October 30, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Amid the political clamour and discussions of initiatives being prepared for negotiations, the primary event remains on the battlefield. The occupying force has yet to receive enough blows to concede its failure in the ground campaign and accept the cost of a ceasefire. However, it has been struck hard enough to abandon its previous demands for security privileges that infringe on Lebanese sovereignty, such as unfettered airspace and maritime access, deep patrols into Lebanese territory, and dismissing the withdrawal from occupied Lebanese lands. Now, it proposes trading its faltering ground offensive for mechanisms of a land, sea, and air blockade under the guise of preventing Hezbollah from rearming.
• The occupying entity’s refusal to engage in genuine political dialogue reveals its unreadiness for negotiations. Its demands remain implausible in both form and substance, rooted in illusions of strength that ignore its evident weaknesses – misjudging its Lebanese counterparts, who are well aware of these frailties. Simultaneously, it launched yet another ground campaign, spurred by false confidence in its ability to succeed, exemplified by its large-scale, multi-directional offensive in Khiyam. Politically and militarily, the entity seems oblivious to the fact that it is facing Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in negotiations – the same adversary from the 2006 July War, who expertly read the battlefield’s influence on the negotiating table. This current scene, both in battle and in diplomacy, is not coincidental but rather echoes the 2006 war and the negotiations that followed in its wake.
• Looking back on the 30th day of the July 2006 War, a vivid reminder stands out which is worthy of recall. According to war records, that day became known as ‘Merkava Day’, when the Islamic resistance killed 18 Israeli officers and soldiers and destroyed fifteen Merkava tanks in fierce confrontations across southern villages, especially in the Khiyam-Marjayoun area. Some of the fiercest battles occurred on the eastern outskirts of Maroun al-Ras, where the resistance claimed ten more soldiers, including four within a Merkava tank targeted by resistance fighters. Politically, the UN Security Council had yet to agree on the final U.S.-French draft resolution, which Lebanon rejected due to conditions on simultaneous withdrawal and international monitoring that sidestepped key issues like Shebaa Farms and prisoner exchanges.
• We now find ourselves in a phase akin to the thirtieth day of the 2006 war, which ultimately ended on the thirty-third day when the occupying entity could no longer bear the cost of sustained failure. This time, reaching a conclusion may take longer than those final three days of 2006, yet we are on course toward a similar outcome. The enemy has indeed exhausted its strategic options, and its leaders’ illusions have been shattered under the resistance’s blows. However, acknowledging defeat now would mean an irreversible concession, unlike in 2006, when failure was followed by vows of rectification and renewed preparations. The Americans have since invested heavily, deploying their full support to secure victory for the enemy. Consequently, a defeat now would signify a historic, strategic shift, not only in the region but globally, given the stakes for both the occupying force and the U.S.
• The occupying army’s ascent has ended, and its decline continues, paralleling events at Aita al-Shaab – once a stronghold of the elite 36th Division, which includes the Golani Brigade and the 7th Armored Brigade. Now, the same fate befalls Division 98, a counterpart in elite status, containing commando units, paratrooper brigades, and Merkava tank units, while the remaining forces are reserves. The breakdown of Division 98, as was the case with Division 36, signals a turning point in the war at which the occupying force will begin accepting the new realities. The Khiyam Plains have once again spoken, as they did in 2006, asserting a single, unyielding truth: these plains are anything but ‘plain’.
