September 12, 2024
By Nasser Kandil
• Diplomatic and security circles have conveyed reports and intelligence to Lebanese officials regarding scenarios of major military operations targeting Lebanon. This is largely due to Hezbollah’s refusal to engage in negotiations concerning the Lebanese front before the war on Gaza ceases through an agreement acceptable to the resistance forces there. This possibly explains the surprising stance regarding Lebanon’s readiness to negotiate an alternative to Resolution 1701, aiming to avoid the risks of escalation. But are these reports grounded in reality, or are they part of psychological pressure to pave the way for political negotiations?
• The resistance doesn’t dismiss any hypothesis, including the worst-case scenarios, based on the principle of not underestimating the recklessness of decision-making within the occupying entity. However, this does not suggest an assumption of the entity’s success in achieving the scenarios it envisions. Furthermore, the resistance remains firm and unyielding in its stance that no negotiations on Lebanese front arrangements will occur without first halting the war on Gaza. The resistance does not engage in debates about the likelihood of certain scenarios but considers itself prepared for every possibility, even those that seem irrational.
• The debate about the realism of these scenarios occurs independently of the resistance’s stance. Can we realistically imagine a scenario in which anti-resistance Lebanese and Syrian factions move to sever the geographical connections of the resistance within Lebanon, between Lebanon and Syria, and inside Syria itself?
• In reality, the occupying entity’s leadership would need to have made this decision on the first day following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation. Washington would also need to be a combat partner in the field. Simply put, for the entity’s leaders to contemplate what they couldn’t accomplish in the 2006 war, they would need a surplus of power exceeding what the resistance has gained since then. However, today they are weaker than they were in 2006, facing a resistance that is multiple times stronger.
Moreover, they come with a demoralised, weakened army that has lost many of its key personnel in the ongoing war. Can involving Lebanese and Syrian factions in combat truly alter the balance?
• Those who believe in the feasibility of this scenario should note that criticism from some Lebanese supporters of the entity resonates in specific circles because it taps into fears of war. But is it plausible to base a call for Lebanese participation in such a war, on this ? How large are these factions, and what is their geographic influence? The areas in question are almost devoid of political forces likely to join such a war.
• As for Syrian factions, their ability to provide significant support in a military operation within Lebanon is highly questionable. This is due to the distribution of Syrian refugees and the absence of organized frameworks for arming refugees in preparation for such a war, which would have required years of preparation and the establishment of semi-autonomous zones, akin to the Palestinian camps before the Lebanese Civil War. Regarding southern Syria, envisioning it as a battlefield assumes a major shift among a certain sect that would mirror a past anti-resistance stance, such as that of the late leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt. Without such a shift, the possibility of a meaningful southern Syrian front is minimal.
• The leaking of these scenarios seems part of a psychological war aimed at pressuring negotiations. The resistance, however, asserts that while such a project might be real, they are committed to fighting and defeating it. Even if it’s merely psychological pressure for negotiations, their position remains unchanged: no negotiations before the war on Gaza ends.
