American Israeli Modifications in the Form of the War and its Goals

By Nasser Kandil

The war designed by the American and Israeli on the 8th of October of the preceding year following the Aqsa Deluge operation ended with an abject failure in terms of goal achievement. It was a war of triple goals, a land war to reoccupy the Gaza strip, eradication of Hamas’ military, political, and civil administrative structures, and freeing the hostages from its grip by force. The calculations for this war were also based on triple assumptions: firstly the indisputable ability of the occupation’s army to achieve victory over the resistance in Gaza by mere readiness to tolerate the human price it had formerly avoided to pay, an avoidance which cost it double the price in the Deluge; secondly that the American deterrence will prevent any attempt by the Resistance Axis ( Al Mukawama) forces from intervening in support of Gaza and its resistance; and thirdly that control over world media through American Israeli cooperation will guarantee the support of Western public opinion and subsequently result in comfort for Western governments despite heavy civilian casualties during the war, with the American veto being sufficient to prevent any resolution initiated by supporters of the Palestinian cause and rivals of Washington and Tel Aviv, with the implication that time will play to the advantage of America and “Israel”.
What has proved in practice is that the American Israeli calculations were sentimental and mistaken in view of the collapse of the three premises on which the war was waged. What has become apparent is that the Occupation’s military is paying the price and more, but is not achieving victory; America brings forth its deterrence power but does not deter; while the Resistance (Al Mukawama) in the region is ready to risk a major confrontation as a price for its determination to offer support to Gaza and its Resistance. What has also become apparent is that the control of the giant world media and holding steadfastly to veto power in the U.N. Security Council does not guarantee control over the time factor which changed by going against the American Israeli war, with a resounding Western street calling for Palestine, activated by millions of tweets and videos posted by Palestinian youths, who were successful in fighting on social media,the narrative war,and winning it.What ensued from the collapse of these three basis for this war is its failure and the crumbling of its goals, with the desired control over Gaza despite numerous land incursions, the eradication of the Resistance, and freedom for the hostages all unrealized.
The entry of the Resistance Axis (Mihwar Al Mukawama) forces on the scene brought about two big problems which rendered intolerable the impact of the time factor. One problem is the insult to the American image in the Red Sea through the challenge imposed and won by a modest force like Ansar Allah, under the rubric of the siege on Gaza vis a vis the siege on the entity. The other problem is the existential stability for the entity in terms of the challenge of ensuring security for settlers in the north of Palestine, against Hizballah,who cannot be beaten in a war venture.Given the formula of security for Gaza for security for the settlers in the north, and in a stumbling war and the impossibility of guaranteeing any goal realization through its continuation, and with its continuation assuring more pressing crises, the American elections enter its critical period with time pressuring to end the war as a condition for improving President Joe Biden’s success chances.

Exiting the war has become a certainty in order to reorganize American cards in the region and to put an end to the accumulating damages. Such exit calls for a framework which shields the occupying entity from an image of clear defeat, and prevents America from appearing in a position of strategic defeat: reasons for the onset of American movement towards modification of the war’s nature and goals. The alternative American threefold proposal to the Israeli is firstly joint security warfare targeting the resistance forces in Gaza,to which regional partners including Arabs are called on to participate, in lieu of an ongoing clamorous war; secondly incapacitating Hamas from a repetition of the Aqsa Deluge,in place of the idea of eradicating it through war as an impossibility, per John Kirby, the US National Security Coordinator for Strategic Communications; and instead of freeing the hostages by force, being satisfied with freeing them, albeit, through negotiations.

Such triple goals will make it possible for “Israel” to claim that it won the war, especially if ending the war is attached to exchanging an American strategic defeat with the generation, under American leadership, of a strategic regional transformation entitled the twostate solution as a trade of for Saudi Israeli normalization. Such thunderous event will then dominate over the image of defeat and failure in the Gaza war, and will move crises over to the opposing bank which is expected to crack under the pressure of how to deal with the duo of Saudi Israeli normalization on one hand, and the twostate solution on the other.

The Axis of Resistance (Mihwar Al Mukawama) does not openly discuss possible hypotheses, but is ready to deal with every scenario arising under the big rubricof the new strategic victory of the Gaza war, and the Deluge’s success in restoring the Palestinian cause as the key for war and politics in the region. The Axis is capable of dealing with the leaders engaged in settlementsas well as the contents of such settlements, and feels no embarrassment in handling the political opportunities resulting from its victories so long as it had decided to win the war by points.