Nasser Kandil
July 31, 2024
The occupation military’s attack on Al Dahieh, Beirut’s southern suburb, and targeting a Hezbollah high-ranking commander, regardless of its success or failure, is a decision to change the rules of engagement, with targeting of Al Dahieh constituting the risk of a large scale war, and possibly, a regional war. What the occupation wants to say is that operations of such nature are now on its agenda and should not lead to a large scale war, i.e. Al Mukawama should adjust to the occupation’s modification to the rules of engagement which snatches from her the upper hand, after Al Mukawama’s proven superiority in holding the reins of initiative and setting the fluctuating rules of engagement over the last 10 months.
The occupying entity refrained from such a decision the day of the Iranian deterrence, because of the level of risk involved, despite the desire and ardent pursuit for a response of a similar magnitude to Iran’s interior, a response it had to overlook because of the American decision not to respond which the entity’s leaders had to abide by. The significance is that the American decision, which had prohibited responding to the Iranian response because of fear of the possibility of a large scale war and America’s involvement, is what has allowed the entity to take the risk of changing the rules of engagement, based on the assumption that such changes will become established and a proof that they will not lead the region to a large scale war.
The American decision to avoid a large scale war has not changed. What has changed is that taking risks at the edge of the precipice to modify the rules of engagement is now permitted, placing
Al Mukawama between two options, taking the modification in stride and adjusting to it, or undertaking the risk of a large scale war. This change was made during the visit of the entity’s Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu to Washington, outside of the media game Netanyahu played before the Congress, and is based on an American-Israeli deal, linking the escalation which serves an American quest to wriggle out of the demands for withdrawal of its forces from Iraq and Syria, to the Israeli delegation to Washington of the Gaza negotiations dossier, and American endeavor to modify the agreement to conform to Netanyahu’s terms, which were agreed on with him. This change will inevitably take the region to a high level of escalation, the escalation which Russian President Vladimir Putin talked about before the missile explosion in Majdal Shams, shedding the light on the missile’s mission, and who, deliberately and not accidentally, is behind it.
Majdal Shams and the Golan residents aborted half of the missile’s mission by expelling Netanyahu and refusing for the occupation to launch wars under the pretext of their children’s blood, an accomplishment supported by the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, and making clear the polarity after the game of manipulation of alignments failed. The escalation round, which we are in the heart of, originates from two sources: American and Israeli. On the one hand they are the weakest party in the region’s power equations, on the other hand they are the party unable to tolerate the consequences of a large scale war, and smartness is ineffective in the face of intelligence. Al Mukawama, which does not fear a large scale war, is ready to play at the edge of the precipice, and will throw back the fireball to the entity’s playground in a painful blow from outside the box of customary targets, shattering the rules of engagement, telling the occupation that it has to adjust to this genre of blows without it leading to a large scale war, and if it wants a large scale war, it has to take the initiative and bear its consequences. Perhaps the occupation will respond with a harder blow than yesterday’s operation, and will receive harder and harder blows, bringing us closer to the edge of the precipice, with the party desirous of a large scale war yet fearful of it, and the party that has no desire for a large scale war but does not fear it.
Yesterday, the region climbed up one step on the ladder of escalation, and will climb another step with Al Mukawama’s response. It appears that Washington and Tel Aviv are safeguarding the platform of negotiations on Gaza as an exit strategy, and when the critical danger point is reached, agreement on a settlement will be speeded, knowing that its declaration will stop the wars on the supportive fronts. This defines the transition from negotiations on a hot tin roof to playing on the edge of the precipice, and is a good expression for Washington’s and Israel’s dilemma, in which either going to war, or agreeing to Al Mukawama’s terms, spells catastrophe.
