September 11, 2024
By Nasser Kandil
• The occupying entity’s leadership had envisioned the West Bank falling decisively once the war on Gaza was concluded, under the illusion of achieving a total victory in response to Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Some in the entity even harbored hopes of successfully displacing Gaza’s population, viewing it as a precursor to initiating a similar displacement in the West Bank.
• However, those hopes of a swift knockout in the West Bank – and certainly of any displacement plan – faded alongside the diminishing prospects of winning the war on Gaza and expelling its residents. The focus shifted to securing a deterrence victory against Lebanon as a means to negotiate an agreement that would meet the entity’s conditions for ending the Gaza war. This plan hinged on Gaza losing its role as a pillar of support for the West Bank resistance, which had often triggered wars against Gaza in retaliation for this support. Weakening Gaza was seen as a potential opportunity to reshape the power dynamics in the West Bank.
Yet, Hezbollah’s retaliation to the entity’s attack on Beirut’s southern suburbs and the assassination of Commander Fouad Shakr shattered any notions of a war on Lebanon and further eroded the entity’s deterrence capabilities against the Lebanese resistance. This left the decision to launch a war on the West Bank squarely on the table.
• The campaign in the West Bank commenced with the intention of uprooting resistance forces in anticipation of any future negotiations on Gaza. Negotiations had become inevitable as the prospect of a decisive military victory vanished, leaving the war as little more than a deadly machine targeting civilians.
• During the campaign, the occupying army faced a dilemma: either limit the operation to the northern West Bank and risk losing territory to the resistance, which could manoeuvre between cities and refugee camps, or expand the operation to cover the entire West Bank, which would provoke the mobilisation of both Fatah and elements of the Palestinian Authority alongside the resistance factions. This escalation could also incite settlers to commit brutal acts, fueling widespread Palestinian popular support for the resistance.
In response, the occupying army opted to besiege the northern West Bank, hoping to crush the resistance groups there without triggering the wider risks associated with expanding the operation across the entire West Bank.
• Just two days ago, resistance factions in Jenin camp – considered the heart of the campaign – held a military parade, with hundreds of fighters participating fully armed. This display of force, ten days into the campaign, signals its abject failure. The killings by the occupying forces mirror the atrocities in Gaza, and the military failure mirrors the similar setbacks experienced there as well.
