December 24, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Without diminishing the positive aspects of former MP Walid Jumblatt’s visit to Syria – particularly its role in opening communication channels between the Lebanese state and Syria’s new government, as dictated by geography and shared interests, and to prevent potential security issues that could harm both nations – the statements made during the visit regarding the occupied Lebanese Shebaa Farms have overshadowed the visit itself, sparking significant debate.
• We are not here to dissect Jumblatt’s intentions or the motivations behind his statements; he is best suited to explain his perspective. What concerns us is clarifying the matter of Shebaa Farms, particularly its identity and its legal standing within the framework of relevant UN resolutions concerning occupied territories. The recent discourse linking it to Resolution 242 as an alternative reference to Resolution 425, and postponing its resolution under the pretext of its disputed identity – Syrian or Lebanese – raises alarming implications. This postponement risks tying Shebaa Farms to the occupied Golan Heights twice: once under the long-forgotten Resolution 242, which is entirely imposed by Israel, and again by claiming its Syrian identity, especially given Syria’s stated inability to address disputes with the occupation, whether related to new encroachments or the occupied Golan Heights. Such claims could ultimately align the Shebaa Farms with Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights.
• From a legal standpoint, before any official or political position is taken, there is a need to carefully and calmly revisit Resolution 1701. Those familiar with diplomatic treaties, UN Security Council resolutions, and international law know that when an issue is addressed in multiple UN resolutions, the latest text prevails if it explicitly mentions the issue by name. If the earlier resolution explicitly names the issue, but the subsequent one only alludes to it, the earlier text governs. Conversely, if the issue is explicitly named only in the latter resolution, the latter text becomes definitive.
• In the case of Shebaa Farms, the debate over Israel’s arguments between 2000 and 2006 – whether about documenting the Lebanese identity of the farms, awaiting Syria’s stance, or demanding the demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border – is no longer relevant. Nor is the argument regarding Resolution 425, which unequivocally calls for withdrawal from all occupied Lebanese territories up to the international border, not merely those occupied during the 1978 war. Likewise, the claim that Resolution 242 applies is invalid, as even Israel acknowledges that the farms are not Palestinian territories seized in 1948 but lands occupied alongside the Syrian Golan Heights in 1967. This contradicts the fact that Israel expanded its control over the farms gradually between 1968 and 1989, with the final seizure of Bastara Farm occurring in 1989.
• Since Shebaa Farms was explicitly mentioned for the first time in Resolution 1701 – and not in Resolutions 425 or 242 – its legal framework is governed by Resolution 1701, rendering further debate over its legal reference unnecessary. Resolution 1701 identifies the farms as a disputed area, eliminating the need to question their Lebanese or Syrian identity. The resolution does not describe Shebaa Farms as a Lebanese-Syrian dispute requiring border demarcation but as a disputed area between Lebanon and Israel concerning the right to security sovereignty. The resolution clearly tasks the UN Secretary-General with mediating between the involved parties, Lebanon and Israel, along with major international stakeholders, to propose a resolution within 30 days. While the Secretary-General can prioritise border demarcation between Lebanon and Syria, as some Lebanese suggest, he may also develop a proposal based on documentation and consultations, as former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon did in 2007. He proposed placing the farms under UNIFIL’s custodianship, pending the implementation of Resolution 242, at which point sovereignty would be determined – either for Lebanon or Syria, but definitely not for Israel.
• Lebanese politicians and officials have no grounds to reinterpret the fate of Shebaa Farms after Resolution 1701 and the Secretary-General’s proposal, which grants Lebanese property owners access to their lands under UN sovereignty following Israel’s withdrawal. Given Lebanon’s official and political commitment to international resolutions, particularly resolution 1701, the only viable Lebanese stance is to demand Israel’s compliance with the UN Secretary-General’s proposal as an application of Resolution 1701.
