Are they talking about the possibility of an agreement?

The political editor wrote

• The American statement, signed by President Joe Biden and co-signed by the Emir of Qatar and the President of Egypt, speaks of an opportunity for an agreement regarding the Gaza war.

The Americans claim it will secure a ceasefire and free the hostages, but they don’t mention a complete end to the war or a guarantee of prisoner exchanges. The language used reflects the perspective of Netanyahu’s government, which the Biden administration adopts and echoes, and the Arab partners in the mediation efforts seem unable to alter this narrative.

Even if we overlook the considerable implications of this phrasing—which reveals the American perspective on the agreement and underscores the superficiality of the Arab role in the mediation process—we must still question the seriousness of this opportunity.

• Those promoting the idea of an opportunity describe a narrative where Washington has provided Benjamin Netanyahu with a semblance of victory after the setbacks of the “al-Tofan” operation, the failure of the Gaza war, and the difficulties in dismantling the Lebanese and Yemeni support fronts—challenges that have posed substantial problems for the occupying entity.

The victory narrative is rooted in the audacious attacks on two key capitals, Beirut and Tehran—both previously considered red lines—where senior leaders, each representing a significant red line, were assassinated.

The subsequent American military build-up to shield the entity from the expected retaliations by Iran and the resistance offers Washington an opportunity to extract a price for this perceived victory: the Gaza agreement.

• However, Netanyahu has yet to announce his acceptance of the agreement, which the American statement—endorsed by two Arab signatures—claims is ready and only requires negotiation of implementation mechanisms. Instead, Netanyahu indicated that he would send a negotiating team to discuss not only the implementation mechanisms but also the terms and framework of the agreement itself. This indicates that there is no assurance of a successful outcome, and the likelihood of failure, as seen in previous negotiations, remains a real possibility.
• Netanyahu views every potential agreement through the prism of maintaining his government’s cohesion, which hinges on the support of his so-called “extremist” allies—as though Netanyahu himself could be considered a moderate. If Washington’s proposal is tailored to Netanyahu’s terms, rather than merely a slightly altered version of the previous offer that Hamas had accepted with some cosmetic changes, what does this imply for the resistance?
• Hamas is now led by its president Yahya Sinwar who succeeded Ismail Haniyeh following Haniyeh’s martyrdom in an assassination in Tehran. Sinwar understands that a key aim of the negotiations is to undermine the Iranian and resistance response to the assassination. And that negotiations conducted after the response would differ significantly in terms of power dynamics compared to those held before the response or those aimed at preventing it. He also understands that Netanyahu, emboldened by his recent operations, is unlikely to be more willing to accept the resistance’s terms than he was before these actions. The increased American military presence heightens Netanyahu’s confidence in strengthening his negotiating position, while the push for negotiations to prevent a response only further emboldens him.Thus, there is no evidence to suggest a new outcome will materialise, other than buying time and delaying the response.
• The resistance in Gaza has no further terms to negotiate, having already accepted the previous offer’s terms and framework. If the mediators wish to negotiate these terms and framework with Netanyahu’s representatives, they can do so. Once an understanding is reached with Netanyahu and the negotiations shift, as stated, to focus on implementation mechanisms, the resistance may then participate.
• The resistance might agree to participate, but it will set time limits and conditions, including halting the killing and destruction and allowing aid during the negotiations.

If negotiations fail to produce results by the end of the set timeframe, the resistance will not continue to shield Netanyahu from accountability, allowing him to buy more time for further violence.

If the massacres continue and aid is not delivered, negotiations become meaningless. Should the Americans use the talks merely to reward Netanyahu for the assassinations, leveraging their military presence to support him, the resistance will remain with its people and allies on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table.

Only when the Americans and Israelis acknowledge that the balance of power is not in their favour and agree to terms that meet the resistance’s conditions will there be grounds for negotiation.