February 05, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• The name of Prime Minister-designate Nawaf Salam is no stranger to the world of politics and political thought. He has long engaged with Lebanon’s crisis and held well-defined views on what must be done to address the challenges of nation-building, long before his appointment. These include his stance on the future of the resistance’s weapons, as well as political, electoral, administrative, and judicial reforms. Those who believed they were appointing a mere puppet to the premiership – one they could manipulate at will – were surprised to find that he possesses a distinct vision and a deeper understanding of the political process and its reformist dimensions than they had anticipated. Their miscalculation stems from their failure to read, not just his books on reform and the Taif Agreement, but also the lectures and articles he has published in various newspapers. Had they done so, they might have come to terms with his actions as a natural extension of his prior positions, or perhaps they would have refrained from appointing him in the first place.
• Nawaf Salam is not enamored with the Shiite duo, but he firmly believes in the formulas enshrined in the Taif Agreement and in linking the legitimacy of power to the national pact of coexistence. The Shiite duo itself has demonstrated political pragmatism, first with the rise of General Joseph Aoun to the presidency, then with the designation of Nawaf Salam as prime minister, and subsequently in its approach to the government formation process. However, many of those who nominated Salam lacked this same pragmatism. They mistakenly viewed him as a mere tool for avenging the Shiite duo and humiliating a key sectarian component of the state and society.
Salam has consistently opposed the troika’s power-sharing arrangement that diminishes the state’s authority. He has long advocated for restoring power to the Council of Ministers, with the President acting as a referee and the Prime Minister serving as an executive leader, without attempting to centralise the government’s powers within himself. He acknowledges that the ministerial formation process and its governing powers under the Taif Agreement are fundamental to preserving civil peace and maintaining the delicate sectarian balance.
• This perspective was articulated in a lecture he delivered two years ago at the Makassed Association, where he outlined his vision for Lebanon’s path out of crisis. Those interested can refer to the full text, published in al-Nahar on March 2, 2023. In it, Salam addresses issues that he may now incorporate into his government’s ministerial statement, most notably:
• Establishing a National Commission for the Abolition of Sectarianism.
• Strengthening judicial independence.
• Restoring the Constitutional Council’s authority to interpret the constitution.
• Implementing expanded administrative decentralisation.
• Strictly adhering to Article 95 of the constitution, ensuring merit-based public sector appointments and eliminating sectarian quotas in all but the highest-ranking positions, without reserving any position exclusively for a particular sect.
• Reaffirming Article 22 of the constitution, which mandates the election of a non-sectarian parliament alongside a Senate representing sectarian groups, tasked with addressing existential national matters.
• Proposing constitutional amendments to set deadlines for parliamentary consultations on government formation, timelines for prime minister-designates to form a cabinet, deadlines for ministers to sign government decrees, and conditions for dissolving parliament.
• On the issue of the resistance’s weapons, Salam stated in his lecture:
“The extension of state authority over the entirety of Lebanese territory through its own forces, as stipulated by the Taif Agreement, has yet to be realised, as well-known. In fact, it remains one of the key unresolved issues since the agreement’s adoption. Notably, what was once considered a ‘special status’ granted to Hezbollah for retaining its arms due to Israeli occupation has, since Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, become a source of political contention and sectarian tensions. In reality, extending the state’s authority nationwide has become inseparable from reaching a consensus on a national defense strategy – which is also supposed to address the future of Hezbollah’s weapons. The pressing task today is to define and adopt the content of this strategy”.
• Salam’s statements make it clear that he understands exactly what he is doing. It is therefore natural that he and the Shiite duo would have differences over certain issues, given his positions and objectives. However, the real paradox lies in those who nominated him and now oppose him – either they never knew what they were doing, or they have only now come to that realisation, far too late.
