October 22, 2024
By Nasser Kandil
• The U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in Lebanon too late. The Israeli conditions handed to him could have been brought to Beirut by the end of September, when the occupation had dealt what it believed were decisive blows to Hezbollah, culminating in the assassination of its Secretary-General. At that time, the occupation had unleashed devastating airstrikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut, the south, and the Bekaa, killing over 600 people and injuring 2,000 in a single day. Even though Lebanon would have rejected the conditions and insisted on Resolution 1701 and a ceasefire, the Israeli demands might have seemed in line with the balance of power imposed by the occupation. But since Hochstein didn’t come then, it means he’s too late, and perhaps it would have been better for him not to come at all.
• At the same time, Hochstein arrived too early, as the situation had changed significantly – though not enough. Since the beginning of September, the resistance has dealt the occupation a series of blows, starting with the severe Iranian strike, followed by the rise of the resistance in ground warfare and the increasing precision and reach of its missile and drone strikes. These strikes have inflicted painful losses on the occupying entity, erasing its brief moment of triumph. The resistance has regained its vitality, cohesion, and presence, weakening the image of Israeli superiority that had lasted for two weeks. As a result, Israel’s conditions, relayed to Hochstein, now seem laughable. However, while the resistance has restored balance, it hasn’t yet pushed the enemy to the point of despair or forced them to back down from their aggressive escalation. Therefore, it might have been wiser for Hochstein to wait until the situation fully crystallised, allowing him to gauge Israel’s readiness to de-escalate before seeking an exit strategy. As such, it would have been better for him not to come at all.
• Hochstein, knowing the balance of power and the personalities of the negotiators – Benjamin Netanyahu and Nabih Berri – chose a different message than what the Israelis asked for or what the Lebanese wanted. His goal, like that of every U.S. envoy, is to serve Israeli interests, not to shield Lebanon from the dangers of war. He framed his proposal around the idea that the deterioration of the situation at the border, despite Resolution 1701, means the resolution was insufficient for ensuring stability and requires “add-ons”. Call them amendments, implementation mechanisms, annexes, or guarantee letters – regardless of semantics, Hochstein believes this approach could break the deadlock and start negotiations on filling the gaps in 1701, in order to achieve a ceasefire. This would open the door for Israel to present its conditions under the guise of guarantees, mechanisms, and annexes, with U.S. diplomacy attempting to offer mutual guarantees to both sides.
• It’s clear that Hochstein left frustrated, taken aback by the strength of the Lebanese response and his inability to proceed with his diplomatic manoeuvring. He was presented with undeniable evidence that the problem doesn’t lie in the deficiencies of Resolution 1701, but rather in Israel’s complete disregard for it. All demands for implementation have been directed at Lebanon, which has fulfilled its reasonable obligations, but with its land still occupied – especially the Shebaa Farms, despite 1701 explicitly calling for resolving this issue – Lebanon cannot be expected to exert further pressure on the resistance. On top of this, Israel’s massive violations of Lebanon’s airspace and territorial waters continue, and the failure to fully implement 1701 has left the situation at a ceasefire without reaching the final, permanent ceasefire phase outlined in the resolution. Hochstein was also questioned about the credibility of his claims that Lebanon and Israel were equally committed to 1701. Lebanon demanded he obtain an official commitment from Israel to 1701, as Lebanon’s information contradicted Hochstein’s claims. Israeli leaders have openly declared their unwillingness to accept 1701, with some even suggesting that the area south of the Litani River is now part of Israel.
• Hochstein returned empty-handed, and while Lebanon won this diplomatic round, it has not yet achieved a complete victory. Similarly, the resistance prevailed on the battlefield but hasn’t yet secured full triumph. As with Condoleezza Rice in 2006, who failed after multiple rounds of diplomacy, Hochstein is likely to face similar rounds that will eventually lead to the same outcome. The resistance will push the occupying entity into despair, convincing it of the futility of continuing the war and the unsustainable costs of doing so. This is the resistance’s agenda moving forward.
