November 01, 2024
Nasser Kandil
Between goodwill and hostility toward the resistance, the question arises regarding the continued commitment of the resistance to align with the Gaza front. Some interpret Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem’s clear statements about Gaza as evidence that this connection remains intact, while others point to his comments on the ceasefire, Resolution 1701, and support for Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri’s efforts, suggesting the resistance has shifted from backing Gaza to a defensive stance focused on Lebanon. So, what is the truth?
Certainly, the scale of the war launched by the occupation against Lebanon and the resistance, from September 17 to September 27, including the assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General and central figure of the resistance, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, introduced complex challenges that necessitated structural shifts in the nature of the conflict. Initially, the occupation sought to subjugate Gaza and its resistance, aiming to impose a post-war management vision for Gaza that would weaken the resistance there. Supportive fronts were used as strategic assets to reinforce Gaza’s resilience, challenging the occupation’s negotiating offers. However, a new phase soon emerged, mirroring the confrontation with Iran, characterised by an intent to dismantle the deterrence equilibrium established with the resistance axis and to impose regional dominance. The occupation identified Hezbollah, as the heart of the resistance axis, and Sayyed Nasrallah as its vital force, believing that a decisive blow to both would cripple the entire resistance front and usher in a new strategic environment in the region, including with Iran.
This shift was solidified through full U.S.-Israeli cooperation, evident following Netanyahu’s visit to Washington at the end of July. Immediately thereafter, key resistance figures, including Commander Fouad Shukur and Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh, were assassinated, with a series of intensified strikes targeting Hezbollah, culminating in Nasrallah’s assassination.
The occupation made no secret of its intention to shift the primary front to Lebanon, openly announcing troop movements and intensified air raids with the goal of decisively defeating Hezbollah. The outcome of the war in Lebanon would thus determine the region’s future, including Gaza’s. Should the occupation secure victory, confrontation rules would be redefined across all fronts; if the occupation fails, the rules of engagement would shift accordingly. Therefore, ensuring the resistance’s endurance, strengthening its forces, and regaining control of the situation would be critical not only for Lebanon’s defence but for safeguarding the entire resistance axis, with Gaza at its forefront.
Remarkably, the resistance rebounded swiftly from these strikes, achieving a new balance and regaining the initiative. However, it prioritised organising its internal Lebanese front in light of the occupation’s shift from tacitly coexisting with the established confrontation rules to declaring an all-out war on Lebanon. The occupation sought to impose an Israeli security and U.S. political mandate over Lebanon, even as the resistance’s support base evacuated from the south, the Beqaa, and the southern suburbs to other parts of the country.
Initially, the occupation’s goal was to neutralise the Lebanese support front to focus on Gaza and impose its terms before turning to Lebanon. However, having escalated into a direct war to subdue Lebanon, leaving Gaza as the final piece of its regional conquest, the occupation’s acceptance of a ceasefire and Resolution 1701 now signifies its failure. This, in effect, would defeat its strategic regional deterrence project, as it represents an acceptance to coexist with Lebanon’s resistance power under the terms established before the Al-Aqsa flood – eliminating any near-term opportunity to weaken, reduce, or remove the resistance’s influence through military engagement. The unprecedented level of firepower and intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and Israel invested in these efforts makes retreat an unthinkable outcome, as missing this opportunity means no forthcoming chances, at least in the short to medium term.
The resistance seized this opportunity and announced, in a carefully ambiguous manner, a dual commitment: alignment with Gaza, while opening the door to political and diplomatic efforts focused on the ceasefire and Resolution 1701. The first reflects its position within the resistance axis; the second stems from its Lebanese roots, leaving its actions on the ground to clarify its stance. The occupation’s acceptance of Resolution 1701 indicates a retreat from its strategic deterrence project against the resistance axis, as it implies coexisting with the central force in this axis rather than dismantling it.
The resistance does not engage in much debate over its acceptance of a ceasefire and Resolution 1701, understanding that the occupation’s refusal to accept this after having launched the war and set its objectives, means that only a strategic defeat could make the occupation reconsider. Should the occupation be forced to accept, it may then prioritise Gaza, feigning that the issue of detainees necessitated an agreement there. This agreement with Gaza would entail a ceasefire across all fronts without politically conceding to any side, thus suspending hostilities with Lebanon while maintaining the ceasefire without formal agreement, gradually paving the way back to Resolution 1701 as a way to avoid the overt acknowledgment of defeat.
The resistance understands that this war is one of action, not words. Therefore, it selects optimal terms to secure its freedom and protect its position on the battlefield to achieve victory. This is where Resolution 1701 serves as a strategic tool. When the occupation faces defeat, that defeat will be all-encompassing or nonexistent. Isn’t it striking that as the balance begins to shift on the battlefield, negotiations over Gaza have revived? Meanwhile, contrary to Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s predictions, no serious negotiations are taking place on the Lebanese front. As for his remarks on the resistance’s delay in detaching from the Gaza front, the answer is that no such detachment has occurred; only the approach has shifted. If his intent was the resistance’s acceptance of Resolution 1701, then yes, it delayed acceptance until the point where the occupation’s agreement to it became a defeat and a victory for the resistance, paving the way for renewed alignment with Gaza, where previous acceptance would have marked a setback for both the resistance and Gaza.
