August 29, 2024
Albinaa’ Newspaper
Nasser Kandil
From the occupying entity’s perspective, the West Bank’s pivotal position in its strategic security and ideological dimension has not changed. Gaza’s standing after withdrawal from the strip in 2005 was derived from the degree of All Mukawama’s involvement to prevent what the entity planned and the actions it took in the West Bank, Jerusalem included, and especially in
Al Aqsa Masjid (Mosque), and the meaning embodied in Saif Al Quds (Jerusalem’s Sword) and
Al Aqsa Toufaan (Al Aqsa Deluge). When the entity seemed to regain historical dreams of displacement in Gaza and its annexation to the entity’s geography, and opening it to settlement and investment from the hypothetical gateway of the Ben Gurion Canal and natural gas platforms, the basis appeared a stage of power arrogance power which settled in the heart of the entity’s leadership given the vengeful rage which seemed to unite the entity politically behind its military to exact a historic revenge, with such psychological and moral mobilization accepting the sacrifices required to realize this historical dream which was unattainable before. This was especially shored up by the horde of Western countries coming to support the entity, and the American military hordes coming to support the entity and defend it. However, the West Bank as the point which tips the scale, remained present in the minds of the entity’s leaders, whether the control over Gaza took place or not.
Just like in Gaza, there exists in the West Bank a higher ceiling and a lower ceiling, and a current time and a later time. Assuming that the higher ceilings in Gaza and the West Bank are interrelated organically, which are the displacement endeavor and the hoped for demographic numerical advantage in favor of the concept of a Jewish State, failure on this dimension in Gaza and the rootedness of Palestinians in their land in spite of the massacres makes it difficult to conceive of chances for success of displacement in the West Bank. If the later time in Gaza is a time for an agreement which the entity strives to make as close as possible to the minimum required to avoid defeat if creating an image of victory became impossible, the current time in Gaza is more of buying time, but this time to enable more achievements in the West Bank, especially reaping gains in Jerusalem and Al Aqsa.
What is evident is that advancing the calendar on the big military campaign in the West Bank came after Hezbollah’s response and the change it effected and was alluded to by the discourse of the entity’s leaders which set war rhetoric aside, with the statements coming out from all their mouths on the day of the response that a war and escalation were undesirable. Added to their statements were Netanyahu’s about handling the situation of the entity’s displaced from the north without declaring the means, and especially the words of War Minister Yoav Galant, the daily voice of war, saying that the war on Hezbollah will be not now, but in the distant future.
When the understanding of the entity’s leaders about Lebanon’s front changes to conceding that the bet on power equations and bullying relying on the presence of American military hordes, threats of war, or engagement in war partially or in full is no remedy for the nature of the challenge this fronts presents, it will mean a double image of victory for Hezbollah: winning the war of deterrence anew on the one hand, and on the other hand, the entity’s transition to an equation in which Hezbollah says no way exists to stop the ramifications caused by Lebanon’s front in terms of deterrence and in the matter of the displaced settlers except through an agreement on Gaza which ends the war, a formula acknowledged by the West, at its head America, after long months of pressure exertion attempts. This makes the war on the West Bank due, and investment in the time made available through the ongoing war in Gaza and the wars in support, to impose a fait accompli well suited security wise and ideologically to the entity and its government, and in the case of powerlessness at displacement, the goal and plan are eradication of resistance hubs and sanitization of the West Bank and Jerusalem, even if massacres similar to the continuing ones in Gaza are required.
The entity, through the escalation in the West Bank, wants to embarrass Al Mukawama in all her components by raising the question about the efficacy of her reinforcement and support, though it knows from an operational standpoint that victory in the West Bank is not possible, and that the importance of the security provided by the West Bank is measured by the ability to have the ideological dimension translated in Jerusalem, and in Al Aqsa Masjid in particular, by marketing such achievement as a cover for any agreement on Gaza, to say that Gaza was a threat when it rose to defend the West Bank and Al Aqsa, that the days of Saif Al Quds (Jerusalem’s Sword) and Al Aqsa Toufaan (Al Aqsa Deluge ) are over, and that the measure of changing the reality in Jerusalem is what is evoked outside of Jerusalem, and not what is in the hands of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to change it.
It could be assumed that the entity’s leaders who have been building their calculations on the difficulty for Al Mukawama Axis to intervene directly in the war on the West Bank to defend it, to also take into account that the situation regarding Jerusalem differs because it holds the balance of victory and defeat. Al Mukawama Axis came into existence on the formula declared a few years ago by Hezbollah’s Secretary General and supported by Ansar Allah Movement’s Leader, when there was no war in Gaza or the West Bank, and before the Toufaan (Deluge), that a threat on Al Aqsa equals a regional war. It behooves the entity’s leaders to remember this formula, and to consider that it came about before the Gaza War, and will continue to exist after it ends.
