December 11, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Two major powers dominate the Syrian military landscape with the ability to maneuver geographically: Turkey and the occupying entity. Beyond their respective regional security doctrines and the demarcation of security zones, both Ankara and Tel Aviv act as players with grand regional ambitions. It would be naive to assume that the unfolding Syrian scene is merely about defining red lines for securing their interests, given Syria’s current incapacity to resist, confront, or even object. The political scene reflects this imbalance, with millions of refugees returning from Turkey under Ankara’s unilateral decision, embarrassing Damascus, while Israeli airstrikes and territorial expansions humiliate Syria further by violating its geography and national dignity. Meanwhile, Washington plays the role of arbiter, seemingly unhurried in organising the Syrian scene or expediting its resolution. In geopolitics, there is no room for charity or mercy – only projects and interests. Washington dangles the carrot of lifting sanctions, including the Caesar Act, and hints at removing Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and its leader from terror lists, all while carefully deliberating how to execute these steps.
• A pivotal question looms over Syria: Can any of the three major players – America, Turkey, and the occupying entity – invest in building a strong, unified Syrian state capable of national restoration? The answer is clear: none of them aim for such a state. Each seeks to capitalise on Syria’s current fragility to bolster their own regional projects. Turkey, under the banner of neo-Ottomanism, aims to position Ankara as the regional hub safeguarding U.S. interests. This approach gained American acceptance before the Arab Spring faltered at Syria’s gates. However, in the aftermath of Al-Aqsa Flood, Washington has realised that Israel’s defeat equates to a defeat of America and its regional and global agenda. Without an Israeli victory to anchor U.S. progress in the region, Washington’s ability to shift global balances in its favor becomes questionable. This was evident when Washington intervened directly with its technological and intelligence resources to shift the tide of the war sparked by Al-Aqsa Flood, as Israel faced imminent defeat. The resulting escalation targeted Hezbollah, altering the regional balance significantly.
• Washington’s desired transformation in the region revolves around reshaping the balance of power in negotiations with Tehran. Central to this strategy is the rejection of direct war – a path favored by Benjamin Netanyahu – which risks catastrophic consequences, including the destruction of U.S. bases and fleets, closure of strategic straits, disruption of global trade, and an unprecedented energy crisis, particularly in Europe. Given Israel’s complete dependency on Washington for financial, military, and political support, the final say lies with the U.S. To negotiate from a position of strength, Washington seeks to weaken Iran. However, Turkey’s role is more suited to regional competition with Iran than directly undermining it. This competition, while significant, does not serve Washington’s core objective of pressuring Iran into compliance.
• The key to isolating Iran and pressuring its socio-political fabric lies in leveraging the Syrian scene to establish a Kurdish state. Such a state would threaten Iraq’s unity and stability while harnessing Kurdish aspirations for statehood in Syria and Iraq – aspirations tied to strong relations with Washington and Tel Aviv. This Kurdish entity would serve as a strategic base for influencing Kurdish populations in Iran. Yet, this ambition carries significant risks, including destabilising Syria and Iraq further. The emergence of a Kurdish state as a robust ally for the occupying entity necessitates a disregard for the potential fragmentation of Turkey. While President-elect Donald Trump previously expressed a desire to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and abandon the Kurdish enclave, recent developments will likely shift his stance, favoring a stronger military presence in Syria and greater investment in the Kurdish project.
• Instead of pursuing dreams of expanded influence, Turkish President Recep Erdogan must prepare for a future where his gains in Syria are reduced to minimal security interests in northern Syria. Simultaneously, he faces the prospect of a volatile confrontation with Turkey’s own Kurdish population, as the U.S. positions itself as the ultimate arbiter of Kurdish aspirations. It is no coincidence that Israeli voices, following recent developments in Syria, are discussing the “David Corridor” – a vision of a Druze state in southern Syria and a Kurdish state in the north, connected by the strategic Al-Tanf corridor.
