Is the Occupation’s Army at the Brink of Collapse?

By Nasser Kandil
Numerous articles have discussed the angle of political physics such as the loss of propulsion force and reaching the critical point, applying it on the condition of the Occupation’s army in its confrontation with the Al Mukawama Axis forces, with all charts comparing the degree of cohesiveness among the Occupation’s and Al Mukawama’s embracing and supportive milieus, revealing a great deterioration in the former’s when compared with the solidarity and cohesion on Al Mukawama’s side. Similarly, all the charts reveal regression in the Occupation’s military performance, fighting spirit, combat vitality, and combat skills and its opposite for
Al Mukawama, in addition to the compensation ability for human and material losses and the amassment of power surplus for Al Mukawama, and fatal attrition for the Occupation. What we conclude from these comparisons points in the direction of the Occupation army’s nearing the so called critical moment in this open ended war.
In physics, the critical moment is the moment when a qualitative change occurs, such as the critical temperature when water boils and starts evaporating, and in the case of armies, the point when it is no longer possible to mask the defects resulting from the loss of 50% of its propulsion force and its entry into the phase of weakening and debilitation. Signs of deterioration and poor performance, abandonment of posts, desertion, shortage in numbers necessary for combat in the units, and deficiency in specialties needed to complete the formation of these units, have all become evident in the Occupation’s military units This is coupled with an absence of enthusiasm, vitality, and combat spirit in confrontations at the moment of clash and engagement, to the point that when geography changes hands, and the Occupation’s army voluntarily retreats as a translation for its impotence, it does so without any guarantee that Al Mukawama will not fill this vacuum.
Neither threats nor proposals or enticements have succeeded in freezing the impact of the role of lebanon’s supportive front which Hizbollah plays, making the solution to all the problems caused by this supportive front tied to the condition of ending the war on Gaza. In Gaza, it is apparent that Al Mukawama holds the initiative on the battle field, transforming the battle in Rafah from an opportunity for the Occupation into a liability which does not realize the solemn promise of a decisive victory, with no alternatives left to talk about a continued large scale military operation. It is no secret that Al Mukawama as an axis has come to the conviction that the hostage dossier is insufficient to produce a formula which brings the Occupation’s government to worthwhile negotiations resulting in a settlement meeting Al Mukawama’s conditions, after it confirmed its positive attitude in negotiations by accepting last May 6 proposal, and being liberated from the concern about a tumble down into a large scale war after the Iranian deterrent response last April 14, the Israeli flight from a response to the response, and the firm American acceptance of regression in face of Iran’s dominant presence in the region’s strategic deterrence scene.
Building on these three elements, the weakness of the hostage dossier’s effectiveness in Netanyahu’s calculations, regression in the prominence of the avoidance of a large scale war in Al Mukawama’s calculations, and the presence of a text from the mediators which can be transformed into a settlement, Al Mukawama transitioned to a new program aimed at driving the Occupation’s army to the critical point, meaning to the brink of collapse, as the only path to impose worthwhile negotiations. Driving the army to the critical point became the only way to bring the Occupation to worthwhile negotiations, given that worldwide public opinion does not deter Benyamin Netanyahu’s wisdom with continuing support and protection from Washington, and internal protests do not force Netanyahu to meaningful negotiations with his hold on a sufficient majority in the Knesset.
For two months and longer since May 6, the Occupation’s army had been facing a good number of damaging attacks and has lost scores in military hardware and mechanized equipment and hundreds of soldiers and officers, with its image as a fighting army flailing in the eyes the settlers, such that signs of the transformation sought by Al Mukawama began to appear in American newspapers. Occupation Generals began talking about an exchange agreement which ends the war and keeps Gaza under Hamas’ control, and an army spokesman stated that getting rid of Hamas is akin to throwing sand in the eyes of Israelis and is an unattainable goal. Dissention became public between pillars in the government and the heads of the military and security organizations, placing matters between two options. The first is the revelation of the weakness of the military and security organizations by succumbing to the government’s unachievable demands, which makes it of importance for Al Mukawama to study the transition to counter attack to regain Gaza’s territory through semi-conventional military operations to forcibly expel the Occupation’s army. The second option is the military and security organizations’ success, through American support, in avoiding collapse, by pressuring for a negotiated agreement to end the war satisfactory to Al Mukawama.
What is occurring now calls for verification about whether the Occupation’s army has reached the critical point.