The American Intervention to Rescue the Occupation: Presidency and Haifa

October 12, 2024

Nasser Kandil

How mesmerising were the resistance’s rockets over Haifa, and how eloquent was the statement that announced its shelling, just once, in response to the attack on the southern suburbs. Afterward, the response reverted to its usual form – answering the savage targeting of civilians in Lebanese towns and cities. It became evident that the occupying entity was offering, subtly and through the battlefield, a reduction in strikes on the southern suburbs in exchange for a reduction in strikes on Haifa. They hoped for a mutual halt, but barely a week passed before Beirut was bombed again without clear justification. The pretexts did not align with the meticulous attention the occupation’s intelligence supposedly pays, especially when targeting resistance leaders, particularly in Beirut. When a facility belonging to the Islamic Health Committee was hit, the question arose: Who was the target, given that all the martyrs and wounded were medics? Just two days ago, a densely populated neighbourhood in the heart of Beirut, known for its strong support of the resistance, was targeted. The excuse of pursuing a Hezbollah leader fell apart both times, but the message was clear: stop shelling Haifa, or we will bomb Beirut. Then Blinken came with the definitive news: we can de-escalate if we secure guarantees not to bomb the capital in exchange for halting strikes on Haifa.

The resistance has yet to unleash any of its precision missiles, which number in the thousands, reserving them for the equation of Beirut for Tel Aviv. The resistance chose not to activate the southern suburbs for Tel Aviv equation to shield the capital. Instead, Haifa was placed under fire. Once the resistance realised the significant impact of targeting Haifa, it tied that to all operations responding to the targeting of civilians in the Bekaa, the south, and the southern suburbs. While the timing of activating the Beirut for Tel Aviv equation is up to the resistance’s leadership and their calculations, what is certain is that the occupation, despite its arrogant display of power, has started to run out of options. The decisive reason is the failure on the ground in the land war and the introduction of the Haifa equation into the scene. Reports within the entity reveal the rapid and intense consequences of failures on the frontlines and the increasing accuracy and density of rockets falling even close to Tel Aviv.

This sheds light on the American rush to push for a ceasefire in exchange for electing a president – specifically, a president approved by Washington and accepted by its allies in Lebanon. The premise of a consensus president demands the approval of these factions and a veto power over any candidate with the backing of at least a quarter of parliament members. This push wouldn’t have gained so much traction and persistence from Washington if the war, from their perspective and that of Tel Aviv, was proceeding smoothly. The American effort is an attempt to rescue the entity from a failure that now seems inevitable in the war’s trajectory. They are exploiting the perception among some Lebanese that the resistance is losing its way following the martyrdom of its leader, and that Hezbollah’s political clout is far weaker without its secretary general. This perception emboldens Hezbollah’s opponents and those swayed by Washington’s deceptive advice to push for a swift presidential election. The goal is to capitalise on the murky military situation, allowing them to maintain claims of Israeli superiority, and present the presidential election to Hezbollah as a convenient solution for it and its community to escape the burdens of continued war. They attempt to treat Hezbollah as a naive orphan who has lost his father and is now vulnerable to manipulation, before Hezbollah realises that it stands on the verge of a great victory, with the means to bring the occupying entity to its knees, pleading for a ceasefire once it activates all its strategies and harnesses the valour of its fighters in the south, making the 2006 July War victory look like a mere appetiser in the upcoming triumph.

The American suggestion of the “Haifa for Beirut” equation, now coupled with the explicit offer of “presidential election for ceasefire”, reveals the U.S. aim to halt the fighting to save Israel from the inevitable disgrace of defeat. Simultaneously, they seek to extract a political price, transitioning from trying to crush Hezbollah to containing and restraining it after their military efforts failed. What the Americans – and many Lebanese – fail to grasp is that, despite the significant loss of the leader of the resistance, Hezbollah continues to follow his playbook, fully understanding the balance of power, how to manage war, and the intricacies of negotiation and politics. A ceasefire, under these conditions, is a win-win equation, without the need for presidential elections or any convoluted deals that attempt to recoup what the entity failed to impose during the July War of 2006. The foolish and suspect notion of tying Resolution 1701 to Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament south of the Litani River is absurd. What was agreed upon only prevents Hezbollah from public armed presence south of the Litani, nothing more, while the occupying entity’s unfulfilled commitments are many and await enforcement.