January 27, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• This is a time for frankness – to speak plainly, without evasion or obfuscation – especially to those who now praise the courageous popular movement in the south while attempting to separate it from the resistance and its arms. They claim that recent events neither shift their stance on the resistance and its victories nor weaken their resolve to see its defeat. These are the same individuals who, during the sixty days of the ceasefire, belittled any mention of the triad of the army, the people, and the resistance. They ridiculed the role of the resistance and promoted an idea aimed at reshaping the international and regional landscape to protect Lebanon without the need for resistance, which they argue has become a burden on the people of the south and their security due to changing circumstances.
• Without evasion or pretense, those in the south whom you seek to separate from the resistance are, in fact, inseparable from the people of the south. Their identity is clear and openly expressed, symbolised by the flags they carry – each citizen holding a flag in their right hand and an image of a martyr in their left. The flag is that of Hezbollah, and the images are of Hezbollah’s martyrs. This segment of the population consists of the families of Hezbollah’s martyrs, who hold unwavering allegiance to the resistance and a steadfast commitment to its arms.
• Acknowledging those who praised the southerners does not imply that their opinions on the resistance and its weaponry are valued or should be considered. Instead, we pose this question: If this initiative, led by southerners deeply rooted in Hezbollah’s culture, resistance, and sacrifices, had not occurred, would the developments in the southern scene have unfolded as they did?
• The positive interaction of the army with this popular uprising, which was marked by sacrifices – including the martyrdom and injury of one hundred southern citizens – was evident. The army shifted from blocking roads to tolerating their passage and ultimately supporting the movement, as exemplified in Mays al-Jabal. Additionally, the official responses from the president, the parliament speaker, the resigned prime minister, the prime minister-designate, the foreign ministry, the army command, and UNIFIL leadership demonstrated a coordinated political and diplomatic effort aimed at world capitals, particularly Washington. This effort sought to bolster the popular stance and highlight the dangers of the situation escalating further. The only prudent solution identified was to expedite the withdrawal of the occupying army from the south without resorting to prolonged negotiations.
• If it is established that a new dynamic, linked to the precise implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the requirement for the occupying forces to withdraw, was set in motion by this popular uprising, then did the state, parties, and leaders who reject the resistance and speak of its role’s end have an alternative plan to initiate such a dynamic? And if so, what was their plan?
• If this new dynamic is the only viable option to fully and honestly implement the ceasefire agreement, and if it stems from one of Hezbollah’s popular bodies, infused with the martyrdom spirit of its fighters and inspired by their heroism, does this align with the calls for Hezbollah to retire from its resistance and relinquish its responsibility for expelling the occupation, leaving that burden to the state?
• What does the comparison reveal between the cold handling of the official and international bodies responsible for the ceasefire agreement during the sixty days of its implementation, and the Israeli destructive and criminal tampering with its provisions, versus the single day of dynamic intervention by Hezbollah, which unsettled the Israelis and prompted both American and French policy makers to act once again?
• Given that the experience of the sixty-day ceasefire revealed that the Israelis would not implement the agreement fairly and would manipulate its terms to impose unjust interpretations on Lebanon unless confronted by a stronger reality – one that would embarrass and unsettle them, as occurred yesterday – and that the state has no means of achieving this while outside powers are divided between those lacking the ability and those lacking the will, what is the benefit of hastening to reassure the Israelis that there is a Lebanese trend to resolve the issue of the resistance’s weaponry? This, while the Israeli government declares that its implementation of the agreement is solely contingent on ‘the deployment of the Lebanese army and Hezbollah’s withdrawal to the Litani River,’ as stated by the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the day before yesterday?
