January 18, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• To those persistently promoting the theory of a Zionist victory over the resistance forces in the “Flood of Al-Aqsa” war, solely based on the scale of losses suffered by the resistance – particularly in Gaza and Lebanon – and by the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples, especially within the resistance’s supportive environment, this is an invitation for a systematic discussion. The focus should be on the Zionist project’s gains and losses through its historical ebbs and flows, recognising that the resistance project is not a standalone endeavor but rather a counter project aimed at confronting Zionism. The measure of the resistance’s progress or retreat is not the costs of confrontations it wages but its success or failure in dismantling the pivotal and structural components of the Zionist project.
• Since the establishment of the occupying entity, the Zionist project has relied on maintaining an upward trajectory on two fronts: militarily- the ability to occupy more territory and impose Zionist will upon it; and demographically – attracting more settlers through promises of security and prosperity, while forcibly displacing the indigenous population to expand settlement areas and secure demographic dominance. This dominance enables framing the entity as a “democratic yet Jewish state”.
• Militarily, the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem in 1967 marked the last major territorial expansion. This was accompanied by extensive settlement projects, particularly in the West Bank. However, the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, including the dismantling of settlements, signaled a growing defect in the Zionist project – both in retaining occupied territories and ensuring settler security.
• The “Flood of Al-Aqsa” war reopened all deferred battles. Just as the entity failed to reoccupy parts of southern Lebanon, culminating in an agreement committing to a full withdrawal from all occupied territories in Lebanon including those which it had not withdrawn from after signing Resolution 1701 in 2006, it also signed an agreement for a comprehensive withdrawal from Gaza, an integral part of Palestine and its national territories. The failure of the Generals’ Project in northern Gaza, intended as a precursor to reintroduce settlements, underscores the inability to reverse the effects of the 2000 and 2005 withdrawals. Agreements in both Lebanon and Gaza reaffirmed the entity’s retreat to the realities of those years.
• The most critical strategic test in this war was the transfer project – forced displacement of Palestinians – where Gaza was the centerpiece. The aim was to displace two million Palestinians, thereby altering the demographic balance in favour of a Jewish majority. With Jewish immigration to Palestine no longer supplying the needed human resources, demographic dominance depends on reducing the Palestinian population. Success in Gaza was intended as a model to force Palestinians in the West Bank to migrate to Jordan and eventually displace Palestinians from the 1948-occupied territories into Lebanon. The project’s failure in Gaza signifies its collapse as a historical wager.
• What transpired in this war is unlikely to be repeated in future wars – assuming the entity can even launch another war. The scale of atrocities meeting the definition of genocide, coupled with explicit displacement plans, reveals the Western, especially American, endorsement of the transfer project. However, the war’s end, with Palestinians still in Gaza, has rendered any future transfer attempts in other Palestinian regions constrained by Gaza’s precedent. Gaza, envisioned as an example of displacement, has become a symbol of Palestinian resilience and the failure of forced migration.
With the transfer project thwarted, the entity faces an existential dilemma: choosing between being a democratic but non-Jewish state or a Jewish but non-democratic state. Both options portend internal strife, potentially culminating in civil war within the entity. Alternatively, the Jewish state vision might survive through a separatist government in West Bank settlements. In any scenario, the failure of the transfer project is a historic event that exposes undeniable realities and confronts the entity with a crisis no leader can resolve.
• The choice is no longer between “Greater Israel”, “Mighty Israel”, or “Great Israel”, but between “Lesser Israel” and the path to decline – whether through civil war or separatist governance. The resistance project has succeeded in dismantling two core pillars of the Zionist project: the ability to occupy and the ability to displace.
