December 07, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Over the 13 years of the Syrian war, the landscape of participants has shifted significantly. Arab states, European countries, and many others have renewed their ties with Damascus, while the U.S., “Israel”, Turkey, Qatar, and Britain continue to engage in the war. An examination of the war’s trajectory – during the past few years and now, reveals its distinctly Turkish character. Without Turkey, other actors would have been unable to pose a significant threat to Syria’s sovereignty, security, and unity. A closer analysis of the forces currently fighting and those that have fought throughout the war demonstrates that, without Turkey’s geographic, military, and intelligence support, these groups could not have established organised, professional, and well-funded military structures. This becomes even more evident when considering Turkish President Recep Erdogan’s rhetoric – referring to an “opposition offensive”, and addressing it as a shepherd, Godfather, supervisor and leader, framing its destination as Damascus, and expressing hope it does not encounter obstacles.
It is the same Turkey whose president, Recep Erdogan, justified his failure to uphold a clear provision of the Astana Agreement, which required dismantling terrorist organisations, including the one at the forefront of what Erdogan refers to as the “opposition offensive” This group – formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, now rebranded as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, led by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, whose real name is Ahmad al-Sharaa – is not composed of Syrians. Erdogan himself admitted that its strength lies in more than 50,000 foreign fighters, who have no Syrian reformist demands but instead adhere to a global agenda: establishing an authority under the guise of an international Islamic project. This agenda does not provoke the U.S. or “Israel” because Turkey guarantees its alignment with their interests. The goal is to transform Syria from a state of independence and resistance into one of subservience and normalisation.
During the recent offensive, several figures from this group appeared on Hebrew channels, succinctly summarising their position. Addressing Israelis, they declared, “Our enemies are the same: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah, and Iran”. Over 14 months of massacres in Gaza, these groups did nothing to challenge this claim; not a single drone targeted Haifa in solidarity with Gaza, despite the thousands of strikes they launched on Syrian army positions in Aleppo and Hama.
• Erdogan arrogantly framed the offensive as punishment for President Assad’s refusal to attend a Turkish-Syrian summit. Some question if the Syrian President should have agreed to the summit, but the more appropriate question is why previous efforts to establish a roadmap for Syrian-Turkish reconciliation failed, despite high-level meetings involving foreign ministers, defense ministers, chiefs of staff, and intelligence heads from both sides. During these engagements, Syria offered constructive positions addressing Turkey’s Kurdish concerns but could not secure clear commitments from Turkey beyond Erdogan’s empty rhetoric and repetitive assertion of supporting Syria’s unity and sovereignty. Syria sought a tangible timeline for Turkey’s withdrawal from its territory, synchronised with dismantling terrorist groups in the northwest and Kurdish cantons in the northeast. Syria was ready to act on its commitments, including the use of force, but Turkey offered only rhetorical assurances and deferred substantive discussions to a potential leaders’ summit. For Syria, whose territories are occupied by Turkey, such a summit would risk legitimising the occupation. Erdogan’s current sponsorship of the offensive underscores the correctness of President Assad’s stance.
The second concern that has emerged is regarding the depth of Russian and Iranian support for Syria. Both nations recognise that allowing Syria to fall would have severe consequences. For Russia, it would mean losing its foothold on Syria’s coast and facing local backlash for abandoning the country. For Iran, the loss of Syria would reduce it to a mere corridor between the Gulf and Central Asia, forfeiting its regional leadership as a champion of resistance and Palestine.
In practice, both Moscow and Tehran are fully committed. Russia spares no effort in providing military support, while Iran is mobilising resources and allies to bolster Syria. Hezbollah has already taken decisive action, reaffirming its unwavering support.
• The third concern being raised is whether Syria, with its allies, can withstand the immense challenges it currently faces. The answer lies in the dynamics at play. The ‘New Middle East’ project hinges on Syria. After Israel’s failures in Lebanon and Gaza, only a decisive victory – such as toppling Syria – could alter the regional balance.
However, the anti-Syria coalition has fractured, with most Arab and European states withdrawing. Syria has learned from past battles and understands the consequences of allowing Turkish-backed groups to take control, especially in light of ‘Turkification’ efforts in Idlib, including changes to curricula, telecommunications, and currency. Neighboring Iraq and Jordan recognise that Syria’s collapse would destabilise their own borders, while Egypt and the Gulf states fear the resurgence of Turkey-hosted extremist groups.
Importantly, the Syrian army and its allies have fought these battles before, gaining invaluable insights into the terrain, strengths, and vulnerabilities of their enemies. This expertise is now being leveraged to make Homs a critical stronghold in repelling the Turkish project.
• Syria has overcome far greater challenges. Many of the areas Turkey now claims to control, such as parts of Aleppo and Hama, were reclaimed through reconciliation agreements. Yet, key areas that were once battlegrounds – Damascus, its suburbs, and critical highways – are now secure. The decisive battle for Homs will likely determine the outcome of this war. Let us wait and see what the Battle of Homs will reveal.
