October 28, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• The fundamental dynamics of ongoing regional conflicts – and diplomacy’s role within them – remain unchanged, despite the latest Israeli attack on Iran. The trajectory has been evident since the assault on Iran’s consulate in Damascus, through the assassination of the martyr Commander Ismail Haniya in Tehran, culminating in yesterday’s assault. This trajectory confirms that the war with resistance forces is tightly interwoven with the U.S.-Iranian confrontation, where Israel’s standing and deterrence in the region are at stake. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s declared project to “reshape the Middle East” cannot be realised without resizing Iran’s influence in the region.
• If we accept reports of U.S. pressure on Israel to avoid striking nuclear and oil facilities, then it follows that Washington can influence Tel Aviv when it wishes. This suggests that Washington’s failure to prevent large-scale violence in Lebanon is a deliberate choice. Therefore, we must ask whether U.S. restraint stems from an active negotiation track with Iran – which seems unlikely – or from a calculation to avoid a full-scale regional war. This calculation implies that avoiding conflict with Iran means refraining from attacking Iran’s critical infrastructure – an ambition Netanyahu has pursued for decades but now holds back from due to potential repercussions. These repercussions include an Iranian response directly impacting Israel, escalation of Iran’s nuclear activities, and broader consequences for the global economy, especially energy markets. In military terms, this is deterrence: Iran’s direct and indirect leverage has constrained both Washington and Tel Aviv from unfettered provocations.
• While Israel’s recent assault avoided Iran’s critical facilities due to U.S.-Israeli caution over possible fallout, it was not merely symbolic. The operation targeted Iran’s air defence and missile systems to undermine Iran’s military deterrence and pave the way for future escalation. However, Iran’s preparedness, along with Russian cooperation, thwarted the assault, showcasing the limits of Israeli force. This confrontation saw the F-35 face off with the S-400 defence system for the first time, and hundreds of Israeli and American drones tested Iran’s defence systems, including Khordad 15 and Sayyad missiles. In contrast to U.S.-Israeli hopes, Iran emerged victorious, solidifying its deterrent power by forcing Washington and Tel Aviv to avoid its critical facilities and by foiling attempts to cripple its military capabilities.
• An Iranian response seems certain, but the regional balance of deterrence is firmly established. Washington, bound by General Martin Dempsey’s 2013 assessment requiring half a million troops and a trillion dollars to impose a no-fly zone over northern Syria, cannot readily escalate without provoking an all-out war with Iran. The continued security of U.S. bases in the Gulf relies on avoiding direct confrontation with Iran, meaning we are seeing the extent of Israel’s capacity against Iran, having already witnessed its maximum efforts in Gaza and Lebanon. Now, Israel struggles to maintain control, unable to drive the war in new directions in Lebanon and Gaza.
• The recent flurry of U.S. diplomatic activity – evident in Special Envoy Amos Hochstein’s visits between Tel Aviv and Beirut and CIA Director William Burns’ arrival in Doha – signals Washington’s shift from a diplomacy of securing gains to one of minimising losses, akin to stock market investors hedging against downturns.
