February 25, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• During his meeting with the visiting Iranian delegation participating in the funeral of Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the President of the Republic invoked the notion of Lebanon’s exhaustion from the wars of others on its soil. This was a clear reference to Lebanon becoming a battleground between Iran and both the United States and Israel, aligning with the conventional characterisation of Hezbollah as an extension of Iran in this war. This notion, which the late Ghassan Tueni had philosophised and conceptualised, first emerged in describing the Lebanese Civil War, where Lebanese killed one another, as a war between Israel and the Palestinian resistance on Lebanese soil, and, in part, a war between Syria and both the United States and Israel on Lebanese territory. But does this framework truly encapsulate the current reality?
• In a previous discussion with the late Ghassan Tueni, I posed questions that did not challenge the core idea but exposed gaps difficult to reconcile, such as why the Israeli occupation of Lebanon persisted even after the defeat of Syria and the Palestinians, despite the Philip Habib Agreement in August 1982, which mandated the withdrawal of Syrian and Palestinian forces from Beirut. Israel, however, remained, seeking direct gains through a peace treaty with Lebanon – one Lebanon was incapable of delivering. Each time it attempted such a move, it fractured. The continuation of the occupation led to the rise of a Lebanese resistance that ultimately forced successive Israeli withdrawals, culminating in the retreat from the border strip in 1985. Had Israel harbored no ambitions, interests, or calculations regarding Lebanon, its final withdrawal should have occurred then, at a time when the Lebanese resistance operated on principles that could have closed the chapter of conflict without regional entanglements, Iran was not yet present, and Hezbollah had not yet become the dominant force in the resistance. It could be said, quite simply, that Israel’s prolonged occupation obstructed the implementation of the Taif Agreement, which was partly premised on successfully enforcing Resolution 425 by establishing a state capable of deploying its own forces nationwide, disbanding all militias, and collecting their weapons. Instead, the occupation’s persistence, and its establishment of a sectarian-tinged enclave, legitimised the resistance led by Hezbollah and supported by Iran.
• Despite the special relationship between the Lebanese resistance, led by Hezbollah, and both Iran and Syria before the year 2000, despite ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States over their fraught relations, and despite Syrian-American peace talks following the Madrid Conference, Hezbollah’s resistance was repeatedly accused of merely serving as an Iranian or Syrian proxy, advancing their negotiating positions. Yet, the results speak for themselves: the land that was liberated was Lebanese land, while the diplomatic files remained unresolved between Syria, Iran, and the United States.
• After the recent war, irrespective of ongoing debates over Lebanon’s role in it, the legitimacy of supporting Gaza, and the wisdom of that decision, a new presidential and governmental reality has emerged, shaped by Hezbollah’s positioning. First, a military withdrawal from south of the Litani, handing control to an area where only the Lebanese state is allowed to bear arms. Second, a policy of restraint in responding to Israel’s flagrant and severe violations of the ceasefire agreement, whether through its continued occupation of Lebanese border hills and the Lebanese section of Ghajar, both within the Blue Line, its daily breaches of Lebanese airspace, or its cross-border attacks through airstrikes and gunfire. Hezbollah has thus deferred the responsibility of ending the occupation and repelling these aggressions to the Lebanese state, relying on diplomatic channels. Third, within the framework of others’ wars, subordinating the future of resistance arms to the outcome of national dialogue on formulating a defense strategy, based on the priority of protecting Lebanon and upholding its sovereign rights, practically means, declaring an end to the Iranian and Hezbollah-related aspect of this premise. The question remains: will Israel abandon its aspirations to impose its own conditions on Lebanon, as it did after 1982 when it occupied Lebanese land for 18 years?
• The question remains: if Israel repeats its actions, maintaining its occupation and aggression, as is most likely, and if the United States, as it has consistently done, prioritises Israeli superiority and ignores calls for intervention, what happens then? If a new resistance emerges, distinct from Hezbollah, or if Hezbollah resumes its armed resistance, can one still speak of “wars of others” on Lebanese soil? And if this resistance finds support not from Iran or Syria but from Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Brazil, and South Africa, countries that stood with Gaza against its genocidal war out of a commitment to human rights, would it still be condemned as a war of others? Would its emergence necessitate Lebanon declaring exhaustion?
• If we apply the “wars of others” framework to the Syrian-Israeli scene, do we not need corrective lenses to recognise that the new Syrian leadership has achieved remarkable security gains for Israel? It has expelled Iran and Hezbollah from Syria, dismantled and weakened the Syrian army, and severed supply lines to the Lebanese resistance. Meanwhile, Syria’s regional patrons, Turkey and Qatar, are among Washington’s closest allies. Are there still “wars of others” on Syrian soil, or are they Israeli ambitions, readily supported by the United States, regardless of Washington’s relationship with the opposing side? Can Lebanon avoid the same bitter fate, given that it cannot offer Israel the same concessions the new Syrian leadership did, nor secure the regional sponsorship that Syria enjoys through Turkey and Qatar? Should Lebanon, in such a scenario, resort to vilifying any prospective resistance as merely an extension of foreign wars, thereby stripping it of its national legitimacy while absolving the occupation of its aggression and ambitions?
