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February 24, 2025
By Nasser Kandil
• Benjamin Netanyahu was not visiting the occupied Golan or Israeli military positions there when he spoke about Syria, so his remarks were not merely inspired by his location, nor were they spontaneous trial balloons. He was in Tel Aviv, addressing a graduation ceremony for Israeli military officers, when he deliberately spoke about Syria, plainly stating that the so-called “security zone” of the occupying entity inside Syrian territory extends across all of southern Damascus. He also emphasised that Israel considers the Suwayda region to be of special strategic interest and will not allow its concerns there to be disregarded.
• Essentially, Netanyahu is signaling that Israel has finished thanking Syria’s new leadership for its gratuitous services to the occupation – chief among them expelling Iran and Hezbollah from Syria, severing Hezbollah’s supply routes, and denying any advantages to Palestinian resistance factions, including those previously seen as allies or friends, such as Hamas. Now, Netanyahu implies, the time has come for Syria to pay the price for securing its regime and its relationship with Washington – by remaining silent about Israel’s new demands and complying with them.
• Netanyahu’s real objective is the partition of Syria into separate entities. His statement concerning a Druze specificity that prevents their incorporation into the central state was accompanied by the announcement of an independent military council rejecting Damascus’ authority. According to Netanyahu, the Syrian government must not overstep Israeli red lines in three provinces: Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra.
• The annexation of the Golan and the indefinite Israeli presence in Mount Hermon were long-standing demands from Netanyahu, which U.S. President Donald Trump openly endorsed during Netanyahu’s visit to Washington. Now, it seems Israel’s new demands have also gained Washington’s approval. More importantly, it appears that Damascus’ acceptance of these conditions has become a prerequisite for lifting U.S. sanctions. Without U.S. relief, any European sanctions relief would remain largely ineffective, particularly in the banking sector.
• The Turkish-led operation in Syria, executed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and backed by U.S. sanctions and Israeli airstrikes, was built on a simple equation: that expelling Hezbollah and Iran from Syria would be enough to win Israel’s approval without additional politically costly concessions, while also securing Washington’s readiness to withdraw, dismantle the Kurdish autonomous zone in northeast Syria, and lift sanctions. Today, that equation is crumbling.
• Netanyahu makes it clear that he speaks not only for himself but for Washington as well. He is sending a message to Ankara and Syria’s new leadership that the U.S. and Israel were joint partners in toppling the previous Syrian government and that the share of the spoils allocated to them is insufficient. Netanyahu is now setting the price; can Ankara and the “new Damascus” afford to pay it?
• For the Lebanese, the unfolding Syrian scenario offers a sobering lesson: can they still cling to the illusion that diplomacy, when reliant on Washington, will end Israeli occupation and deter its ongoing aggression against Lebanon?