January 09, 2025
Nasser Kandil
Efforts to exploit presidential entitlements as a platform to promote the narrative of a defeated resistance, while sidelining its representative significance – anchored in the dual national parliamentary blocs of Development and Liberation and Loyalty to the Resistance – have ultimately failed.
The surge of international and regional pressure failed to muster the 86 votes needed to elect the sole presidential candidate, Army Commander General Joseph Aoun. Attempts to surpass this threshold – intended to demonstrate that the candidate could prevail with or without the support of the dual bloc – also faltered. Proponents emphasised that, given the constitutional requirement for cross-sectarian participation, the dual bloc’s backing was essential. The result, however, made one fact abundantly clear: the coveted 86 votes remain out of reach without the dual bloc’s involvement.
The dual bloc approached the presidential matter through two interwoven considerations. First, they hold no objection to the sole candidate, General Joseph Aoun, whose tenure as army commander has provided reassurance to the resistance. His nationalistic vision, rooted in the military institution’s ethos of unity and coexistence, meets the fundamental criteria for the presidency. In fact, Aoun’s qualifications tip the scales in his favour when compared to former President Michel Suleiman, who similarly transitioned from army leadership to the presidency. As such, just as the dual bloc supported Suleiman, they are not opposed to endorsing Aoun.
The second consideration is regarding consensus. Michel Suleiman’s election was grounded in broad national agreement, supported by international and regional guarantees that ensured adherence to the implementation of agreements tied to the consensus on the presidency.
Today’s scenario is fundamentally different. The dual bloc, led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, repeatedly called for dialogue but faced rejection. Even ahead of today’s session to elect a president, Berri urged for consensus, but his calls went unanswered.
The bloc, having endorsed former Minister Suleiman Frangieh, was told that despite his representative weight, he could not support a presidential candidate from another sect. Ironically, the same bloc was then instructed to back the army commander so that the largest bloc from the presidents’ sect might consider his candidacy. These contradictions reveal a clear truth: political vendetta has overshadowed aspirations for consensus.
The absurdity peaked when the dual bloc was pressured with claims that “everyone else has fallen in line with the sole candidate, so you must do the same – and we’ll call it consensus”. This left the bloc face-to-face with external actors, as no domestic Lebanese partner remained to negotiate consensus. Thus, achieving the presidency now hinges on agreement between the dual bloc and international and regional stakeholders.
This shift in focus means the presidency and its sole candidate are no longer the core issues. Instead, the discourse revolves around external consensus on critical Lebanese matters that once required internal agreement. These include implementing Resolution 1701, addressing the fate of occupied territories such as the Shebaa Farms (a matter for the U.S.), securing Lebanon’s right to maritime resources (a question for France), and rebuilding war-damaged areas with Arab and international support, led by Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the implementation of the Taif Agreement’s pending reforms awaits action.
Is the goal to elect a ‘rescue’ president or merely fulfill a foreign-imposed electoral mandate? The dual bloc’s vote in the presidential ballot box will depend on the answer to this question.
Today, tomorrow, or in a week, General Joseph Aoun will likely be elected president but only after consensus is achieved.
