February 07, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• Prime Minister-designate Nawaf Salam fully understands the foundational principles of the Taif system, whose core lies in civil peace safeguarded by the National Pact of Coexistence, as explicitly stated in the agreement. He also grasps that the legitimacy he seeks to fortify his government with – preventing it from being used as a weapon to topple it should a major sect be represented by a single political colour – resides in Parliament, not in the government itself. The Prime Minister-designate knows that a resigned minister can be replaced and that an entire sect’s ministers can be substituted, provided that the government secures charter legitimacy in Parliament. This means that no major sect, particularly the larger ones, should entirely withhold its confidence in the government, even if its ministers are drawn from across all sects.
Thus, the issue of Amal and Hezbollah’s representation in the government begins and ends with the fact that all Shiite MPs belong to this dual alliance. If this alliance disapproves of the government’s formation, it will withhold confidence from it entirely, depriving it of charter legitimacy and leading to its inevitable collapse.
• The Prime Minister himself holds a de facto blocking third power within the government – akin to a veto that he does not even need, as the government automatically resigns if he steps down. Yet, he insists on engineering the government’s composition to prevent the emergence of a hypothetical obstructing third, using this as justification to reduce the representation of others. But can the Prime Minister’s team, which commands only a limited number of parliamentary votes, be granted multiple ministerial seats without contributing any real weight in securing the government’s parliamentary confidence? Meanwhile, parliamentary blocs such as the Moderation Bloc and the Free Patriotic Movement are sidelined, primarily due to the overreach of the Prime Minister’s camp – whether his direct allies or the Kulluna Irada group, which behaves like a ruling party. This group secures ministerial representation through two parties while denying others the right to representation under their own party banners, merely because Kulluna Irada belongs to an internationally backed consortium with Western diplomatic sponsorship.
With all due respect to the American University of Beirut and its graduates, it is inconceivable that one must search hard to find a Lebanese University graduate among the ministers.
• This emerging experiment of a ruling party, embodied by Kulluna Irada acting as though it governs, recalls the anniversary of the February 6 uprising – the only event in Lebanon’s history that toppled a one-party rule. The failure of one-party rule has been universal, even in cases where such regimes had far greater resources for success. How, then, can a party with no real popular or parliamentary representation exploit the appointment of a friendly prime minister to climb onto his shoulders and proclaim itself a ruling party? Its lone MP even appears on television boasting that the Prime Minister consults him – a theatrical display that demeans the Prime Minister-designate, undermines the government, and sets a dismal precedent for party politics.
• Can the Prime Minister-designate deny that he selectively interpreted his agreement with Hezbollah and Amal, aligning himself instead with external pressures – chief among them the American stance, which insists on a government composition that signals Hezbollah’s defeat? Could he not have drawn from the experience of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who firmly upheld the resistance and had a ready response for the West: As long as neither Israel nor the West can disarm Hezbollah, why impose this task on the Lebanese and push them toward civil war and instability? Political wisdom dictates that domestic policies should reflect the realities forged by past wars. Lebanon’s war ended with two crucial outcomes: Israel’s inability to dismantle Hezbollah’s arsenal – ultimately settling for the framework of Resolution 1701 – and Hezbollah’s acceptance of its full implementation, particularly the establishment of exclusive Lebanese Army control south of the Litani River.
Has the Prime Minister-designate abandoned his conviction that launching a national dialogue to formulate a defensive strategy addressing Hezbollah’s arms is the foremost task of any government?
• The new presidential term began with a speech that garnered national consensus, setting a strong foundation for the government’s mission. But does the Prime Minister-designate’s current approach – one that everyone wishes to see succeed – serve this goal? What wisdom is there in squandering his political capital to favor those who lack the legitimacy to tip the scales in their favor? How can a government be presented to the Lebanese people where a third of its ministers collectively hold just one parliamentary vote, while major parliamentary blocs representing dozens of MPs are marginalised?
As the government enters its fourth week of formation, its birth remains out of reach, simply because it lacks a viable path to securing parliamentary confidence.
