February 01, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• Some Lebanese go too far in their hostility toward the resistance; they delude themselves and claim that a ceasefire agreement and the implementation of Resolution 1701 require the disarmament of the resistance. They persist in this view even when Israeli officials themselves set a different threshold, as stated by the office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which defined the agreement’s scope as the resistance’s withdrawal from south of the Litani River. When Israeli aggression continues, they insist that it will only end once the resistance is disarmed. But is this true?
• Setting aside questions of sovereignty and national dignity – issues that those who hold this view are unlikely to grasp – one need only look at Syria to test this theory. There, no armed resistance exists to serve as either a target or a pretext for Israeli attacks. The new ruling authority has achieved for Israel what Israel itself failed to accomplish over two decades: it dismantled the Syrian army, permitted the destruction of its weaponry, expelled Iran and Hezbollah, and severed the resistance’s supply lines. Rather than reciprocate with even rhetorical gestures about withdrawing from the occupied Golan Heights, the Israeli prime minister instead occupied Mount Hermon and declared that the Golan would remain Israeli forever. Despite the Syrian leadership’s silence on its country’s right to reclaim its land, Israel was not satisfied. It has repeatedly launched incursions several kilometers deep into Syrian territory, reaching areas close to the capital. Even the efforts of the new Syrian leadership’s allies – Turkey, a NATO member, and Qatar, a close partner of Washington – failed to halt these Israeli advances.
• The Syrian example serves as a warning to the Lebanese, particularly those hostile to the resistance: there is only one way to secure Lebanon, and that is by ending Israeli aggression. Even if an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon were achieved, the country would remain vulnerable without a comprehensive security strategy. The inaugural address affirmed the state’s exclusive right to bear arms, but also emphasised that this right is realised through the existence of a strong and capable army. Beyond Lebanon’s international and regional alliances, its security depends on a military force that commands respect. As the inaugural address made clear, the state must sustain and strengthen its army to deter aggression and reclaim occupied land. This is a complex and costly undertaking that requires years of effort and unwavering resolve. For this reason, the address called for a broad discussion to develop a national security strategy – one that encompasses political, diplomatic, economic, and military dimensions. This discussion must determine how Lebanon can defend itself during the transitional phase required to build a formidable army.
• During this period, the resistance would adhere to state-imposed guidelines, with the government deciding when and how force should be used to protect Lebanon. Should military action be required, it would be up to the state to determine whether the army or the resistance should take the lead. In line with the ceasefire arrangements, the resistance would not take the initiative or act unilaterally. As long as the state commits to fulfilling its defensive role, the resistance will stand behind it – until the state proves that it has fully assumed responsibility and succeeded, making the resistance unnecessary.
• At present, Lebanon does not need to build a conventional land force to counter potential Israeli incursions. The Israeli military is no longer capable of launching a ground war against Lebanon, having suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the resistance in the forward-line villages. For years to come, such an operation will remain beyond its reach. Nor does Lebanon require a firepower capability that matches Israel’s destructive bombardments, as witnessed in the recent war. The resistance has already demonstrated its ability to penetrate the Iron Dome, strike deep within Israeli territory, reaching Netanyahu’s bedroom and the heart of Tel Aviv. Nonetheless, a scenario demanding such capabilities is also unlikely for years to come.
• The immediate challenge is that Israel may resort to periodic airstrikes on Lebanese territory after withdrawing its ground forces from the forward villages, seeking to prevent the emergence of new resistance formations that might compel a full withdrawal. The resistance’s current approach creates space for a new political framework in which the state takes the lead. This presents an opportunity for a national consensus affirming that the resistance stands behind the army when needed. Such a need is most likely to arise in wartime, not in response to sporadic Israeli violations. This, in turn, simplifies Lebanon’s defensive strategy – eliminating the necessity of building a large standing army to confront Israeli ground forces or developing a firepower capability equal to Israel’s. Instead, Lebanon can rely on the resistance in wartime while ensuring military coordination with the army. But how can Lebanon, through its army, confront the anticipated phase of Israeli aerial aggression?
• Lebanon must make a serious decision to acquire an air defense system. This type of weaponry can only be operated by national militaries, as it requires infrastructure, strategic positioning on high ground, radar networks linked to air defense missiles, and military frameworks that only the state can provide. Lebanon had previously sought to establish such a network before the civil war in the 1970s. The primary obstacle today is not the resistance but the absence of political will within the Lebanese state to pursue this objective. Lebanon should prioritise acquiring Western air defense systems, particularly American ones – but it must not limit itself to these options or yield to external pressures if they seek to block such efforts. National security must take precedence. Let us remember that Turkey, a founding NATO member, purchased the Russian S-400 missile system, as did Washington’s allies in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. So why should Lebanon not do the same?
