What about Biden’s Initiative?

By Nasser Kandil

The U.S. President, Joe Biden’s, press conference about the region’s situation, the future of the war in Gaza, and negotiations to reach an agreement to end it raises three issues. The first is the identity of the author of these suggestions which Biden attributed to the occupying entity, and devoted principal segments of his press conference beseeching the entity’s leaders to support the initiative as the opportunity to avert drowning in a possibly unending war, and attacking those who want to continue the war and talk about total victory. The second issue is knowing the difference between the provisions he announced as the framework for an accord, and the provisions which Hamas informed the mediators its agreement on and were subsequently refused by Benyamin Netanyahu’s government. The third is how Al Mukawama (the Resistance) will deal with these proposals and what it contains in terms of American guarantees.
Regarding the first point at issue, it appears clear from the manner in which Biden spoke, that the proposals have not received Benyamin Netanyahu’s clear and forthright acceptance. Otherwise, Biden would not have called on the Israeli leadership to support the proposal and not waste the opportunity. Comments from the entity, including those issued by Netanyahu’s office, though not directly referring to Biden’s talk, and specifically Netanyahu’s affirmation of his adherence to the aims of the war until the elimination of Hamas, confirm Netanyahu’s refusal of Biden’s discourse and initiative. This was followed by quotes from a senior official, usually referring to Netanyahu, accusing Biden of weakness and ignorance of reality. What this points to is that Biden’s reference to the entity is closer to being a reference to some parties in the entity relying on Biden’s adoption of these proposals to launch dynamics opening the way for the initiative. Such parties, in all probability, are the heads of the security apparatus led by the Chief of the Mossad who presides over the management of the negotiating team, supported this time by the Chief of Staff and possibly by the Minister of War and a number of Likud Knesset members, all of whom realize that the road before the war is blocked, and know well the huge costs incurred by the military in the form of daily losses of soldiers, officers, and materiel, and the army reaching the brink of collapse. Yesterday’s (May 31, 2024) news published in the entity’s newspapers about the refusal of 48 % of officers to sign new service contracts against 42% who agreed, sheds the light on the degree of deterioration in the army, in light of the escalating war of attrition which is being launched by Al Mukawama in Gaza and its supporting fronts.
Regarding the second issue and the content of the proposals, we stand in front of modifications to the deal agreed on by Hamas, adopting the entity’s viewpoint about the fundamental issue of a definitive ending of the war. What Biden announced says that negotiations about enduring pacification starts in the first phase, while a cessation of all military acts continues to allow for the continuation of the negotiations, even if the period designated for the first phase lapses. However, the second phase which includes the release of the living officer and soldier detainees commences, and is not predicated on an announcement of the end of the war. This contradicts the deal agreed on by Hamas, and offers in its place a standing in between a promise, an aspiration, a commitment, and a guarantee on the American part that such agreement is an announcement of the end to the war. The second discrepancy is that the text Hamas agreed on contained the complete withdrawal of the Occupation’s forces from Gaza following the end of the war and not withdrawal only from populated areas, as well as with the complete and final lifting of the blockade. These clauses remained ambiguous in Biden’s proposal, and were juxtaposed with a commitment for rebuilding. In parallel, Biden’s proposals offer the Occupation compensations for ending the war, namely Arab guarantees that Hamas will not go back to governing Gaza, that Hamas will be incapable of going back to a new October 7, and an entrée to normalization with Saudi Arabia if the agreement is reached.
The third point relates to Al Mukawama’s position. Concerned about dealing responsibly and in earnest in handling the political dossier of its war, demonstrating exceptional skill and competence in its handling, when Al Mukawama was able to accept the deal offered by the mediators, which the Americans ignored and the Israelis disavowed, it received a widespread popular, political, moral and ethical endorsement to go to war, a war of attrition which led to the failure of the war on Rafah and opened the door for Biden’s initiative. Cognizant that what is before it is a new discourse by the U.S. President, Joe Biden, and well aware that it is the same Biden, partner in the war and its crimes, and not the honest and impartial broker, and conscious to the same degree that the initiative is an expression of the dilemma the war is in and its failure owing to the resilience and sacrifices of the Palestinian people and Al Mukawama’s heroism and achievements, Al Mukawama has a great deal to say should it return to the negotiating table on the basis of Biden’s initiative. Al Mukawama is not required to comment before the announced acceptance of the initiative from the entity, at its head Netanyahu. Since the previously announced acceptance of the mediators’ proposal went to waste, it is incumbent on Biden, his administration, and the other mediators to guarantee Netanyahu’s acceptance before asking
Al Mukawama for its position.