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Who Will Raise the Red Card Against Erdogan?

Dotting i’s and Crossing t’s

December 06, 2024


 

Nasser Kandil

• The narrative surrounding an attack by armed groups opposing the Syrian state, led by Jabhat al-Nusra, appears to obscure the reality of what is happening. While emphasising the American and Israeli roles in orchestrating, sponsoring, and exploiting the assault is essential to highlight its purpose and beneficiaries, stopping there would evade confronting the harsh truth: this attack is spearheaded by Turkey, utilising its army, intelligence, and military, financial, and human resources. Syria alone cannot counter this. Turkey’s overt official statements openly embracing and capitalising on the operation leave no room for doubt, especially as it coincides with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s transition to power, amid plans for an American withdrawal from Syria, abandonment of Kurdish armed groups, and a pivot toward granting Russia the lead in counterterrorism and political solutions. Turkey’s clear objective is to court Trump by undertaking the task Russian President Vladimir Putin has avoided, which is securing Israeli interests in Syria, particularly by severing supply routes to resistance forces, especially Hezbollah.

• Iran’s focus on Syria is not about expanding influence or defending gains. Tehran cannot afford to be passive, as everything is at stake. Syria is the strategic fortress of Iranian national security. Erdogan’s project, supported by American and Israeli conditions, hinges on excluding Iran, cutting off resistance supply routes, isolating Iran from Palestine, and igniting sectarian strife in the region. This would escalate into civil war in Iraq and revive terrorist groups, whose rhetoric already targets Iran as a primary enemy. Therefore, Iran’s leadership must adopt a strategic approach reminiscent of the late General Qassem Soleimani before the 2015 Aleppo battle. Soleimani’s appeal to Moscow emphasised the necessity of collaboration to secure victory in Syria, even at the risk of provoking Washington to abandon the newly signed nuclear agreement. As Supreme Leader Khamenei later explained, the stakes of Syria’s victory extend to Tehran’s survival – failure to fight in Damascus would mean fighting in Mashhad. Iran’s challenge is not choosing between resistance against Israel and bolstering Syria but achieving victory in Syria to defeat the Israeli project, which Turkey’s aggression seeks to rescue after its failures in Gaza and Lebanon. Will Iran raise the red card against Turkey and force Erdogan to choose between allying with Nusra or Iran?

• Russia, entrenched in a brutal war in Ukraine where the U.S. and Europe funnel money and weapons, understands that even a victory in Ukraine might secure a prominent role in Europe but will not cement its status as a global superpower – something Syria has accomplished for Moscow. Moreover, many of Erdogan’s fighters hail from former Soviet republics, and their success could ignite Russia’s neighborhood, posing existential security threats. As Putin acknowledged during Syria’s early war years, Moscow’s security begins in Damascus. Ukraine’s involvement in preparing and coordinating Turkey’s offensive underscores the stakes: a Turkish-Ukrainian alliance could encircle Russia if Erdogan prevails in Syria. Therefore, Russia’s global stature and success in Ukraine hinge on an unprecedented level of support for Syria – not just militarily but also politically. The moment has arrived for Moscow to confront Turkey with a clear choice: align with Russia or Nusra.

• Arab states’ positive rhetoric toward Syria and counterterrorism, in stark contrast to their earlier stance, does not diminish the scale of the new challenge. Despite most Arab regimes’ ties to Washington, their reluctance to confront Tel Aviv, and some illusions about coexisting with a transformed Syria, a Turkish-backed Nusra victory would reshape the region. Iraq’s balance of power would unravel, with Nusra-inspired groups rising under Turkey’s ambitions to annex Mosul and Kirkuk. Similarly, Jordan would face regime destabilisation, paving the way for the “alternative Palestinian homeland” project. Egypt could not avoid the resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to unending chaos. The domino effect’s trajectory depends on Syria’s map – those who think supporting Syria is optional are mistaken. Defending their nations’ stability starts with raising the red card against Erdogan, who has invested heavily in normalising ties with Arab states. He must understand these relations cannot continue unless he reconsiders his war on Syria.

• Some may be deceived by the soft language of Nusra’s leader toward Arab governments or sectarian and social components. This calculated rhetoric aims to expand and consolidate influence, after which the blade will return. Lebanese individuals rejoicing over Syria’s events should pause and rethink their stance.

• On a side note, it is bizarre that Nusra’s defenders, who describe it as a “Syrian popular movement”, shamelessly claim on Arab satellite channels that its rapid advance stems from Israel’s wars against the resistance axis – wars in which Nusra has remained silent. Moments later, they don the analyst’s hat to comment on Gaza’s resistance.

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