December 09, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• With Russia’s announcement of granting political asylum to the former Syrian president, Dr. Bashar al-Assad, and the distribution of his images from Moscow alongside claims of his resignation as part of a settlement, critical questions arise. This purported settlement would hand Syria over to a framework centered on the armed opposition, spearheaded by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, as a means to prevent Syria’s fragmentation and an unending civil war. Coupled with signals from Russia and Iran suggesting openness to this new governing arrangement, one must ask whether the seismic shifts in Syria and the region represent a major international-regional settlement.
This could be seen as a settlement forged from the brink of collapse, reflecting a position of weakness for both Iran and Russia. However, it does not appear to be a balanced settlement. Evidently, Iran and Hezbollah are no longer present in Syria, and Iran’s path to supporting resistance in Lebanon has been severed. Additionally, the handover of a hybrid governance model in a geopolitically sensitive country like Syria falls short of a true settlement. The future of Russian forces in Syria hinges on the balance of power shaping the new government, and Turkish guarantees alone do not suffice. This necessity-driven settlement is a form of defeat, albeit with minimised losses.
While the armed opposition, particularly Jabhat al-Nusra, has not achieved outright victory, the coalition supporting Assad has been defeated. His removal from power is merely part of a broader defeat. A stark expression of this loss is Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to deploy forces to seize Mount Hermon – a long-held Israeli ambition. Yet, the reasons behind Syria’s military withdrawal and its cascading retreats when opposition forces advanced into major cities remain unclear. This was evident in Aleppo and Hama but became glaringly apparent during what seemed like a deliberate handover in Homs and later Damascus.
• The role of external actors – Russian, American, or Gulf – remains ambiguous, as does Assad’s potential complicity in these decisions. However, these details now belong to the past. The present is murky, and the future uncertain. What is clear is that U.S. President Joe Biden has called on Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to gain Israeli approval to remove its terrorist designation and facilitate its ascension to power, potentially including the swift lifting of sanctions on Syria. It is also apparent that Israel’s agenda extends beyond cutting Iran’s access to Lebanon and pushing Iran out of Syria. It harbors broader ambitions to shape Syria’s future governance. Public declarations from Israeli officials emphasise their interest in protecting what they term “Druze and Kurdish distinctiveness”, alongside overt expansionist aims, including the earlier annexation of the Golan Heights. Can the new Syrian government resist American temptations conditioned on Israeli approval while simultaneously countering Israeli aggression toward Syria?
• Compounding this is the U.S. and Israeli backing for Kurdish autonomy, which clashes with Turkey’’s deep-seated fears of a Kurdish enclave threatening its territorial integrity. This raises dual concerns: one of potential Syrian fragmentation and another of Turkish overreach in Syrian affairs. Turkey, unlike distant Russia or Iran, shares a 900-kilometer border with Syria and has intertwined demographics. Having already annexed Liwa’ Aliskenderun decades ago, Turkish leaders have expressed intentions to claim Aleppo as a historical part of Turkey. Can the new Syrian government confront these challenges while constrained by the American-Israeli-Turkish triad?
• Additionally, Arab states remain wary. The new government seeks to establish positive relations with neighboring countries like Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, which fear extremist movements that could threaten their security. It also looks to Gulf nations, which possess significant financial resources, for economic support. However, these states remain apprehensive about the composition of the new ruling coalition.
• Internally, challenges abound. Chief among them is managing the relationship between armed factions united solely by their opposition to President Bashar al-Assad. With this common enemy gone, competition for power may erupt into armed conflict. Questions also arise about maintaining coherence with the message of tolerance espoused by the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Governing responsibilities demand preserving state structures, particularly the military, while avoiding the pitfalls of Iraq’s disbandment under Paul Bremer, which left the country without an army or functioning state. A glimmer of hope lies in the designation of a caretaker prime minister to oversee the continuity of state institutions.
• The earthquake of the New Middle East has begun, and any settlement can only act as a temporary restraint on its dangers. But can it endure the internal, regional, and international pressures imposed by these challenges?
