders and influential field commanders. Fifty-five days ago, the occupying entity launched its ground war, mobilising five divisions – comprising the bulk of its combat-ready forces – despite branding it a “limited operation”.
• The ground war has been accompanied by campaigns of destruction and deep strikes into Lebanon. Airstrikes repeatedly unleashed massacres and widespread devastation across the Bekaa, South, and the southern suburbs of Beirut, extending to the capital itself on several occasions. The overarching objective of this all-encompassing war has been to achieve a decisive military breakthrough: halting the resistance’s missile capabilities and facilitating the return of displaced settlers in the north. Alternatively, the goal is to secure political gains that ensure the occupying entity’s control over security in southern Lebanon and its influence over Lebanon’s interior, enabling sustained targeting of Hezbollah’s infrastructure, preventing its armament, neutralising its precision missiles, and placing its weaponry on the agenda of Lebanese and international negotiations.
• This strategy could include implementing an “innovative” interpretation of Resolution 1701, allowing the occupying entity to retain Lebanese territories – foremost among them the Shebaa Farms – as leverage for future operations. It also seeks to preserve freedom of movement in Lebanese airspace under the pretext of monitoring resistance armament and verifying compliance with disarmament. Ideally, international oversight of the Lebanese-Syrian border would also be established. In all scenarios, the occupying entity aims to maintain the capacity for preemptive and retaliatory actions against any perceived threats to its security.
• In a politically calculated move, the resistance announced a few days into the ground war its support for Speaker Nabih Berri’s initiative, endorsed by several prominent leaders, to forge a near-consensus among Lebanese factions under the banner of a ceasefire and the implementation of Resolution 1701. The U.S. mediation efforts, led by Amos Hochstein, sought to explore avenues for accommodating the occupying entity’s demands within the framework of Resolution 1701, either through amendments, bilateral or trilateral side agreements, or other mechanisms. For Washington – whether under Democratic or Republican leadership – the goal has always been twofold: to ensure diplomatic efforts either capitalise on the occupying entity’s dominance or mitigate its losses when prolonged conflict becomes untenable.
• Through two visits by Hochstein, it became evident that Lebanon’s interpretation of Resolution 1701 is firmly grounded and non-negotiable, rejecting any concessions that would grant the occupying entity freedom of movement, territorial retention, or control over Lebanese airspace. The occupying entity was thus left with two options: either demonstrate its ability to achieve significant battlefield gains through overwhelming strikes and territorial advances or lower its demands in accordance with the realities on the ground. It chose both paths, intensifying its firepower and ground operations while ambiguously framing its demands, such as the right to “self-defence” and establishing U.S.-led oversight committees. Yet, none of this altered the position in Beirut.
• Yesterday marked the 55th day of the ground war, during which the resistance delivered a decisive response. In a single day, it destroyed ten Merkava tanks and launched over 400 rockets – half targeting the ground front and occupation forces along both sides of the border, and the other half striking deep into the occupying entity, including Tel Aviv, in retaliation for attacks on Beirut. Through this, the resistance defined the trajectory of the coming days: either the implementation of Resolution 1701 in a manner that restores Lebanese sovereignty and undoes gains unlawfully seized by the occupying entity since October 7, or the continuation of a war in which the occupying entity has no hope of improving its position.
The resistance, which has thus far shown only a fraction of its strength, signalled that it stands ready for escalation. Perhaps the occupying entity might consider a third option: a return to the Gaza agreement, which would entail a ceasefire across all fronts – Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon – without requiring further commitments, effectively reverting to the pre-October 7 status quo.
