September 23, 2024
Nasser Kandil
Netanyahu is cognizant that a super power like America with immense financial, human, and military resources began studying what it termed failure in Iraq since 2004 when the number of American of casualties in that war reached 4000 in one year. For that reason, his calculations that a strike of the magnitude of the explosions of communication devices causing a parallel harsh number of casualties to a power the size of Hezbollah’s human, financial, and armament resources compared to America, has to at least mean raising a white flag obliquely asking intermediaries for a political solution if it did not have Hezbollah fall to the ground.
Secondly, Netanyahu is also aware that the occupying entity harbors an intellectual revenge with Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Al Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, since 2000, based on the background of the occupation’s military defeat in Southern Lebanon, and the historic formula
Al Sayyed declared from the square in Bint Jbeil, which the occupation’s army failed in entering during the July 2006 War to erase the echo of Al Sayyed Nasrallah’s formula “Israel is more fragile than a spider’s web,” that has become a balance sheet on which all the entity’s defeats are entered as part of the psychological warfare impacting the occupation’s domestic structure, its military, and international reputation. Netanyahu believed that the successive strikes on Hezbollah will nullify this formula, bringing back to the entity its image of dazzling power, and relegating to Hezbollah, habitually monopolizing dazzlement in his wars, the image of weakness, and perhaps having him wear the gown which “Israel” has been wearing for decades since it has been considered more fragile than a spider’s web.
Thirdly, Netanyahu knows that he is required not to commit on Lebanon’s front the error he committed in Gaza, namely making the title, slogan, and goal the eradication of Hamas, given that the entity had lost the July 2006 War because of waging it under the slogan of the eradication of Hezbollah, according to the Winograd Report. For that reason Netanyahu believes that if he chose a lower realistic ceiling just like Al Mukawama Axis, at its heart Hamas, has done after Al Aqsa Toufan (Al Aqsa Deluge) and the launch of supportive fronts, by asking for ending the war and withdrawal from Gaza, and a deal on exchange of prisoners, he made the goal for his war on Hezbollah the return or the displaced settlers to their settlements in the north.
While such goal seemingly has a lower ceiling, and is realistic, in demand, and easily marketable domestically and internationally, its realization means grabbing the cardinal card from in Hezbollah’s hands to support Gaza, namely pressuring Netanyahu’s government to go to an agreement on Gaza, through capitalizing on the issue of displaced. Netanyahu’s goal is impossible to achieve without a ceasefire on Lebanon’s front irrespective of Gaza’s front, with its achievement proving the weakness and retreat of Hezbollah, which in turn will inflict harm to Hezbollah’s moral superiority and ideological image, the solid nucleus of Al Mukawama Axis.
Hezbollah’s quick recovery from the impact of the successive blows of the explosion of communication devices, and perseverance in the missions of the supportive front the following day, with increased firepower intensity and wider geographic coverage, followed by speedy and forceful response with qualitative and painful missile strikes on two military targets of strategic importance in Haifa, the Ramat David airbase, and the Rafael electronic and intelligence weapons factory, was shocking. Without any need for analysis, Hezbollah emerged as a party made of steel, with the opportunity of being attributed as “more fragile than a spider’s web” lost. Of what metal or rock is the body of this party which rises standing on both feet with such speed and power, in comparison to how a country of the substantiality of America had dealt with similar losses!
Netanyahu’s trilogy coincided with Hezbollah’s concern to express such potency through Secretary General Al Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and prove the steely nature of the party, with secondly, Al Sayyed Nasrallah’s reaffirmation of the futility of a search for a means to sever the tie with Gaza’s front, and drawing the formula linking the return of the displaced settlers of the north with an agreement with Al Mukawama in Gaza, a call which has gained international popularity and agreement over the months of war, to the point of declarations by American officials including President Joe Biden that an agreement on a ceasefire in Gaza will automatically result in ceasefire on Lebanon’s front and the return or the displaced to their homes. With such content, Nasrallah’s speech constituted a clear message to the entity’s interior, that we are as strong as steel and will not fall as your leaders and some of you imagine, and those of you who want the return of the displaced should go to the streets to pressure for speeding up an agreement with Al Mukawama in Gaza, because it is the only way for their return, and the only way for the return of the prisoners, in accordance with Al Mukawama’s formula.
In the third part of Al Sayyed Nasrallah’s quartet, he held onto the slogan of the return of the displaced of the north, which Netanyahu thought was realistic and had a low ceiling and was far removed from the language of fantasy about the concept of victory, and insisted on transforming it into a challenge difficult for Netanyahu to back away from to a slogan hard to prove, such as the weakening of Hezbollah. He drew the formula that success in returning the displaced without an agreement with Gaza implies victory for the entity and defeat for Al Mukawama, and failure in returning the displaced is a declaration of victory for Al Mukawama and the entity’s defeat.
The fourth part in Al Sayyed’s plan was a roadmap defining the function of military action in achieving victory, which is missing for Netanyahu. Al Sayyed Nasrallah says that the return of the displaced by fire will not be realized because the north is burning, and the circle of fire will expand, increasing with it the number of displaced, while Netanyahu has no answer to the question of how the airstrikes will bring about the return of the displaced. Based on the current conditions of this open confrontation, Al Sayyed wins by points with each passing day of this war. Can Netanyahu change this?
With the fear inside the entity increasing with the fire exchange, and the Israeli interior exposed to Al Mukawama’s missiles and drones, the support for war which Netanyahu had garnered is wearing out and eroding, and more and more will be coming out from under the cloak of support for war, while the rest will be telling Netanyahu to opt for a land invasion and push back Hezbollah from the front if he wants to proceed with the war. And with the proven vulnerability of the Israeli interior to Hezbollah’s missiles and drones, exposure of residential and civilian depth in Lebanon to random aggression similar to that of the July 2006 War and what is going on in Gaza has an equivalent price to the entity, dropping the choice of the war on cities from Netanyahu’s hands. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is ready to deal with both possibilities, escalation in firepower and land invasion, opening the door for the possibility of the current situation continuing until the war option drops and the option of an agreement on Gaza rises. At the same time, Hezbollah welcomes a land experiment, and hopes not to be obliged to display all the open fire options he has, to avoid resulting losses for Lebanon, even if it meant the total destruction of the entity. Will the land option be the only exit for Netanyahu preceding the fall?
Just like Netanyahu wishes for Hezbollah to slip into a war of cities before he does, Hezbollah seeks to avoid this option regardless of the numerous calls for it regardless of the good or malicious intentions behind such calls. And Just like seeking to activate domestic pressures on Netanyahu to go to an agreement with Gaza through the pressure of firepower on the entity’s interior and increasing the number of the displaced and candidates for displacement, Hezbollah hopes for a trial of a land confrontation, and for Netanyahu to imagine through a foolish scenario that his army could succeed.
The important question which is supposed to be asked by those in the entity with a minimum capacity for calm thinking, is how could an army exhausted from a one-year war in Gaza, be capable of accomplishing what it failed to accomplish when it was at the apex of its power in 2006 facing a tenth of Hezbollah’s capability today, and how can an army which failed for a whole year to defeat Hamas in Gaza, achieve victory over Hezbollah who possesses ten times what Hamas has, and moves in an area with a topography which raises the dangers of fighting on it, and is ten times the size of Gaza?
Al Sayyed Nasrallah says often: “Thank God who has made our enemies out of fools.”
