Did the Support Front Cause Lebanon to Lose Its Right to Defense?
Dotting i’s and Crossing t’s
October 23, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• In a statement regarding the war, coupled with his original criticism of the ‘Support Front’ for Gaza, Gebran Bassil, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, emphasised his opposition to discussing the future of the resistance’s weapons during wartime. He prioritised a ceasefire and the implementation of Resolution 1701. Bassil claimed that opening the Support Front for Gaza might have caused Lebanon to lose the legitimacy of its right to defence. By this, he wasn’t referring to the legitimacy of the Lebanese army- which has been denied any significant weaponry by the U.S. and Western powers – but rather the legitimacy of the resistance to implement its deterrence strategy, such as targeting Tel Aviv if the southern suburbs of Beirut are hit.
• This assertion underscores the illegitimacy of discussing the resistance’s disarmament before the Lebanese army is equipped to meet defence needs against an aggressive and criminal entity. The wars we are currently facing reveal truths that only a fool, ignoramus, or suspect would deny, and it seems Bassil’s words are aimed at them. The first truth is that the occupying entity harbours expansionist plans against the region’s people and geography that do not require excuses, and these plans are not deterred by appeals to peace or passive diplomacy. Maps of expansion are etched on soldiers’ arms, and the intentions are clear in the speeches of the occupation’s Defense Minister and Prime Minister. The second truth is that the international community’s claim to prevent aggression and protect the weak is a blatant lie, as stated by the EU’s foreign policy chief, who admitted that they are all begging Netanyahu to stop the war while he proceeds undeterred. The third truth is that the normalisation efforts and concessions made by Arab states have only emboldened the occupation’s brutality and contempt for the Arabs.
• These wars, while open to criticism of the resistance’s performance in some details, should have clarified one undeniable truth to any rational mind, patriot, or responsible leader: The only way to deter this vicious, criminal entity – backed unconditionally by Western powers dominating the global system – is through possessing a military force that the entity respects. And if it does not respect it, then it must be made to pay dearly for its aggressions, just as the resistance is forced to do. In this era of limitless U.S. support for the occupying entity and the imposed prohibition on Lebanon and its army acquiring any real military deterrent, Lebanon has no choice but to rely on the resistance. Criticism of the resistance is fair, but it must be accompanied by the recognition that this war has proven the resistance is not just a tool for liberation and defence – it is an existential necessity for Lebanon’s survival. Anyone claiming otherwise should have the courage to present their alternatives to the Lebanese people, without resorting to empty rhetoric about international resolutions or fantasies of the army’s supposed respect from the occupation, especially when the blood of Lebanese soldiers in the south is still fresh.
• Now, addressing the idea of the right to defence and whether it was compromised by the Support Front: The reality is that the Support Front was one of the most effective defensive actions for Lebanon, although it’s true that the deterrence equations were impacted – that is separate from the legitimacy of defence. The defensive value of the Support Front can be understood on three levels. First, the occupation’s intentions toward Lebanon have now become crystal clear, and it is naive to think that its rejection of Resolution 1701 and its desire for security privileges resembling the May 17th Agreement with Lebanon are simply reactions to the Support Front. These are the strategic conclusions of the occupation’s preventive security doctrine after the Al-Aqsa Flood. For them, the mere existence of the resistance poses an existential threat, and the absence of such forces invites expansion and settlement. Therefore, the occupation’s desire to freeze the Support Front was always tactical and temporary, aimed at winning its war in Gaza before turning its attention to Lebanon and revealing its true objectives. The second defensive level of the Support Front is that, just as it mobilised in support of Gaza, it opens the door for Lebanon to benefit when the war shifts focus to it. The occupation will be forced to fight on multiple fronts, exhausting its capabilities and creating the conditions for a broader regional conflict. The third and most crucial level is the military front. The Support Front kept the occupation on alert, drained its forward capabilities, prepared the battle lines, and allowed the resistance to train its combat structure in the field, adapting to the war environment. It also robbed the occupation of the element of surprise, preventing it from delivering sudden fatal blows to the resistance amidst an ongoing war.
• Of course, there were costs to the Support Front, including adjustments to the deterrence equation, and that is true. However, this is entirely different from a complete loss of the legitimacy of defence. What happened is that the resistance, recognizing that certain segments of the Lebanese population did not share its stance on the Support Front, refrained from targeting Tel Aviv in retaliation for attacks on the southern suburbs to avoid the risk of retaliation against Beirut. Instead, it restricted its deterrence equation to Tel Aviv for Beirut, if the occupation escalates to fully targeting the capital. In the meantime, the resistance and its supportive base bore the brunt of the Support Front’s consequences during a difficult transitional phase that followed the assassination of its highest and most revered leader. Eventually, the resistance regained its balance and resumed the initiative in both firepower and ground operations. This transitional phase was endured by the party’s structure and its supportive community to prevent the burden from being placed on all Lebanese people -not out of weakness or lack of legitimacy. This is something that should be acknowledged as a credit to the resistance, not a mark against it.