Strategic Intelligence Between Opening and Separating the Fronts

October 16, 2024

Nasser Kandil

• Some attacked Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah for opening a support front, while others criticised him for not launching missiles at Tel Aviv from the first day. Even after his martyrdom, some would say, “If he hadn’t opened the support front, he wouldn’t have been martyred”, while others claim, “If he had fired missiles at Tel Aviv from day one, he wouldn’t have been martyred”. Similarly, Sheikh Naim Qassem will now face criticism for announcing Hezbollah’s readiness to accept a ceasefire on the Lebanese front without referencing the traditional support front formula, where a ceasefire begins with Gaza. He clearly shifted the narrative from a support front to a defensive front against Israeli aggression, with accusations to follow: “Hezbollah abandoned Gaza”. Others will argue, “What ceasefire are you talking about? Hezbollah is still heavily armed! Lebanon’s future and Hezbollah’s weapons must be addressed first, as this war has shown that these weapons put Lebanon at risk”.

• Just as Sayyed Nasrallah didn’t concern himself with voices downplaying the value of the Lebanese support front – relying solely on the occupier’s assessment of its threat – he knew it was a declaration of war that would unleash all the American and Israeli wrath on Hezbollah. This confirmed the correctness of his decision. He similarly disregarded accusations of dragging Lebanon into a war that had nothing to do with it, being content with his knowledge of what the occupying entity was plotting for Lebanon if it succeeded in Gaza. Likewise, Sheikh Qassem will not heed those accusing Hezbollah of abandoning Gaza, as the threat emerging from the Lebanese front alone is sufficient to make the occupying entity accept a ceasefire, acknowledging a new regional equation. This equation demands coexistence with a threat that was once theoretical but has become real, impervious to the most massive American-Israeli military-security operations. In this new regional landscape, Gaza becomes a mere detail, while the Lebanese front dictates security to the entity – or withholds it – at will. The occupier’s best option would be to agree to a Gaza ceasefire under a U.S.-brokered deal that guarantees a simultaneous cessation on the Lebanese front. The alternative? Continuing the war, which would grant Hezbollah the legitimacy to wage its long-prepared defensive battle, repeating a simple message: “We only seek a ceasefire to negotiate the implementation of Resolution 1701”, meaning a return to the pre-October 7 status quo. Yet now, a massive military force looms on the border with the occupying entity, one that the latter has failed to uproot or tame. Hezbollah will tell the entity, “Return the displaced settlers from the north after the ceasefire, we don’t mind, but we will be here as a formidable threat”. He will not entertain those seeking to question the future of Hezbollah’s weapons, as what the entity and its American backers couldn’t dismantle is now an unshakable Middle Eastern reality, beyond debate. Hezbollah’s arms have become the ultimate embodiment of Lebanese nationalism and the strongest Arab shield against proven Israeli ambitions and aggression. After the ceasefire, most Lebanese will firmly believe that, without these weapons, Lebanon would have become a firing range for the occupying army, with Israeli patrols roaming the south, as outlined in the occupier’s security plans, or its border being redrawn at the Litani River, as stated by Israel’s defence minister, Yoav Gallant. Or worse, discussions on settlement in Lebanon would begin, as proposed by the occupier’s minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir.

• For Hezbollah, ideological and principled considerations come first, whether in opening the support front or accepting a ceasefire as part of today’s defensive war. The party’s unwavering commitment to the Palestinian cause remains central to its regional strategy. Yet, from a military strategic perspective, Hezbollah’s moves represent one of the most sophisticated strategic manoeuvres in modern warfare. By opening the Lebanese border as a support front for Gaza, Hezbollah maximised its freedom of manoeuvre within Lebanon’s constraints, provoking the occupying entity’s deterrence capabilities and undermining its military prestige. Hezbollah managed to displace the majority of settlers in northern Israel, creating a 10-kilometre deep buffer, revealing a formidable military force along the border, a presence that the entity could not tolerate without losing its image of strength. This escalation drew the entity, supported by the full might of American firepower and intelligence, into a war of annihilation against Hezbollah, resulting in the martyrdom of its supreme leader and many of its military commanders, and inflicting significant losses on its community and infrastructure. Yet, Hezbollah rose from these ruins, demonstrating overwhelming power that thwarted cross-border attacks and left the entity exposed, without security or shelter. In this moment of shared rage between Hezbollah and the entity, Hezbollah declared that it was content with a ceasefire on the Lebanese front, allowing the displaced settlers to return and leaving the rest to be negotiated later. The party leveraged its firepower and newfound prestige from rising out of destruction to position itself as merely defending Lebanon. It offered the entity the option of coexisting with an undeniable strategic threat after a ceasefire or continuing a war that has lost its purpose. Hezbollah accepted a ceasefire on the Lebanese front without halting operations in Gaza, and permitted the return of displaced settlers. The occupier had sought to separate the Lebanese front from Gaza and ensure the return of settlers. If the entity continues the war under the pretext of reorganising southern Lebanon, demanding a buffer zone, the right to pursue, disarmament, or dismantling Hezbollah – ridiculous claims touted by the occupier’s generals – Hezbollah laughs in secret and tells them, “You’ve come to your demise”. It will then turn to the Lebanese who urged for a ceasefire, saying, “I agreed, but the entity doesn’t. Is there any way to protect Lebanon other than through battle?”.

• Hezbollah’s strategic intelligence is the occupying entity’s demise. Just as it fell into the trap of the support front war, today it falls into the trap of Lebanon’s defensive war. As for those who question, they remain the same: if Hezbollah fights, they say it endangers Lebanon; if it doesn’t, they ask why the weapons exist. If it opens a support front for Gaza, they call it reckless adventurism; if it doesn’t spark a major war, they ask why Hezbollah is sitting idle while Gaza bleeds. To those inquirers, we say: don’t rush. Wait. The one who laughs last, laughs longest. Don’t be upset if you struggle to keep up with the strategic intelligence of the resistance.

• Two equations now emerge: Iran takes Hezbollah’s place in presenting a threat and luring the entity into a greater trap, offering a response the entity cannot digest – just as Hezbollah’s support front did. And the second equation: Hezbollah imposed the interconnectedness of fronts when it was most painful for the entity, and now separates them when this becomes even more painful, handing the baton to Iran to continue the race.