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Political Games in Washington and Tel Aviv and the War

Dotting i’s and Crossing t’s

Nasser Kandil

In the constant comparisons made by researchers and those following the state of the confrontation between the Axis of Al Mukawama and the American Israeli duo, one cannot ignore a focal point, the presence of which becomes more prominent during times of crises and election periods, namely the position the game of domestic politics occupies in influencing the war-related strategic decisions taken in each of the U.S. and the occupying entity, and the degree of truth in talk about what is commonly called the “deep state” and its exerted control to ensure consistency in the performance of institutions in accordance with what is termed “best interest” and the concept of national security, and continued immunity from influences of manoeuvers, political games, voter mobilization, the pursuit of gaining votes imposed by different phases in elections, and attunement to public sentiment in times of crisis.
This war appears to be the most difficult test on two levels, firstly in the ability of political decision-makers to turn their back on political equations in the street and directions in public opinion, which increases in presence during periods of crises and elections, and secondly in the capability of the “deep state” of imposing its will on signatories holding decision-making offices.
We are witnessing an unprecedented American election testing the future of each of the competing parties, behind which stand economic sectors, establishments, and a network of interests which cannot be ignored, and who are looking for victory in elections which they deem existential. This explains the talk about civil war, and the pressure exerted on their respective representative in this election to bring into a harmonized whole all performances holding the best chances for victory. In the occupying entity, the change in public opinion for ending the war exerts pressure on political players and raises panic in Netanyahu about the prospect of losing majority in the Knesset, leading him to threaten with civil war under the pretense of a warning.
In juxtaposition, symbols of the “deep state” in the military and security establishments in Washington and Tel Aviv appear to be impotent in agreeing on a unified identification of best interest and the concept of national security. Some high-ranking officials in the American establishment believe that identification with Netanyahu’s position is resulting in irreparable losses from the perspective of American interests, and that a wise American leadership will attune its stance with the requirements of international and Arab mobilization for ending the war, and a settlement of the Case of Palestine via viable formulas refused by the rulers in the occupying entity, and that the American leadership, if willing, has the power to make military and financial aid contingent on accepting such terms of American policy.
Others in the military and security establishments see that weakening the image of a powerful “Israel” will embolden
Al Mukawama forces to increasingly challenge American influence and “Israel” itself, and that the conflict in the area will morph into successive American and Israeli losses leading to an ultimate loss, and that the price of standing behind the Israeli war remains less than the price of adopting a spirit of retreat and accommodation.
In the occupying entity, the military and security establishments appear confused between three directions, one stating that proceeding with pressure on the military to continue the war implies speeding up defeat and an irreparable aftermath, while voluntarily accepting a certain level of defeat opens the possibility for future rehabilitation plans. A second direction states that acceptance of Al Mukawama’s conditions to end the war will create a ceiling under which the entity will find itself in any preparation for prioritizing an end to the war, and under a similar ceiling in the northern front, and that matters will soon stumble into settlement processes entitled loosening the Israeli grip on the West Bank in favor of the Palestinian Authority, which will in turn be exploited by Al Mukawama forces, leading “Israel” to face another Gaza in the West Bank, signaling the beginning of the end. Meanwhile, the cost of adjusting with a war of attrition which escalates and de-escalates, and includes intermittent truces, remains less than the resounding defeat which prioritization of an end to the war will carry. The third direction is represented by officers in the military and security establishments whose behavior is motivated by the desire to avoid being questioned about what occurred on October 7th and later in the Gaza war, and are in a state of perplexity centered around placing responsibility on the political echelon and having had to bear the consequences of their decisions.
As a result, what can be deduced is the total absence of a strategic perspective guiding the American-Israeli embroilment in the war and negotiations, and the absence of forces which could unify the political and military bodies in Washington and Tel Aviv under that perspective. This explains the state of flux, hesitance, confusion, and the state of “day by day” in the absence of an action plan. The reverse is occurring at the level of the Axis of Al Mukawama where the relationship between the decision-making leadership, among themselves and with their public, which is free from aspirations for political power or factional gains, but is instead governed by a clear vision for the war, its role, the requirements for engagement and victory, and the full confidence in the decisions by Al Mukawama in Gaza about war and negotiations, granting it full and open ended decision-making power on behalf of the entire Axis, and placing all sacrifices and capabilities of states and forces at its disposal.
We are facing a differential in firepower equilibrium administered by two sides, one using criteria of fidelity, sincerity, morality, and considerations of principles and causes, and the other using conspiracy, intrigue, and considerations of office and gains criteria. This reveals the secret behind the balance weighing in favor of victory for the front of virtue, right, and patience.

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