October 31, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• News reports and statements expressing optimism about a ceasefire agreement between the Lebanese resistance and the occupying army have surged. Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s comments hinting at a potential announcement within hours only fueled this optimism. For those enduring the trials of war, displacement, and who have suffered the bullets that took their loved ones, such news would be welcome – if it truly reflects the reality of the situation and is based on genuine hope. But is it?
• The main source of this optimism is the occupying entity’s media, suggesting that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is open to ending the conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza, claiming that military objectives have been met. However, a closer look at the reports reveals conditions that, though not explicitly stated, imply an overhaul of Resolution 1701 – terms that contradict its very essence. Even if framed as part of Resolution 1701, these demands clash with its original intent and would be unfeasible for any Lebanese political leadership to accept.
• Netanyahu seeks to reinterpret Resolution 1701 as a mandate to dismantle Hezbollah’s presence in the south in exchange for a ceasefire. This would grant the occupying army the authority to resume hostilities with Lebanon’s consent and an international mandate should compliance fall short – giving them unilateral power to judge compliance. This demand is not just unacceptable on a national level; it also conflicts with a straightforward reading of Resolution 1701.
• Resolution 1701 outlines two phases. The first mandates a cessation of hostilities. Only after both Lebanese and Israeli sides fulfil their obligations during this phase could a final ceasefire, or stable truce, be established. For Lebanon, hostility includes rocket fire; for the occupying entity, it necessitates a withdrawal from lands it seized during the 2006 July War, primarily the Lebanese part of Ghajar village, as well as ending its daily violations of Lebanese airspace and waters, and accepting a resolution to the Shebaa Farms dispute, as proposed by former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Without these steps from the occupiers, Lebanon would have no grounds to press the resistance on disarming south of the Litani River. Can anyone expect the Lebanese government to request that Hezbollah vacate the south while the occupation persists and air and maritime violations continue?
• The occupier’s proposition for Lebanon is to normalise its ongoing aggressions, which have continued unabated for the 18 years Lebanon has adhered to Resolution 1701. Instead of halting these actions, they would become legitimised, transforming the region south of the Litani into a new ‘security belt’, allowing the occupier free access. This would also revive the prospect of loyalist militias and shadow governments in the area, as seen in the former occupied border strip. Could any Lebanese citizen accept this?
• A ceasefire without preconditions and solely on the basis of Resolution 1701 as a framework for further negotiations would be acceptable to Lebanon. Yet, would the occupying entity agree, given it hasn’t yet acknowledged its failures despite heavy losses in ground operations? The logical outcome is a withdrawal from Lebanese territories, the cessation of air and maritime violations, and, finally, a discussion on designating the area south of the Litani as weapon-free, supervised exclusively by the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL under Resolution 1701’s oversight – not by the occupier, which seeks authority to intervene if disarmament doesn’t proceed as it sees fit.
• The notion of a ceasefire merely as a pause before resuming hostilities, as some speculate, is implausible, even if pitched as a U.S.-driven electoral gambit. Would displaced residents return only to face renewed conflict within months? Would the occupier withdraw troops from costly positions just to reoccupy them, with mounting losses? Could it even sustain further escalation? And would the resistance agree to leave occupying forces stationed inside Lebanese borders under the guise of a ceasefire?
• Optimism here seems premature. Our experience with Gaza has taught us that premature optimism often serves as a prelude to failed negotiations, with the blame conveniently shifted to the resistance.
