Strategic Problem Explosion in the Deluge with Elusive Solutions

by Nasser Kandil

In accordance with the concept of the relationship between power surplus and added value being the gauge of strategic capability in states, entities, and forces, what transpired in the Aqsa Deluge is that Al-Mukawama (Resistance) which possesses an added value indisputable in vitality and excellence, represented by the oppression of the Palestinian People, was able to accumulate sufficient added value to demolish the wall of Israeli superiority scattering its stones in the air, a sturdy wall of power surplus which the Israeli relied on to create an added value called normalization with Saudi Arabia from the portal of the “joint Iranian threat.” Instead, the Israeli became entrapped in a formula in which power surplus was lost, and the supposed added value through normalization with Saudi Arabia transformed from a gateway of bypassing the Palestinian Cause to becoming subject to its resolution.
In accordance with the same concept, the Occupation is trapped in a complicated duality. Any investment in added value points i.e. a good reputation, political gain, and advancement in normalization projects, requires concessions in power glory, a forfeit in its use of power surplus, acceptance of regression in position and status, and concessions in its role and on the ground. Any time it invests in power surplus for more geographical gain and demonstration of combat field superiority, it finds itself besieged by hostile international and regional environments to the point of openly accusing it of crimes and threatening isolation. The Occupation finds its renewed efforts to bring together more power surplus and added value, which it had previously accomplished, fruitless. Meanwhile the reverse is occurring on the Palestinian bank. More Palestinian success in the game of power is increasing its chances for success in the arena of moral superiority and earning it more favor and moral support.
At the strategic level, the third dilemma imposed by the Deluge and its aftermath has put the Occupation face to face with a challenge of the magnitude of the need for a saturating demonstration of power surplus to regain the status lost on the day of the Deluge, which implies pulverizing Al-Mukawama and getting rid of it as a force in Gaza. Such complete victory in the power surplus arena implies by necessity the acceptance of a complete defeat in the added value arena i.e. the loss of global support and political maneuvering ability in the Arab arena.
Al-Mukawama’s defeat will result in feelings of defeat among the Arab populations and rob normalization projects of their moral flavor manifesting as a voluntary dismantling by Arab Populations of the centrality of the Palestinian Cause under the pretext of the precedence of nationalism over pan-nationalism, which will turn normalization into an instrument of surrender acknowledging defeat and conceding to the victor. Parallel to it, a complete victory in the power arena in no longer possible without representing a complete defeat to all of the Al-Mukawama forces because of field interdependence, which will necessitate these forces to prepare to go far in an all-out war to prevent such a defeat. This in turn means that “Israel” and America will have to invest further in power surplus and engage in war at a higher level, requirements for which neither appears to possess, along with finding in their calculations for such an option no guarantee for victory.

All this is occurring at a global moment unfavorable to America and the West, in which the Ukranian war represents a test for the claim that America possesses power surplus along with moral superiority, similar to “Israel’s” claims before the Deluge. Washington, who used to believe that it was capable of serving the Ukranian front sufficiently to drain Russia, stating that it was providing enough support to a sovereign country and a people facing occupation and aggression to defend themselves against an overpowering force, finds itself after the Deluge unable to provide for the needs of “Israel” and the Ukraine simultaneously, and finds that prioritizing “Israel” is Ukraine’s loss, and discovers that its slogans in the Ukraine have become binding in the Israeli case. Any support for “Israel” has become support of Russia’s discourse in the Ukranian war, and all support for Ukraine’s discourse has become a ratification of the Palestinian narrative. Ameirca fell into what “Israel” had fallen into, namely the impossibility of holding together gains in power surplus and added value on the one hand, and impotence in serving two fronts simultaneously, and simultaneously, victory on both fronts. The two fronts in America’s case are the Ukraine and “Israel” and in the “Israeli” case, the northern front with Lebanon and the southern front with Gaza.

Europe’s geographical position closer to both fronts, Palestine and the Ukraine, sheds more light on the dilemma. Yemen’s position on the maritime divide between the two fronts, namely that of the occupation of Gaza and that of the normalization with Saudi Arabia, highlights further the nature and magnitude of the American and European dilemma. Like Gaza, Yemen was able to gather the power surplus necessary to protect added value by making Gaza the headline for the maritime equation it holds onto, namely siege on “Israel” until the removal of the siege on Gaza.
All of those manifestations are signs of the formation of a new world on Palestine’s tempo, from Brazil to South Africa, and from Rachel Corrie to Aaron Bushnell, a course which does not appear containable with small arrangements, even if they looked possible or necessary, and if undertaken, will only be steps in a context continuing and reaching the end of its course.