March 13, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• At a pivotal moment in the Al-Aqsa Flood War (following the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, whom the occupying entity’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, described as “the axis of the Axis of Resistance” and whose elimination, he claimed, “paved the way for the fall of the Assad regime and the decline of Hezbollah’s power and influence in Lebanon”), Lebanese, Arab, and Turkish thinkers, each in their own spheres of influence and intellectual circles, engaged in deep analysis. Notably absent from this discourse were Lebanon’s ‘Change MPs’ and the remnants of the Syrian opposition. However, among these thinkers were figures who had entered Lebanon’s new government and individuals highly regarded by Qatari and Turkish circles due to their past connections with the former Syrian regime.
These thinkers formulated a theory arguing that Hezbollah and the Syrian regime found themselves trapped between their ideological commitments and national identities. Their adherence to these ideological principles imposed constraints that prevented them from fully leveraging their surplus power in the al-Aqsa Flood War, leading to an all-out war. Given the nature of the war’s outbreak, they had no choice but to act in accordance with their ideological considerations to avoid a form of moral suicide. This led them to a conclusion: both in Lebanon and Syria, an opportunity had emerged, one that should not be squandered.
• This opportunity, they proposed, involved creating a third political space: one between Israel and the resistance in Lebanon, and another between Israel, the United States, Iran, and the resistance in Syria. The idea was that the blow sustained by the resistance in Lebanon could be leveraged to push Hezbollah toward accepting an adjustment in the implementation of UN Resolution 1701. This adjustment would entail Hezbollah withdrawing south of the Litani River in favour of the Lebanese Army before the occupying entity itself withdraws beyond the Blue Line and ceases its violations of Lebanese airspace, i.e., what Resolution 1701 defines as a “complete cessation of hostilities”.
In parallel, the occupying army’s failure to make significant territorial advances in Lebanon, thus preventing it from claiming an outright victory, could be used as leverage in Washington to convince Israel not to exploit Hezbollah’s withdrawal as an opportunity for further incursions. Instead, Israel would be urged to reciprocate by accelerating its withdrawal and ending hostilities, placing this step under the banner of supporting a Lebanese state led by pro-American figures under direct Saudi sponsorship. This would create a third political entity in Lebanon, neither resistance nor occupation, but a “state” aligned with Washington.
This state, in turn, could demand further concessions from the resistance, starting with placing the decision to use weapons exclusively in state hands. In return, Israel would be pressed to withdraw to the armistice line, thus setting the stage for a gradual push toward disarming the resistance, forcing it into a dilemma where it must choose between compliance and isolation. In effect, Israel would achieve what it could not accomplish militarily, while the resistance would be told that, by retreating in favor of the state, Lebanon had gained what it could never have secured through direct confrontation.
• A parallel scheme was envisioned for Syria by Arab thinkers close to Turkey and Qatar, as well as by Turkish strategists and Al Jazeera figures. They theorised that a third space could be constructed between the U.S.-Israel axis and Iran-resistance forces, with Turkey and Qatar playing the role of intermediaries. This would capitalise on the setbacks of war, Iran and the resistance’s preoccupation with it, Russia’s distraction in Ukraine, the devastating impact of U.S. sanctions on the Syrian people, military, and state, as well as the cumulative damage caused by Israeli airstrikes on Syria’s military infrastructure and Iranian supply lines.
The plan envisioned a carefully orchestrated intelligence operation that would ultimately produce a new Syrian regime, aligned with Washington, capable of expelling Iran and the resistance from Syria, severing their supply routes, and weakening Russian influence. This would grant Israel a strategic victory it could never achieve on its own while delivering a major geopolitical prize to Washington. In exchange, Israel would refrain from its security meddling in Syria, and the U.S. would lift sanctions on Damascus and abandon the project of Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria.
• Over the past hundred days, this theory has been tested. The Lebanese initiative gained more traction, successfully securing the presidency for a prominent national figure whose name had been at the top of the list for the post and who required the resistance’s approval, which he ultimately obtained. Similarly, a distinguished individual was selected for the premiership, and the resistance adhered to the outlined conditions, granting the initiative its chance to unfold.
However, in Syria, the plan faced a stark reality: the only viable military force capable of challenging the government was Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham – formerly Jabhat al-Nusra. Despite this complication, ultimately bypassed, the broader scheme proceeded as designed, leading to the fall of the Syrian government and the establishment of a new regime under Turkish and Qatari auspices. Meanwhile, Lebanon held presidential elections, a prime minister was appointed, and a government was formed under direct Saudi sponsorship, all in line with the so-called “opportunity”.
• The outcomes of both experiments in Lebanon and Syria highlight a broader American strategy. This approach coincided with the transition between U.S. presidential administrations, culminating in Donald Trump’s ascent to power and the emergence of a U.S.-Russian understanding to carve out independent spheres of influence with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Israel found itself grappling with post-war vulnerabilities, including a fracturing public opinion that no longer bought into government narratives of victory. This weakness was further underscored by the refusal of displaced settlers to return, and by Israel’s inability to contemplate a Palestinian state as a condition for normalising ties with Saudi Arabia, given the dominance of the settler movement and its messianic vision of the West Bank.
As a result, a shifting American position began to take shape, one that aligned with Israel’s need for internal cohesion and its reliance on brute force. This was reflected in the growing Israeli aggression on both the Lebanese and Syrian fronts, backed by Washington. Most recently, this approach manifested in a U.S. push to bundle Lebanon’s occupied border areas into broader negotiations over unresolved territorial disputes, fully embracing Israel’s strategic outlook. Meanwhile, on the Syrian front, American-backed Israeli incursions intensified further, linking any sanctions relief for Syria, or any economic recovery initiatives for Lebanon, to Israel’s satisfaction.
• In the end, the resistance in Lebanon retreated, paving the way for a state openly aligned with Washington under direct Saudi sponsorship. Was the bet on America justified? Has the land been liberated? Will it ever be, as many once believed, and some still do? In Syria, the government collapsed, replaced by one under Turkish and Qatari patronage. But has this transition brought security and stability? Has Israeli encroachment ceased? Has Syria reclaimed its territorial integrity, or have federalism and sectarian militias become the new reality? Has the country edged closer to internal strife, from the coast to the heartland, all while U.S. sanctions remain firmly in place?
