Has Russia’s stance on the “Al-Aqsa Flood” war changed?

The political editor wrote:

• In our effort to understand, analyse, and grasp the background of current events, we consider three significant occurrences that command attention and defy simplistic explanations. It is insufficient to merely claim that Russia is passively observing the developments in the “Al-Aqsa Flood” war, offering only political and media support to the Palestinian stance, the resistance forces, Iran, and Syria. Instead, Russia diplomatically maintains a firm position against American attempts to leverage the UN Security Council and other international bodies to weaken the Palestinians and their allies in the resistance axis. Whenever possible, Russia proactively advances initiatives aligned with Palestinian aspirations to halt aggression and pave the way for a political solution based on international law and resolutions, fostering hope for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
• The first notable event is that Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first to warn of the current escalation. This warning came during an unannounced summit with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, where Putin publicly declared that Moscow was well aware of the proceedings in Washington during the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Putin’s remarks coincided with Netanyahu’s speech before Congress on July 25, initiating a rapid escalation sequence that followed Putin’s statements. The situation unravelled as follows: the explosion in Majdal Shams on July 28, which claimed the lives of twelve civilian Syrian youngsters from the town that has been opposing occupation for over half a century. What followed was immediate accusations by Israeli political and military leaders towards Hezbollah for responsibility for the alleged missile that caused the explosion. Israel vowed retaliation, and within hours, the US, through its Secretary of State and Vice President, expressed support for Israel’s “right to self-defence.” On July 29, Israeli airstrikes targeted a building in Beirut’s southern suburbs, killing a man described as Hezbollah’s Chief of Staff, Fouad Shukar, whom both Israel and the US claimed they had been pursuing for forty years.
• No one questioned which was easier to orchestrate—the Majdal Shams explosion or reaching and assassinating Fouad Shukar—but Putin’s preemptive remarks about the escalation heightened awareness. His reference to Syria as part of the escalation, particularly in Majdal Shams, the most important occupied Syrian city, turned the explosion into a pretext for the assassination of a prominent resistance figure. Meanwhile, under the operation’s cover, a second assassination attempt targeted Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran during an official diplomatic visit for the inauguration of Iran’s new president. The US rationalised the assassination as an extension of the Gaza conflict. When Iran and Hezbollah announced their intention to respond, the US declared its intent to send troops and aircraft carriers to the region to provide necessary protection for Israel, clarifying the nature of the Washington-Tel Aviv agreement. The American airstrike on a Popular Mobilization Forces site near Baghdad on July 30 further elucidated Netanyahu’s understandings in Washington, linking the “Al-Aqsa Flood” war with the future presence of US forces in Syria and Iraq, particularly Syria, which is considered a vital security interest for both America and Israel.
• Putin’s keen interest became more evident with the unfolding situation in Syria, especially regarding America’s insistence on maintaining the occupation in eastern Syria to prevent its reunification, exploit its oil resources, and hinder its economic recovery. The question was how Moscow would manifest this interest. On August 5, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Tehran, and reports of Russian-Iranian military and security cooperation, including Russia supplying Iran with modern weapons and military equipment, surfaced in American and Arab newspapers. This recalls Putin’s remarks about Moscow’s intention to supply those fighting America with advanced, long-range Russian weapons in response to America’s provision of weapons to Ukraine that reach deep into Russia.
• The third significant event is the White House’s concern over Russia’s transition from political and diplomatic support for Iran to military support. Netanyahu committed to fighting for America’s occupation of eastern Syria against Iran and Hezbollah by merging the “Al-Aqsa Flood” war with the war for the American occupation’s survival but is America’s insistence on maintaining the occupation of eastern Syria, viewed by Moscow as a war against Russia? Has Russia found that it cannot avoid responding to this merging of conflicts? Has it recognised America’s shift from its previous stance of freezing Middle East conflicts to focus on confronting Russia and China, to a new stance where control over the Middle East is a gateway to winning the confrontation with Russia and China, thus preventing Moscow from merely observing and intervening from a distance?