The Stability of the South of the Litani Agreement Weakens the Presidency’s Centrality

January 08, 2025

Nasser Kandil

The Presidency, in and of itself, is not a unilateral source for defining Lebanon’s regional identity, particularly regarding the state’s position in the struggle against the occupying entity, and more specifically concerning its stance on the future of the resistance’s weapons. However, the importance of the presidency, as well as the importance of who takes the position, their stances and potential actions, fluctuate with regional dynamics. These dynamics – whether stable or turbulent – shape Lebanon’s position in the struggle against the occupying entity, particularly in relation to the international-regional equation surrounding the future of the resistance’s weapons. Naturally, after a war of the magnitude witnessed in southern Lebanon, heightened scrutiny is expected in assessing the presidential file within this context.

The nomination of Army Commander General Joseph Aoun, and the resistance bloc’s stance toward him, is evaluated through this lens. Before the war, the resistance forces had firmly backed their candidate, former Minister Suleiman Frangieh, without hesitation. Their stance toward General Joseph Aoun or others, including former Minister Jihad Azour, was not driven by concerns or doubts about potential understandings but remained secondary to their commitment to Frangieh. The only exception to this flexibility is the nomination of the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, who holds a position inherently antagonistic to the resistance. His hostility is independent of broader international and regional conditions, as his agenda is to cultivate such conditions against the resistance. He aims to use his popular, party, security, and parliamentary leverage, bolstered by the presidency, to intensify opposition to the resistance and its arms.

The rejection of General Joseph Aoun by Samir Geagea and his acceptance of other candidates is not rooted in evaluations of their positions on the resistance or its weapons. Rather, it stems from Geagea’s calculation that Aoun represents the only viable Christian leader capable of rivaling him in popular influence and political power. Aoun’s potential support base – enhanced by international and regional backing, his position as army commander, and the ability to secure a substantial parliamentary bloc in the upcoming elections – poses a significant challenge to Geagea. Additionally, Aoun’s presidency would monopolise Christian representation in the government and key state appointments.

Geagea’s recent inflammatory statement, that Hezbollah and Amal -the duo- should nominate General Aoun so that he could then “study the matter”, was a strategic ploy devoid of logic. The prior argument advanced by Geagea and the Free Patriotic Movement against Frangieh’s nomination was that any presidential candidate must secure the endorsement of a substantial Christian bloc and the absence of vetoes from others. By this standard, how could General Aoun’s nomination by Hezbollah and Amal be a prerequisite for Geagea’s approval, rather than originating from the Christian blocs themselves, especially when the Free Patriotic Movement is against him and Geagea has effectively vetoed him?

From the perspective of the duo, Speaker Nabih Berri’s initiative – centered on a ceasefire, Resolution 1701, and a consensus president – reflects their understanding that the obstacles preventing Frangieh’s presidency over the past two years have only deepened. The shift toward a consensus candidate has necessitated a reassessment of all nominees in light of the international and regional landscape in southern Lebanon after the war. Since the post-war presidential equation has been respected, the regional and international factors surrounding the South have become paramount.

What has emerged as more significant than the presidency is the apparent U.S.-Israeli recognition of the risks of undermining the ceasefire agreement. Unrealistic ambitions of waging a successful disarmament campaign under the pretext of recent events in Syria, or attempting to extract additional security gains through delays or territorial claims, have been tempered. This realisation has translated into a clear commitment to implementing the agreement within its defined geographic and temporal parameters, particularly in the western sector, affirming the South of the Litani as an area under the exclusive sovereignty of the Lebanese Army.

As a result, the presidency has receded as a focal point in debates over Lebanon’s regional positioning, especially regarding the resistance’s weapons. Surprisingly, the duo and their allies in the resistance bloc have emerged as the most flexible and pragmatic in engaging with various presidential candidates.