Political and Military Framework More Important than Technical Details

September 18, 2024

Nasser Kandil

Some media outlets capitalized on sensationalism to promote technical tales about the criminal Israeli aggression which struck 3000 Lebanese, Lebanese residents employed in Western embassies, along with hospital employees, the majority of whom belong to
Al Mukawama’s milieu and work in health facilities, unions, and educational establishments, and a small number employed in the body of Al Mukawama. Whether the operation was through the success of an intelligence operation enabling tampering of the devices before they reached their users, or through their control by cyber waves via satellites, the occupation’s technical superiority does not prevent the possibility of Hezbollah committing an immoral act, which Hezbollah does not dismiss because of resource limitations but due to commitment to a moral code which did not deter the entity from committing this heinous crime, which would have no parallel except if Hezbollah poisoned the waters of the Wazzani and Hasbani Rivers and disregarded who might die as long as Israeli soldiers were among them. Perhaps this is the fundamental difference between Al Mukawama forces and the occupying entity.
More important than the technical details is the political and military framework. Evident is entity’s Prime Minster Benyamin Netanyahu’s lack of hope that this operation will lead to one of the three things he wants from Hezbollah, the first is severing the tie between the fronts of south Lebanon and Gaza and ending insistence that the front will not quieten except by an agreement with Al Mukawama in Gaza. Hezbollah will not go back on this unwavering principled commitment because of this operation, clearly declared in his bulletin. The second is allowing the return of the displaced to their settlements in the north of occupied Palestine, a headline which Netanyahu turned into a war of a new form inaugurating it with this crime, which Netanyahu knows will not facilitate the return, but certainly increase the numbers of displaced. The third is pushing back Hezbollah’s fighters behind the Litani River, when he is certain that the reaction to this crime will be a harsh response rather than capitulation and the consideration of the principle of moving away from the front lines. All this only means that Netanyahu wants to inaugurate a round of escalation regardless of whether any goals are accomplished, with the goals becoming pretexts for this escalation.
Contrary to what many who dislike Al Mukawama promote, some of whom support Al Mukawama in Gaza but continue in their hatreds resulting from their positioning in the war on Syria and Hezbollah’s stance, about Hezbollah being controlled by a desire of evasion from escalation which has given Netanyahu superiority by allowing him to cross red lines, what actually occurred with the assassination of Commander Fuad Shukr, and with this latest crime, places the responses available to Hezbollah and its repository of targets within the framework of legitimate defense, which for that reason does not make him fear escalation. What many did not understand from the first day of Hezbollah’s involvement in the war and opening the supportive front in south Lebanon, is that the four considerations Hezbollah took into account in the war of winning by points, climbing the ladder of escalation, and reaching the point of open possibilities, were the preservation of the mobilized wide-spread Lebanese support for every step to be taken; not granting the entity the opportunity of appearing scapegoated to regain what it lost in especially Western public opinion; depiction of Hezbollah’s harsh responses to the public opinion inside the entity as the results of its government’s policies which have caused catastrophes and wrought misfortunes on their heads rather than threats calling for unity behind its government; and fourthly to have each escalatory step result in more pressure to sign an agreement with Al Mukawama in Gaza to end all the wars in one go. Given that these four criteria are strongly met with this latest heinous crime, Hezbollah will be at ease in harsh strikes on the entity.
Contrary to Hezbollah, Netanyahu thinks in an opposite direction. He knows that there is no hope for his strikes to change the course of certain defeat which he is fleeing from acknowledging as an outcome of the war, a defeat which was ascertained on the day of Al Aqsa Toufan (Al Aqsa Deluge), also ascertained with the first Gaza truce, and reinforced with the blockage of the Red Sea, and further reinforced by the displacement of the settlers in the north. What is in Netanyahu’s and his intelligence apparatus’ mind is that since they are losing the war anyway, there is no problem with the timing in acknowledging it, as long as the army executes orders, they have Knesset majority, and Washington proffers advice, but also finances, arms, and secures international protection.
Thus any time a qualitative operation ripens in their hands, an operation of the kind that allowed for the assassination of Commander Fuad Shukr, or confidence about the ability to explode pagers, they create a political atmosphere to execute such an operation, and then attempt to contain it under the ceiling of not going to total war, even by spreading a lie when required. It appears that political escalation is available on demand when an operation becomes ready and is put on the table, and not that the operation is placed on the table as a result of political escalation.
What skips their attention is that in undertaking such course, it may appear to them that they are accomplishing a media scoop, or a tactical victory. However each time they pay the price for their actions, they lose important elements in their power, with their internal unity weakening, their military’s combat ability regressing, and the war they are waging losing its capacity to convince anyone of its efficacy and its capability of resolving the intractable dilemmas represented by the state of the prisoners, the Red Sea, and the displaced, with a growth in the conviction that the only path to a solution is an agreement with Al Mukawama in Gaza. Instead of the return of the prisoners alive, their number decreases as they get killed, the Red Sea becomes more forlorn for crossing vessels, and the number of the displaced mounts, while
Al Mukawama is ready to proceed in this war for years.